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ABSTRACT
The smart grid vision has led to the development of advanced control and management frame-
works using distributed generation (DG) and storage resources, commonly referred to together
as distributed energy resources (DERs). Albeit environment-friendly, these DERs in distribution
networks including microgrids (MGs) could greatly challenge the operational goal of maintain-
ing adequate power system reliability standards because of their high intermittency, uncertainty,
and lack of physical inertia. Meanwhile, these networks are inherently unbalanced and lack high-
quality communications to a centralized entity as compared to the bulk transmission grid. Both
aspects contribute to the challenge of designing voltage and frequency control frameworks therein.
To tackle these problems, we propose decentralized control strategies, which account for cyber-
physical network interactions automatically and dynamically while being either cognizant of vari-
ous communication scenarios or resilient to malicious cyber intrusions.
By treating the transmission grid as an infinity bus, voltage stability is the main concern in dis-
tribution networks where more DERs are being installed in the near future. Thanks to advances in
power electronics, DERs can also be excellent sources of reactive power (VAR), a quantity that is
known to have a significant impact on the network voltage level. Accordingly, we first formulate
the local VAR-based voltage control design by minimizing a weighted quadratic voltage mismatch
error objective using gradient-projection (GP) updates. The step-size design under both static and
dynamic settings is further analyzed for practical implementation purposes. Nonetheless, such lo-
cal design suffers degraded performance due to lack of information exchanges, especially under
limited VAR resources. To address this issue, we develop the distributed voltage control (DVC)
design based on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) algorithm. The DVC
design has simple node-to-node communication architecture while seamlessly adapting to dynam-
ically varying system operating conditions and being robust against random communication link
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failures. To further reduce communication complexity and enhance robustness to imperfect com-
munications, especially under the worst-case scenarios of a total communication outage, we inte-
grate both local and distributed control designs to a hybrid voltage control (HVC) scheme that can
achieve the dual objectives in terms of flexible adaptivity to variable rate of communications and
global optimality of voltage regulation performance. Such an innovative design aims to unify the
separated framework of either local or distributed control design. Numerical tests using realistic
feeders and real time-series data have been demonstrated for the voltage control designs.
The aforementioned decentralized voltage control designs can improve the power system sta-
bility while distribution feeders are interconnecting to the bulk transmission grids. With a high
penetration of DERs in the networks, it is possible to build a discrete energy system, namely, a
microgrid (MG), that is capable of operating in parallel with, or independently from, the transmis-
sion grids. Henceforth, MGs are likely to emerge as a means to advance power and cyber phys-
ical resiliency in future grid systems. As MGs may operate independently, these mostly power
electronics-interfaced DERs exhibiting low-inertia characteristic have raised significant concern
over the frequency stability issues. To tackle this problem, we introduce the concept of virtual
inertia of DERs and cast the secondary frequency control design for isolated MGs as a consen-
sus optimization problem. We solve it distributively by adopting the partial primal-dual (PPD)
algorithm. Interestingly, parts of our specially designed control algorithm turn out to mimic the
dynamics of network power flow and virtual synchronous generator-based inverter. Thus, such
dynamics is seamlessly governed by the physical system itself. Given a proper control parameter
choice, the convergence of the consensus is guaranteed without assuming the time-scale sepa-
ration of the hierarchical control design methodologies. By extending this work to a practical
industrial MG network that follows the IEC 61850 communication protocol, similar frequency
regulation objective is introduced and solved by a decentralized ADMM-based algorithm. The
countermeasures for malicious attacks on the communication network for both PPD- and ADMM-
based control designs are also investigated. Specifically, we analyze two types of malicious attacks
on the communication network, namely, the link and node attacks. Meanwhile, anomaly detection
and localization strategies are developed based on the metrics of optimization-related variables.
We showcase the microgrid frequency regulation operation to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed frequency control designs under a real-time simulation environment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we highlight the need to design the decentralized optimization-based controls pro-
posed in the thesis for power distribution networks and microgrids. Additionally, we summarize
the contributions of this work and outline the thesis.
1.1 Motivation and Context
Large system-wide power outages such as the 2003 Northeast blackout can be great catastrophes.
Within two days of the 2003 outage, over 50 million people lost power and this event contributed
to at least 11 deaths and cost an estimated $6 billion. Experts assumed that there had been a severe
shortage of reactive power in northern Ohio leading to voltage sag and transmission line failures
that set the blackout in motion. According to U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, inad-
equate reactive power support was one of the primary factors causing the voltage collapse leading
to a system-wide blackout [1]. As the power system became one of the most important engineer-
ing achievements of the 20th century [2], maintaining its stability, reliability, and sustainability
is necessary for modern society. To this end, the principle objectives of the thesis are to design
decentralized control frameworks that i) utilize reactive power from power electronics-interfaced
distributed energy resources (DERs) to enhance the voltage stability in distribution networks and
ii) perform frequency regulation for an isolated microgrid to improve power system reliability, e.g.,
minimizing the impacts of blackout in the transmission grid.
The smart grid vision has led to an unprecedented level of information flow across the network
by capitalizing on state-of-the-art technologies in sensing, control, and communication. Nonethe-
less, by and large, the communication infrastructure that supports power distribution networks is
and will continue to be a challenging factor while designing the aforementioned control objec-
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tives. Henceforth, transforming conventional centralized control designs to decentralized ones is
becoming increasingly important to the operation of modern distribution networks. To this end, we
propose decentralized optimization approach-based control designs to reduce the communication
complexity and overhead while guaranteeing satisfactory control performance. Considering prac-
tical implementation constraints of this cyber-physical network, we further focus on improvements
over our decentralized designs to be either cognizant of the instantaneous availability of commu-
nication link or robust to malicious cyber attacks. To sum up, the goal of this thesis is to develop
cybersecure decentralized control strategies which are scalable and flexible with respect to the size
of the network while enjoying minimal overhead and robustness in sensing, communication, and
computation.
1.2 Organization of the Thesis
We give an overview of the ensuing chapters and corresponding contributions.
Chapter 2: A brief overview of the modeling of an unbalanced multi-phase distribution networks
and an power electronics-interfaced inverter design is provided. In addition, the linearized coun-
terpart of both single- and multi-phase networks is also introduced for facilitating the development
of decentralized control designs and their applications.
Chapter 3: We develop a local dynamic optimization framework for analyzing the performance
of a voltage control scheme based on gradient projection methods. Thanks to the physical net-
work couplings, the local voltage measurement serves as the instantaneous system-wide gradient
direction by forming a weighted voltage mismatch objective. Compared to earlier results for a
static optimization scenario, we significantly extend the analysis on convergence conditions and
error performance to account for two dynamic scenarios: i) the nodes perform the local update in
an asynchronous fashion; and ii) the network operating point is dynamically changing. Last, we
provide the rules of selecting a proper step-size, which shows a trade-off between the convergence
speed and the steady-state tracking error for the dynamic control design.
The work presented in this chapter has been published in [3, 4].
Chapter 4: In the context of improving the performance of the local voltage design, we develop
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a fully distributed voltage control (DVC) design to manage the VAR-capable DERs deployed to
an increasingly dynamic and variable distribution system. Under the limited VAR scenario, the
local control in Chap. 3 may attain a suboptimal voltage profile because of lack of information
exchanges. To leverage the network-wide VAR support, we cast the voltage control problem as
a quadratic programming one that minimizes the unweighted voltage mismatch under VAR re-
source limits everywhere by formulating the (multi-phase) power flow model to linear equality
constraints. The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) distributed optimization al-
gorithm is evoked, which requires only information exchange among neighboring buses and totally
local computations. To account for external disturbances and lack of reliable communication links,
we further extend the implementation of the proposed ADMM-based control in an online fashion
that is robust to random failure of communication links.
The work presented in this chapter has been published in [5].
Chapter 5: In this chapter, we integrate the attractive features from both local and distributed
voltage control designs and develop the advanced hybrid control framework. We have cast the
specially-designed voltage control problem by combining both weighted and unweighted voltage
mismatch objectives under limited VAR resources. The PPD-based algorithm is then evoked and
only requires voltage measurement exchanges among neighboring buses with local computations.
We have further provided the stable step-size choices to guarantee control stability. To cope with
cyber resource constraints and lack of reliable communication links, we have extended the hybrid
voltage control (HVC) design to have robustness against random communication link failures and,
in particular, communication-cognizant feature to account for the worst-case scenario of a total
communication outage. Interestingly, under this worst case, the HVC boils down to a surrogate
local control of Chap. 3. Thus, the adequate control performance can still be achieved as it
responses to local voltage variations.
The work presented in this chapter has been submitted in [6].
Chapter 6: To date, MGs are foreseen to play an important role in distribution networks to en-
hance the power system reliability. Under isolated MGs, these mostly power electronics-interfaced
distributed energy resources (DERs) exhibiting low-inertia characteristic have raised major con-
cerns over the frequency stability issues. To address these issues, we adopt the concept of the
virtual synchronous generator (VSG) and develop a distributed secondary frequency control for
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DICs in isolated MGs. Our proposed control architecture consists of a local VSG-based droop
control in the primary level and a distributed PPD-based algorithm in the secondary level. Inter-
estingly, our specially designed control algorithm would seamlessly incorporate the dynamics of
both power flow and VSG-based DICs which is implemented in the physical system by itself. As
most hierarchical control frameworks assume the time-scale separation among different control
levels, our optimization-based control design would explicitly account for the original dynamical
model of network-coupled DICs in establishing the stability conditions of the distributed control
design. This would improve the conventional MGs control framework by incorporating various
time-scaled control objectives automatically and dynamically. Additionally, to make the proposed
control robust to cyber attacks, we analyze two types of malicious attacks on the communica-
tion network, namely, the link and node attacks. Model-based anomaly detection and localization
strategies are developed based on the dual variable related metrics.
The work presented in this chapter has been submitted in [7].
Chapter 7: As communication networks continue to advance in electric power systems, the indus-
try standard called IEC 61850 has emerged for metering, protection, and control functions. IEC
61850 provides a standard for configuring various vendors’ intelligent electronic devices (IEDs)
for MG automation systems to be able to communicate with each other. Based on this protocol,
we design the secondary frequency control as a consensus optimization problem. To avoid a single
point of failure and enhance DERs’ plug-and-play capability, we propose to solve this problem in a
decentralized fashion under IEC 61850 by adopting the alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMM) algorithm. Motivated by the work in Ch. 6, we advocate modifying the ADMM updates
originally derived for the steady state objective to an online feedback-based scheme, incorporating
the instantaneous power measurements. Interestingly, it turns out that we do not need to explicitly
model the MG power flow. Meanwhile, the instantaneous power feedback signal would couple
DERs with the dynamics of power system networks, steering towards a model-free control ap-
proach. Our main contribution lies in the development of a collaborative defense strategy against
these attacks by leveraging the communication capabilities under the IEC 61850 standard. To
enhance the robustness to malicious control command attacks, we employ the round-robin (RR)
technique at the central supervisor for generating the consensus variable based on a variant of the
ADMM algorithm. This provides a multi-pronged approach to resilient and efficient MG opera-
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tion in the face of adversarial conditions. These algorithms are demonstrated through simulation
analysis of several use cases of interest.
The work presented in this chapter has been published in [8].
Chapter 8: In the final chapter, we summarize the contributions made by this thesis and include
insights and suggestions for future research efforts.
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CHAPTER 2
SYSTEM MODELING FOR VOLTAGE CONTROL
IN DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the modeling of an unbalanced multi-phase
distribution network and a power electronics-interfaced inverter design. The linearized counterpart
of both single- and multi-phase networks is also introduced for development of control designs and
their applications in the ensuing chapters.
2.1 Modeling of Distribution Networks
Distribution systems are inherently unbalanced due to, e.g., untransposed lines, unbalanced load-
ing conditions, and multi-phase feeds (see, e.g., [9, Ch. 2]). Hence, it is necessary to model the
coupling effects across multiple phases. To this end, we denote a tree-topology distribution net-
work using (N , E) with the buses in N := {0, ..., N} and line segments in E := {(i, j)} (see
Fig. 2.1 for a multi-phase radial feeder illustration). Bus 0 corresponds to the secondary side of a
voltage regulator at the feeder head, assumed to be of unity reference voltage, which is controlled
by an on-load tap changer of transformer (OLTC). Due to a much slower time-scale of OLTC as
compared to that of power electronic-interfaced DERs, we consider the slow acting OLTC to have
a fixed tap position while performing our ensuing control designs (see [10] for optimal tap set-
tings of an OLTC). Without loss of generality, we assume all buses are connected by three phases.
Accordingly, each bus- or line-associated variable is represented by a 3 × 1 complex vector. For
example, vector Vj := [V aj V
b
j V
c
j ]
T has the voltage phasor at phase φ ∈ P := {a, b, c} per bus j,
and Iij and Sij denote the complex line current and power flow from bus i to bus j, respectively.
All are per-unit (p.u.) quantities. For each line (i, j) with given phase impedance matrix Zij , the
multi-phase Ohm’s law asserts that
Vj = Vi − ZijIij. (2.1)
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Figure 2.1: A radial multi-phase distribution feeder with bus and line associated variables.
The difference between from-end and to-end line flows equals to diag(ZijIij)I∗ij with
∗ denoting
conjugate transpose. Accordingly, the flow balance equation for line (i, j) is given by
Sij − diag(ZijIij)I∗ij −
∑
k∈N+j Sjk = −sj, (2.2)
where N+j ⊂ N denotes the subset of downstream neighbors, e.g., N+i = {j} in Fig. 2.1, and
sj := pj + jqj the complex power injection per bus j, with the active (reactive) power injection
denoted by pj (qj), respectively. In addition, let qj,g denote the controllable VAR contributed
by local DER inverters and qj,c represent the VAR level of local loads. We have the total VAR
injection qj := qj,g − qj,c. Using (2.1) and (2.2), we can represent the nonlinear relation between
voltage and (controllable) VAR injection everywhere in the network. This constitutes the basic
nonlinear AC power flow modeling for unbalanced multi-phase feeders; see, e.g, [9, Chap. 3-
7] and [11–14]. To facilitate ensuing control designs, we firstly present the linearized model for
single-phase networks, and its multi-phase counterpart will be extended later on. The accuracy of
these linearized models can be numerically corroborated by several recent works [15–17].
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2.1.1 Linear Modeling of Single-Phase Networks
We consider a single-phase distribution network (N , E). By an abuse of notation, we neglect the
phase terms for a single-phase network. Per bus j, let vj denote its voltage magnitude and pj and
qj the real and reactive power injection. For each line (i, j), let rij and xij denote its resistance and
reactance and Pij and Qij the power flow from i to j, respectively. Assuming negligible line losses
and almost flat voltage, i.e., vj ∼= 1, ∀j, the AC single-phase power flow model can be simplified
to the so-termed LinDistFlow (linearized) model [18], given for each line (i, j) as
Pij −
∑
k∈N+j Pjk = −pj, (2.3a)
Qij −
∑
k∈N+j Qjk = −qj, (2.3b)
vi − vj = rijPij + xijQij. (2.3c)
Power-balance equations of bus j correspond to (2.3a)-(2.3b) while (2.3c) relates the voltage drop
to line flow. The LinDistFlow approximation leads to a relatively small error of at most 0.25%
(1%) if the voltage magnitude deviation is within a 5% (10%) range which is typical under normal
operating conditions [17]. In addition, several earlier papers [3, 15, 17] have verified the compet-
itiveness of the LinDistFlow model to the nonlinear AC flow model of (2.1) and (2.2) on realistic
feeders.
The matrix form of (2.3) is introduced to further demonstrate its linearity. Let the (N + 1)×N
matrix Mo denote the graph incidence matrix for (N , E). Its `-th column corresponds to a line
(i, j), with all zero entries except for the i-th and j-th (see e.g., [19, pg. 6]). We set M oil = 1 and
M ojl = −1 if bus j is downstream from i. Let mT0 be the first row of Mo corresponding to bus 0
with the rest of the rows in the N × N submatrix M. For tree networks, M is full-rank and thus
invertible; see e.g. [19][Chp. 2]. Upon concatenating all scalar variables into vector form, one can
represent (2.3) as follows:
−MP = −p, (2.4a)
−MQ = −q, (2.4b)
m0 + M
Tv = DrP + DxQ, (2.4c)
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where Dr is an N × N diagonal matrix with diagonals capturing all line rij’s and similarly to
Dx := diag{xij}.
The VAR injection q = qg−qc, where qg denotes the VAR contributed by DER inverters while
qc is the uncontrollable VAR consumption of all loads. Solving for P and Q and substituting
v0 = 1 into (2.4c) give rise to the following linear relation:
Bv = qg + w, (2.5)
where the vector w := MD−1x DrM
−1p−qc−MD−1x m0 captures the system operating conditions,
and B := MD−1x M
T is the Bbus matrix used in the dc power flow model (see e.g., [20, Sec. 6.16]).
By definition, B is a weighted, reduced graph Laplacian matrix and thus has a unique structure
according to the network topology, i.e., Bij = Bji = 0,∀(i, j) /∈ E . This sparsity structure will
play a crucial role in designing ensuing controls.
2.1.2 Linear Modeling of Multi-Phase Networks
For more realistic representation, linear modeling of single-phase networks can be generalized
to unbalanced multi-phase networks which necessitate consideration of coupling effects among
multiple phases. Without loss of generality, assume all buses are connected by three phases and,
accordingly, the bus- or line-associated variable is represented by a 3 × 1 complex vector, same
as the ones in Sec. 2.1. Assuming negligible power losses as for LinDistFlow derivations, the
per-phase flow balance would still hold as in (2.4a) and (2.4b). However, the multi-phase cou-
pling would result in a more complicated voltage drop relation compared to (2.4c). For a given
impedance matrix Zij per line (i, j), Ohm’s law asserts the voltage drop Vi −Vj = ZijIij . As-
suming almost flat voltage, one can multiply this relation by the Hermitian of each side and take
the diagonals of the resultant matrix, yielding
v˜i − v˜j ∼= Re{diag(ViIHijZHij)} (2.6)
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with the voltage magnitude vector v˜j := |Vj|. As in [12], we assume that the voltage magnitudes
between phases are similar, and that angle unbalance is small; i.e,
V bi /V
a
i ≈ V ci /V bi ≈ V ai /V ci ≈ σ˜ := e−j2pi/3.
This assumption leads to the following approximation of (2.6)
v˜i − v˜j ∼= Re{diag(σ˜)ZHijdiag(σ˜∗)Sij} ∼= Re{Z˜ijSij}, (2.7)
where matrix Z˜ij := diag(σ˜)ZHijdiag(σ˜
∗) stands for an equivalent impedance by defining σ˜ :=
[1 σ˜ σ˜2]T.
One can develop the multi-phase counterpart of (2.4c) using (2.7). Define the block diagonal
matrix M := bdiag(Ma,Mb,Mc) and vector m0 := [ma0; m
b
o; m
c
0], as the counterparts to M and
m0, respectively. Upon concatenating the full voltage v = [v˜a; v˜b; v˜c] and similarly for P and Q,
the approximation (2.7) becomes
MTv +m0 = DrP+DxQ, (2.8)
where resistance and reactance matrices Dr and Dx can account for multi-phase coupling; see
e.g., [12, 13]. To derive the aforementioned matrices, we let σ˜ = γ˜ + jζ˜ and σ˜2 = σ˜∗ = α˜ + jβ˜,
and Z˜ij in (2.7) becomes
Z˜ij =

Zaij σ˜
∗Zabij σ˜Z
ac
ij
σ˜Zbaij Z
b
ij σ˜
∗Zbcij
σ˜∗Zcaij σ˜Z
cb
ij Z
c
ij

H
(2.9)
where the superscript of Zij represents the phase or phase coupling term between line (i, j) as
shown in Fig. 2.1. Across phases a and b, we denote diagonal matrix Dabr := diag(Re{Zab}) col-
lecting all the coupling resistances where complex vector Zab := {Zabij }(i,j)∈E . Similarly, diagonal
matrix Dabx := diag(Im{Zab}) accounts for all the coupling reactances. The same notations are
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adopted for couplings among other phases. Thus, we have
Dr =

Dar α˜D
ab
r + β˜D
ab
x γ˜D
ac
r + ζ˜D
ac
x
γ˜Dabr + ζ˜D
ab
x D
b
r α˜D
bc
r + β˜D
bc
x
α˜Dacr + β˜D
ac
x γ˜D
bc
r + ζ˜D
bc
x D
c
r
 (2.10)
Dx =

Dax α˜D
ab
x − β˜Dabr γ˜Dacx − ζ˜Dacr
γ˜Dabx − ζ˜Dabr Dbx α˜Dbcx − β˜Dbcr
α˜Dacx − β˜Dacr γ˜Dbcx − ζ˜Dbcr Dcx
 . (2.11)
Accordingly, the multi-phase counterpart of (2.5) can be similarly derived as
Bv = qg +w (2.12)
with B := MDX−1MT and w := MDx−1DrM−1p−qc−MDx−1m0 capturing the system operat-
ing condition. Again, matrix B is a weighted graph Laplacian matrix for the multi-phase network,
and shares similar sparse structures as B where entries are zero for buses not connected by a line
segment.
Remark 1 (Modeling Considerations). Nonlinearity of the power flow model could be tackled by
the formulation of semidefinite programming (SDP) [10]. Generally, a rank relaxation approach
is adopted in order to obtain a SDP convex problem formulation. Nonetheless, the SDP-based
power flow formulation would face several challenges when applied to power (distribution) net-
works in practice. First, the resultant power flow solution could be non-exact [11] under this
setting when power networks are unbalanced multi-phase. Furthermore, performance guarantees
for the SDP approach fail to hold for general network topology such as meshed systems [21].
Last, the SDP solution increases the computational burden significantly as the size of the network
grows. Compared to the SDP modeling approach, the LinDistFlow models (2.5) and (2.12) hold
for more general scenarios including meshed topology and unbalanced three-phase systems while
the resultant algorithms enjoy minimal computational complexity [3, 22]. Thus, we have adopted
the LinDisFlow models for developing the ensuing control designs. However, the corresponding
numerical tests will be performed using exact nonlinear power flow solvers on practical power
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Figure 2.2: Mode 1 contributes only positive active power output while modes 4 and 5 generate
negative and positive VAR representing inductive or capacitive characteristics, respectively. In
addition, modes 2 and 3 consist of mixed active and VAR outputs. All are bounded by the
physical inverter rating.
networks for accurate system responses.
2.2 Modeling of Inverters
There are many existing reactive power resources in the current distribution systems such as ca-
pacitor banks and inverters-based DERs, e.g, solar photovoltaic (PV) panels and plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles. In the interest of this thesis, we focus on the fast-acting inverters to provide VAR
for the voltage regulation objective while fixing other slow-acting devices to be inactive. With-
out loss in generality, an inverter operates in five different modes as shown in Fig. 2.2. Mode 1
is the base case where only the real power is being generated. Meanwhile, modes 2 and 3 have
the apparent power injection at a lagging and a leading power factor, respectively. Last, mode 4
(5) behaves like a purely inductive (capacitive) element. All are bounded by the physical inverter
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rating. For example, considering a PV-based inverter, a conventional operating strategy would
strictly generate real power during the day in mode 1. Nonetheless, with our ensuing decentralized
control designs, we would adjust VAR judiciously among all the modes to take advantage of its
VAR supporting capability. Additionally, we do not consider the modeling of inverter dynamics in
this thesis except for VAR limit constraints. This approach can be justified under the system-level
control setup, as used by [11, 15, 17]. Thanks to a time-scale separation between the inverter in-
ternal dynamics and external control [23], it has been shown in [24] that ignoring the former does
not significantly affect the stability conditions of the latter.
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CHAPTER 3
COMMUNICATION-FREE LOCAL VOLTAGE
CONTROL
By treating the transmission grid as an infinity bus, voltage stability is the main concern in dis-
tribution networks where more DERs are being installed in the near future. However, the cur-
rently limited communication infrastructure supported power distribution network challenges the
employment of voltage control approaches by minimizing a centralized voltage mismatch error.
Meanwhile, cost concerns for DER products inevitably limit their sensing/computation capabil-
ities. Therefore, centralized voltage control designs are not practically attractive because their
success strongly relies on high-quality communications either between a control center and re-
mote devices [25], or among neighboring devices [15, 26, 27]. These optimization-based open-
loop control designs may become unstable under communication delays or noises during online
implementations. Also, it is unclear whether these approaches will be robust to asynchronous
computational speeds among the networked DERs of heterogeneous hardware capabilities.
To cope with the limited cyber infrastructure, a VAR-based local voltage control framework is
first proposed for distribution network operations; see e.g., [3, 17, 28, 29]. Under this framework,
each node only needs to measure its locally available voltage level as the controller input. Our
earlier work [3] has offered an overarching analysis that generalizes a variety of local control de-
signs, along with convergence analysis for static system scenarios. Interestingly, the local voltage
measurement naturally provides the instantaneous gradient information for a centralized error ob-
jective by weighting the voltage mismatch. Hence, the local voltage control approach using this
measurement boils down to the classical gradient-projection (GP) method accounting for the limits
on reactive power resources. This voltage-measurement-based local design does not require any
real-time communications, and can be implemented with minimal upgrades in sensing hardware.
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the performance of this local GP-based voltage control
design under two dynamic scenarios: i) the nodes perform the local update in an asynchronous
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fashion, and ii) the network operating condition is dynamically changing. The scenario of asyn-
chronous updates arises from heterogeneous hardware capabilities among different DERs. It is
also motivated to allow the “plug-and-play” functionality for flexible DER integration to distribu-
tion networks. The classical asynchronous optimization framework always accounts for the case
of outdated information from other nodes, and thus the choice of step-size has to be more con-
servative due to the information delay; see e.g., [30] and [31]. Different from this, the voltage
measurement for our local control design always provides the up-to-date gradient information and
does not suffer any information delay. Thanks to this physical power network coupling, we can
show that the choice of the step-size for the asynchronous local updates is the same for the syn-
chronous case. Hence, its convergence condition is robust to a potential discrepancy in the control
update rates among different DERs.
In power networks, voltage control designs under time-varying operating conditions have been
implemented as the static optimal power flow solutions to dynamic settings in a heuristic fash-
ion [32, 33]. The scope of these efforts is centered more around dynamic voltage control imple-
mentations than providing control performance guarantees. The latter is of high interest when
accounting for the variability of networked generations and loads in practice. With a time-varying
objective function, this problem becomes one of stochastic optimization; see e.g., [34]. Stochas-
tic approximation algorithms such as stochastic (sub-)gradient descent have been developed in,
e.g., [35, 36] and have been adopted by [14] for this voltage control problem. Nonetheless, per-
formance analysis for stochastic optimization algorithms has focused on the convergence to the
optimal solution that minimizes the expected objective function [34]. Aiming at the error bound
in tracking the instantaneous optimal solution, our analysis is more closely related to the body of
work on dynamic convex optimization; see e.g., [37–39]. This type of problem typically arises
from applications in autonomous teams and wireless sensor networks such as target tracking [40]
and estimation of the stochastic path [41]. Some of these dynamic optimization algorithms follow
a gradient descent update, but none of them has considered the formulation of constrained opti-
mization. This is the key difference from our voltage control problem since the control input has
to be feasible under the dynamic reactive power limits. Hence, the main contribution of our work
lies in the fact that it explicitly accounts for the time-varying projection operation of constrained
dynamic optimization. Our tracking error performance bounds will be derived for a quadratic ob-
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jective function and an autoregressive dynamic model, motivated by this specific voltage control
problem. Nonetheless, our analytical results can be extended to more general constrained dynamic
optimization problems with smooth strongly convex objective functions under stochastic processes
that have bounded iterative changes.
3.1 Local Voltage Control Problem
For ease of presentation, we present the local control design under a single-phase network (N , E).
Similarly, its muti-phase counterpart could be readily extended by considering (2.12). Thanks to
advances in power electronics, DERs’ inverters can also provide reactive power (VAR), a quantity
that is known to have a significant impact on the network voltage level. Accordingly, our goal
is to control VAR, such that v approaches a given desirable voltage profile µ. This is similar to
the goal of secondary voltage control design in transmission and microgrid networks to effectively
coordinate the network VAR resources and enhance the voltage stability [42,43]. One can achieve
various operational tasks or specifications by designing the preferred voltage profile µ. For high
voltage quality or effective conservation voltage reduction [44], a flat voltage profile µ = 1 would
be preferred. Moreover, the distribution management system (DMS) can perform network-specific
planning studies to determine the bestµ, as in earlier work [3,16,22]. For example, one can choose
a decreasing voltage profile to potentially reduce system losses, compensate voltage unbalance, or
correct power factor. Nonetheless, the selection of µ would be infrequently performed and not
affect the implementation of our ensuring algorithms.
With an abuse of notation, we replace qg by q in the rest of the thesis and denote X := B−1 and
v¯ := Xw. Thus, (2.5) becomes
v = Xq + v¯ (3.1)
At every time instance k, let v¯k denote the instantaneous nominal voltage profile. To allow for
a local control design, it turns out that one can minimize a weighted voltage mismatch error, as
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given by
q∗k = arg min
q∈Qk
fk(q) :=
1
2
(Xq + v¯k − µ)TB(Xq + v¯k − µ) (3.2)
where the constraint set Qk := {q
∣∣q ∈ [q
k
,qk]} accounts for the time-varying limits of local re-
active power resources at every bus. This constraint on VAR is due to physical inverter ratings and
would vary according to their active (real) power outputs as depicted in Fig. 2.2 [29]. In addition,
matrix B := MD−1x M
T, by definition, is a weighted, reduced graph Laplacian for (N , E). Since
all the reactance values are positive, B is symmetric and positive definite [3]. Accordingly, the
weighted voltage mismatch error objective of (3.2) is convex, and in fact quadratic, in the variable
q. Ideally, the unweighted error norm ‖v − µ‖ is the best objective in order to achieve the flat
voltage profile. Compared to the traditional paradigm of maintaining the voltage within limits,
this unweighted objective can improve the system-wide voltage profile by coordinating network-
wide VAR resources. Albeit the problem (3.2) minimizes a surrogate objective, it has been shown
in [3] that q∗k can closely approximate the optimal solution to the ideal unweighted error norm,
especially if there are abundant reactive power resources. Last, it is possible to use other convex
error penalty functions such as the Huber’s loss function [45, Ch. 7] instead of the squared error
norm objective in (3.2). This approach generalizes the current design to allow for some tolerance
in the voltage mismatch error, which may be more attractive under the scenarios of limited VAR
resources. Thanks to the separable structure of the box constraintQk, the gradient-projection (GP)
method [46, Sec. 2.3] can be invoked to solve (3.2). Upon forming its instantaneous gradient
∇fk(qk) := Xqk + v¯k − µ, the GP iteration for a given positive step-size  > 0 becomes
qk+1 = Pk [qk − D∇fk(qk)] , (3.3)
where the projection operator Pk thresholds any input to be withinQk, and D := diag(d1, . . . , dN)
is a diagonal scaling matrix that can be designed. As a first-order method, the GP method has
a linear convergence rate, while the convergence speed depends on the condition number of the
corresponding Hessian matrix [46, Sec. 3 .3]. Motivated by this fact, the scaling matrix can be
chosen according to the inverse of the diagonals of Hessian matrix by setting D := [diag(X)]−1
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to approximate the Newton gradient. Note that a positive diagonal matrix D affects neither the
separability of operator Pk, nor the optimality of the update (3.3).
By setting the GP iterate qk ∈ Qk to be the control input at any time k, the instantaneous
voltage becomes vk = Xqk + v¯k based on (3.1). Thanks to the physical power network cou-
pling, the voltage-based feedback signal vk always provides the up-to-date gradient information
as ∇fk(qk) = vk − µ. This voltage-based gradient feedback approach is potentially more robust
to modeling mismatches [47, Sec. 8.9]. Accordingly, the GP update in (3.3) can be implemented
by directly measuring the instantaneous voltage as
qk+1 = Pk [qk − D(vk − µ)] , (3.4)
which can be completely decoupled into local updates at each bus because Pk is separable. This
local voltage control is very attractive with minimal hardware requirements as each bus only needs
to measure its local voltage and requires no communication. The optimality and convergence
conditions for (3.4) are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When v¯k = v¯ andQk = Q (time-invariant case), the local update (3.4) approaches
the unique time-invariant optimizer q∗ of problem (3.2) if the step-size  ∈ (0, 2/M) where
M := λmax{X˜} (3.5)
is the largest eigenvalue of matrix
X˜ := D
1
2XD
1
2 . (3.6)
Proof: The update (3.4) approaching the time-invariant optimizer q∗ is equivalent to having
the iterative error mismatch ‖qk − q∗‖ → 0 as k → ∞. To this end, we diagonally scale all
iterates with D−
1
2 and define yk := D−
1
2qk and y∗ := D−
1
2q∗. Since projection is a nonexpansive
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mapping, the scaled error norm
‖yk+1 − y∗‖ = ‖D− 12P [qk − D(vk − µ)]−D− 12P [q∗ − D(v∗ − µ)] ‖
≤ ‖D− 12 (qk − q∗)− D 12X(qk − q∗)‖
= ‖yk − y∗ − D 12XD 12 (yk − y∗)‖
= ‖(I− D 12XD 12 )(yk − y∗)‖
≤ ‖(I− D 12XD 12 )‖‖yk − y∗‖. (3.7)
Denoting matrix X˜ := D
1
2XD
1
2 , one can establish that its largest eigenvalue
M := λmax{X˜} > 0. (3.8)
This inequality holds because D and X are both positive definite (PD). A sufficient stability con-
dition is to ensure the non-negative error ‖yk−y∗‖ is contracting at every iteration. By definition,
the matrix Euclidean norm ‖I− X˜‖ equals to the largest singular value of I− X˜. Because matrix
X˜ is PD [cf. (3.8)], |1− M | is a singular value of I− X˜. Given  > 0, having |1−M | < 1 for
every k ensures that (3.7) is a contraction mapping for every k. Accordingly, the scaled error norm
‖yk − y∗‖ would go to 0 in the limit and similarly for ‖qk − q∗‖ since D is PD. Hence, to ensure
the stability of (3.4), we need to have  ∈ (0, 2/M).
The local voltage control design has to account for a variety of uncertainties in practical system
implementations. First, due to heterogeneity of various DERs, it is difficult to perfectly synchro-
nize the local update at different buses. This is especially important to facilitate the “plug-and-
play” functionality for flexible DER integration. Second, the volatility and intermittence of elec-
tric loads and renewable-based generations challenge the static setting of time-invariant v¯k. It is
of considerable interest to quantify the performance of the local control (3.4) in terms of tracking
the time-varying optimizer q∗k to the dynamic objective fk.
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3.2 Asynchronous Local Voltage Control
When the DERs are heterogeneous, it is logical that the local voltage update should be performed
in an asynchronous fashion. This way, the buses with better computation and sensing capabilities
do not need to wait for the slowest one. Accordingly, these buses can execute more updates for the
same time interval and hence respond more quickly to localized voltage deviations.
To this end, let the setKj collect all the time instances when bus j executes its local update. The
asynchronous counterpart of (3.4) can be modeled by
qk+1 = qk + sk, ∀k (3.9)
with the difference at bus j given by
sj,k :=
Pj,k [qj,k − Dj(vj,k − µj)]− qj,k, k ∈ Kj,0, k /∈ Kj, (3.10)
where Dj is the (j, j)−th entry of D, while Pj,k projects the input to [qj,k, qj,k].
To establish the convergence condition, every bus needs to update sufficiently often. Similar to
the classical asynchronous algorithm analysis in [30, Ch. 7], we assume the following bounded
update delay condition.
AS1 (Bounded Update Delay). For every bus j and time instance k ≥ 0, there exists a positive
integer K such that at least one element in the set {k, k + 1, . . . , k + K − 1} belongs to Kj .
Equivalently, every bus must update at least once every K iterations.
In addition to Assumption 1, the analysis of classical asynchronous algorithms also assumes
the bounded information delay condition [30, Ch. 7]. Due to potential communication delays
among peer processors, the updates at some buses may not be executed based on the most up-
to-date system-wide information. By assuming that the local information used for computing the
gradient is potentially obsoleted by at most K iterations, it has been established in [30, Sec. 7.5]
that the asynchronous GP algorithm in (3.9)-(3.10) converges to the optimal solution with more
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conservative step-size choice given by
0 <  < 1/[M(1 +K +NK)]. (3.11)
Due to information delay, the choice of step-size would depend on the slowest processor in the
network. Generally, this bound on  can be much smaller than the 2/M bound in Proposition 1,
resulting in a much slower convergence compared with the synchronous case.
For our local voltage control, the gradient ∇fk(qk) = vk − µ always holds. Thanks to the
physical power network coupling, the local voltage vj,k always provides the up-to-date gradient
information at every iteration k. Hence, whenever a node is active, the difference sj,k computed
in (3.10) does not suffer from any information delay. This is different from most parallel and
distributed algorithms where the updates at every processor require information sent by peer pro-
cessors. Therefore, convergence of (3.9)-(3.10) no longer requires the more conservative choice of
 in [30, Sec. 7.5].
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, when v¯k = v¯ and Qk = Q (time-invariant case), the asyn-
chronous update illustrated in (3.9)-(3.10) converges to the time-invariant optimizer q∗ if the step-
size  ∈ (0, 2/M).
Proof: First, it is easy to show that the fixed-point of (3.9)-(3.10) is the same as (3.4) using
contradiction. As for the convergence, by projecting any scalar q to [q
j
, qj], it holds that [Pj(q) −
qj,k][Pj(q)− q] ≤ 0 for the iterate qj,k ∈ [qj,k, qj,k] where Pj = Pj,k; see e.g., [30, Sec. 3.3.1]. This
implies that at every iteration k ∈ Kj (use fk = f for time-invariant case)
sj,k[sj,k+Dj∇jf(qk)]=Djsj,k∇jf(qk) + (sj,k)2 ≤ 0. (3.12)
The descent lemma in [30, Sec. 3.3.2] together with the Lipschitz continuity of f(·) entails for
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every k
f(qk+1) = f(qk + sk)
≤ f(qk) + sTk∇f(qk) + (M/2)‖sk‖2
≤ f(qk)−
(
1

− M
2
)
‖sk‖2. [cf. (3.12)]
Summing up the inequality over all iterations yields
∑∞
k=0 ‖sk‖2 ≤
(
1

− M
2
)−1
f(q0) <∞,
which holds as long as
(
1

− M
2
)
is positive. Thus, if 0 <  < 2/M , ‖sk‖2 is summable and the
convergence limk→∞ sj,k = 0 holds for every j. And this completes the asymptotic convergence
claim for qk to its fixed point q∗.
Convergence analysis for the asynchronous voltage control updates ensures that the heterogene-
ity of DERs does not affect the choice of . As for online implementation, this result can provide
guaranteed stability for the proposed control design.
3.3 Dynamic Local Voltage Control
In addition to the asynchronous voltage control updates, the uncertainty in the nominal voltage
v¯k further challenges the performance of local voltage control. The volatility and intermittence
of loads and generations lead to temporal variations in the network operating condition, i.e., a
dynamic v¯k. Thus, it is imperative to analyze the performance of the local voltage control under a
dynamic setting.
To this end, the first order autoregressive (AR(1)) process is adapted to model the short-term
dynamics.
AS2 (Dynamic Voltage Profile). For a given constant vector c¯, the nominal voltage v¯k follows a
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wide-sense stationary AR(1) process, as given by
v¯k+1 = Av¯k + ηk+1 + c¯, (3.13)
where A is a time-invariant transition matrix with its spectral radius less than 1, while ηk+1
represents a zero-mean white noise process with covariance matrix Ση.
The AR(1) model (3.13) can capture both a short-term temporal and spatial correlation of the
nominal voltage profile. Its validity has been corroborated by [48] from real data-based tests.
Under Assumption 2, for every time k, the nominal voltage v¯k has constant mean Ev¯k = (I −
A)−1c¯ with a bounded covariance matrix Σv¯ satisfying
Σv¯ = AΣv¯A
T + Ση.
For ease of exposition, the spatial correlation for power networks is not considered as it is often
time negligible [49], corroborated by the structure of inverse of reduced graph Laplacian matrix X.
Since X is in fact diagonally dominant, the variations in loads and generations tend to have very
localized impacts. In addition, we assume an equal variation level in the temporal dynamics across
the network; i.e., A = αI. However, the ensuing analysis holds for the original AR modeling in
(3.13) or even higher-order AR modeling as long as it has bounded successive differences. These
assumptions simplify the AR(1) model as follows:
v¯k+1 = αv¯k + ηk+1 + c¯ (3.14)
with Ση = σ2I. Accordingly, the stability condition boils down to |α| < 1, while v¯k the mean
Ev¯k = c¯/(1−α) and the covariance Σv¯ = σ2/(1−α2)I. The smaller the value of |α| is, the faster
that the nominal voltage v¯k evolves.
Proposition 2 (Lemma 1 in ). [50]] Under Assumption 2, the expectation of the weighted norm
of consecutive difference is bounded, i.e., there exists a bounded constant B1 such that
E‖v¯k+1 − v¯k‖2D =
2σ2TrD
1 + α
≤ B1 for all k = 0, 1, . . . . (3.15)
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where the weighted norm ‖v‖2D := vTDv for any v.
Under the settings of both dynamic objective and constraint, we formally state the assumption
we make for the performance analysis of the gradient projection approach (3.4).
AS3 (Bounded Drift of Optimizer). The successive difference of the transient optimal solution is
bounded, i.e., there exists some bounded constant B2 such that (see (3.2) for the definition of q∗k)
E‖q∗k − q∗k+1‖2D−1 ≤ B2 for all k = 0, 1, . . . .
This assumption is related to the boundedness of voltage drift (see Prop. 2) and the compactness
of box constraints. For instance, when the reactive power is unlimited, i.e., Qk = RN , one can
easily verify that E‖q∗k − q∗k+1‖2D−1 is bounded. When the reactive power is uniformly limited,
i.e., Qk is always some compact set (double-sided box constraint suffices) for all k, we still have
the bounded optimizer drift due to the fact that q∗k ∈ Qk. Albeit the error bound (stability) we
are going to construct will depend on B2, intuitively, a smaller voltage drift bound B1 tends to
decrease the drift of the optimizer bound B2 in power networks.
We first introduce a few quantities to simplify the presentation:
yk := D
− 1
2qk, y
∗
k := D
− 1
2q∗k,
uk := D
− 1
2 (v¯k − µ),
and P˜k[·] is an operator that projects its input onto the set
Q˜k := {q
∣∣q ∈ [D− 12q
k
,D−
1
2qk]}.
This way, the original iterative update in (3.4) is equivalent to
yk+1 = P˜k[yk − (X˜yk + uk)], (3.16)
which can be viewed as the standard gradient projection update for the following dynamic con-
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strained optimization problem:
min
y∈Q˜k
f˜k(y) :=
1
2
‖Py + (PT)−1uk‖2, (3.17)
where P is obtained by the Cholesky factorization for the symmetric PD matrix X˜ = PTP.
Correspondingly, y∗k is the optimizer of (3.17). Also, we denote
C := min
k≥0;y∈RN
{
λmin{∇2f˜k(y)}
}
= λmin{X˜},
which is the smallest eigenvalue of X˜. We say a differentiable function f : Rn → R is strongly
convex with some positive constant c if for any x and y, we have f(y) ≥ f(x) + 〈∇f(x), y−x〉+
c
2
‖x‖2 where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product of two vectors. A differentiable function f : Rn → R is
gradient Lipschitz continuous with some positive constant m if for any x and y, we have f(y) ≤
f(x) + 〈∇f(x), y− x〉+ m
2
‖x‖2. Note that, under this definition, C also serves as the least strong
convexity constant of f˜k(y), ∀k, while M also serves as the greatest gradient Lipschitz continuity
constant of f˜k(y), ∀k. A vector v is called a subgradient of a convex function f : X → R
⋃{+∞}
at point x ∈ X if f(y) ≥ f(x) + 〈v, y−x〉 for any y ∈ X . The set of all subgradients at x is called
the subdifferential at x. We use ∇˜f˜k(y) and ∂f˜k(y) to denote a subgradient and the subdifferential
of the function f˜k at y, respectively. These notations were also used in [51]. The subgradient
used in the algorithm or analysis will be specified in the context, and our analysis will be based on
the equivalent update and optimization problem in (3.16) and (3.17), respectively. The following
lemma gives the first-order optimality condition of (3.17) and an equivalent recursive relation of
(3.16).
Lemma 1 (First-Order Optimality Condition and Recursive Relation). The instantaneous opti-
mizer y∗k to the dynamic optimization problem (3.17) and iterates yk satisfy the following condi-
tions, for k = 0, 1, . . .,
X˜y∗k + uk + ∇˜gk(y∗k) = 0 (3.18)
25
and
yk+1 − yk = −
[
X˜(yk − y∗k) + ∇˜gk(yk+1)− ∇˜gk(y∗k)
]
(3.19)
where
Ik(y) =
 0, if y ∈ Q˜k,+∞, if y /∈ Q˜k
is the indicator function of the set Q˜k at time k.
Proof: We first replace the projection operation in (3.16) by a subgradient step featured by the
indicator function Ik(·). By definition, the projection of any ω to Q˜k equals to
P˜k(ω) = arg min
x
Ik(x) + 1
2
‖x− ω‖2. (3.20)
The first-order optimality condition leads to ∇˜Ik(P˜k(ω)) + P˜k(ω) − ω = 0. Thus by letting
ω = yk − (X˜yk + uk) and P˜k(ω) = yk+1, we obtain
yk+1 = yk − [X˜yk + uk + ∇˜Ik(yk+1)]. (3.21)
Furthermore, by using the indicator function, (3.17) is equivalent to
y∗k = arg min
y
1
2
‖Py + (PT)−1uk‖2 + Ik(y). (3.22)
From the first-order optimality condition of (3.22), we have X˜y∗k + uk + ∇˜Ik(y∗k) = 0. This along
with (3.21) proves the recursive relation (3.19).
Note that the subgradient ∇˜Ik(yk+1) used in (3.21) is well-defined because (i) yk+1 ∈ Q˜k, (ii)
gk(·) is continuous over Q˜k, and (iii) the minimum in (3.20) is uniquely attained since ‖x − ω‖2
is real-valued, strictly convex, and coercive. Using the aforementioned notation, our analysis
coincides with those earlier results on nonsmooth optimization; e.g., similar notions and analysis
schemes have appeared in [51–53] and references therein. Our main result is as follows:
Theorem 2 (BIBO Stability with Geometric Decaying). Under Assumption 3, for any step-size
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choice
 ∈
(
0,
2
C +M
]
,
the expectation of the weighted tracking error between the local control update qk of (3.4) and the
instantaneous optimal solution q∗k can be bounded by
E‖qk − q∗k‖2D−1 ≤ ρkE‖q0 − q∗0‖2D−1 + 1−ρ
k
1−ρ Θ, ∀k (3.23)
where the geometric rate ρ ∈ (0, 1) and Θ is a bounded positive constant gap.
Proof: By the smoothness and convexity of f˜k, it follows that [54] (see (3.5) for the definition of
M )
CM
C+M
‖yk − y∗k‖2 + 1C+M ‖X˜(yk − y∗k)‖2
≤ 〈yk − y∗k, X˜(yk − y∗k)〉.
(3.24)
By applying the basic inequality
2〈
√
βa,
1√
β
b〉 ≤ a‖a‖2 + 1
a
‖b‖2,
which holds for any β > 0 and any real vectors a and b of the same dimension, the right-hand-side
of (3.24) can be upper bounded by
〈yk − yk+1 + yk+1 − y∗k, X˜(yk − y∗k)〉
≤ C+M
4
‖yk − yk+1‖2 + 1C+M ‖X˜(yk − y∗k)‖2
+〈yk+1 − y∗k, X˜(yk − y∗k)〉.
(3.25)
Substituting (3.25) into (3.24) leads to
CM
C+M
‖yk − y∗k‖2
≤ C+M
4
‖yk − yk+1‖2 + 〈yk+1 − y∗k, X˜(yk − y∗k)〉.
(3.26)
Since the indicator function Ik(·) is convex due to the fact that Q˜k is a convex set in our settings,
its subgradient ∇˜Ik(·) (subdifferential ∂Ik(·)) is a (set-valued) monotone mapping (this can also
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be obtained from the subgradient inequality [53]), i.e.,
〈yk+1 − y∗k, ∇˜Ik(yk+1)− ∇˜Ik(y∗k)〉 ≥ 0. (3.27)
Combining (3.26) and (3.27) we have
C+M
4
‖yk − yk+1‖2
+〈yk+1 − y∗k, X˜(yk − y∗k) + ∇˜Ik(yk+1)− ∇˜Ik(y∗k)〉
≥ CM
C+M
‖yk − y∗k‖2.
(3.28)
Substituting (3.19) into (3.28) for X˜(yk − y∗k) + ∇˜Ik(yk+1)− ∇˜Ik(y∗k) leads to
C+M
4
‖yk − yk+1‖2 + 1 〈yk+1 − y∗k,yk − yk+1〉
≥ CM
C+M
‖yk − y∗k‖2.
Using the equality 〈y∗k − yk+1,yk+1 − yk〉 = ‖y∗k − yk‖2 − ‖y∗k − yk+1‖2 − ‖yk+1 − yk‖2 to
expand the inner product, we have
‖yk+1 − y∗k‖2 ≤
(
1− 2CM
C+M
) ‖yk − y∗k‖2
+
(
M+L
2
− 1) ‖yk − yk+1‖2. (3.29)
By choosing  ≤ 2
C+M
to ensure the second term on the right-hand-side of (3.29) being nonnega-
tive, the inequality (3.29) can be further relaxed to
‖yk+1 − y∗k‖2 ≤
(
1− 2CM
C +M
)
‖yk − y∗k‖2. (3.30)
By applying another basic inequality
‖a′ + b′‖2 ≤ (1 + β′)‖a′‖2 + (1 + 1
β′
)‖b′‖2,
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which holds for any β′ > 0 and any real vectors a′ and b′ of the same dimension, we have
‖yk+1 − y∗k + y∗k − y∗k+1‖2
≤ (1 + β′)‖yk+1 − y∗k‖2 + (1 + 1β′ )‖y∗k − y∗k+1‖2
≤ ρ‖yk − y∗k‖2 + (1 + 1β′ )‖y∗k − y∗k+1‖2,
(3.31)
where ρ := (1 + β′)(1 − 2CM
C+M
) while the second inequality comes from (3.30). Let us denote
Θ := (1 + 1
β′ )B2, and thus taking expectation on both sides of (3.31) gives us [cf. Assumption 3]
E‖yk+1 − y∗k+1‖2 ≤ ρE‖yk − y∗k‖2 + Θ. (3.32)
Applying recursive induction on (3.32), we eventually obtain
E‖yk+1 − y∗k+1‖2 ≤ ρk+1E‖y0 − y∗0‖2 +
1− ρk+1
1− ρ Θ,
which recovers (3.23) by the definition of yk+1 and y∗k+1. It shows that as long as ρ ∈ (0, 1) and
Θ ∈ [0,∞), E‖yk+1 − y∗k+1‖2 is bounded for all k. Note that the choice of β′ can be arbitrarily
close to 0. Hence ρ can always achieve a value that is less than 1 as long as  > 0 and C > 0 (a
simple choice to demonstrate this is β′ = CM/(C +M − 2CM)). Finally, we conclude that the
step-size condition is 0 <  ≤ 2
C+M
.
Theorem 2 establishes that the tracking error of the local control update (3.4) under dynamical
settings exponentially decreases until a constant error bound is reached. Moreover, the AR(1)
process assumed to model the v¯k series can be potentially extended to a general stochastic process
that has bounded iterative changes. This is because the constant Θ in (3.23) is bounded as long
as the condition in (3.15) holds. To extract a more specific result, let us choose β′ = CM/(C +
M − 2CM). In this case, the steady-state (k →∞) error is explicitly bounded by
limk→∞
1−ρk
1−ρ Θ
= 1
1−(1+β′)(1− 2CM
C+M
)
(1 + 1
β′ )B2
= (C+M)(C+M−CM)
(CM)2
B2.
(3.33)
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This error depends on system parameters C, M , step-size , and the constant B2 which bounds the
successive difference of the instantaneous optimal solutions. It can be seen that the larger step-
size would lead to the smaller steady-state error bound. Letting the step-size be  = 2
C+M
(best
achievable) further yields that the steady-state error does not exceed (C+M)
2(C2+M2)B2
4C2M2
. To sum
up, under the settings of both dynamic objective and dynamic constraint, the stable step-size is
slightly smaller than the one in the static case (no optimality drift), but under both situations, the
achievable step-sizes are on the same order O
(
1
M
)
because 2
M
≥ 2
C+M
≥ 2
M+M
= 1
M
.
Remark 2 (Time-Invariant Box Constraints). For the special case that the box constraints are
time-invariant (only objective is time-varying), we can show that the step-size choice to achieve
stability is the same to the static case of  ∈ (0, 2/M) [50]. This way, the same choice holds
for static, dynamic, or asynchronous scenarios. Constant limits on reactive power are the case for
photovoltaic inverters if the solar irradiance stays the same during, e.g., nighttime and cloudless
scenarios.
3.4 Numerical Tests
We investigate the performance of the decentralized voltage control scheme under the settings
of asynchronous update and dynamically time-varying network operating conditions. The desired
voltage magnitude µj is chosen to be 1 at every bus j. Each bus is assumed to have a certain number
of PV panels installed, and thus it is able to control its reactive power via advanced inverter design.
All numerical tests are performed in MathWorks R© MATLAB 2014a software.
A single-phase radial power distribution network consisting of 21 buses is first used to test the
algorithm. This network is equivalent to the system in Fig. 2.1 for N = 20. The impedance of
each line segment is set to be (0.233 + j0.366)Ω. Hence, the linearized flow equations in (2.4) are
only an approximate model. The limit of reactive power resources at every bus is chosen to be
[−100, 100]kVA. More realistic test using a 123-bus multi-phase network will be presented later
on.
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3.4.1 Asynchronous Updates
The impact of asynchronous updates across different buses is first considered under a constant
nominal voltage v¯k. The maximum update delay is set to be K = 50. For the 21-bus network, the
theoretical upper bound on the step-size is  < 2/M = 0.0062 following Theorem 1. Hence, we
set the step-size to be  = 1/M = 0.0031. To model the level of asynchronous updates among
multiple buses, we introduce a duty cycle parameter η ∈ (0, 100%]. For a cycle of total K
2
time
slots, we randomly pick dη× K
2
e number of slots for bus j to implement its voltage control update.
Hence, the maximum update delay among any two nodes is no more than K. In addition, the
larger η is, the more frequently every bus performs an update, and the smaller the effective update
delay would be. In particular, the setting of η = 100% provides the benchmark performance of the
synchronous scenario where each bus updates at every time slot. Fig. 3.1 plots the iterative voltage
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Figure 3.1: Iterative voltage mismatch error performance for the asynchronous decentralized
voltage control scheme under various choices of duty cycle η and step-size .
mismatch error performance for the decentralized voltage control design under different η values
and choices of step-size. The case of no voltage control is also plotted with the corresponding
error staying constant. Using the classical convergence conditions for asynchronous GP updates
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in (3.11), the step-size should be chosen as  = 0.0031/1051 with N = 20 and K = 50. As shown
in Fig. 3.1, this choice of step-size is too conservative. Thus, the resultant convergence speed is
much slower than that of the choice  = 0.0031 following Theorem 1. This demonstrates that our
theoretical results for asynchronous GP updates are more competitive for the specific decentralized
voltage control application here.
Moreover, it is observed that the convergence accuracy would depend on the total number of
updates for the whole network. Because of the asynchronous update settings, the expected number
of control updates across the network for a cycle of K
2
iterations equals to dη × K
2
e × N . Fig.
3.2 illustrates the voltage mismatch error performance versus the expected number of total control
updates. Interestingly, the convergence speed in this plot is the same for the same step-size 
value, regardless of the asynchronous metric η. Hence, the average update rate across all the buses
determines the performance of the asynchronous decentralized voltage control scheme.
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Figure 3.2: Voltage mismatch error versus the total number of updates across the network for the
asynchronous voltage control scheme under various choices of duty cycle η and step-size .
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3.4.2 Dynamic Operating Conditions
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Figure 3.3: An instance of the nominal voltage series {v¯k} at selected buses under the AR(1)
model settings.
To verify our results on dynamic voltage control, we generate the nominal voltage series {v¯k}
using the AR(1) model in (3.14). Neglecting the effects of voltage regulators, it is well known
that the voltage magnitude in power networks tends to decrease monotonically away from the root
node, i.e., bus 0. Hence, we set the mean voltage at bus j to be c¯j/(1− α) = 1.025− 0.0519 (j − 1)
to follow this decreasing voltage rule. Fig. 3.3 plots the nominal voltage sequence at selected
network locations for the choice of α = 0.1 and noise variance σ2 = 6× 10−6. This choice of the
forgetting factor α value leads to very fast dynamics in the nominal voltage.
The step-size : Fig. 3.4 plots the iterative voltage mismatch error performance using different
choices of , while Fig. 3.5 plots the weighted tracking error between the iterate qk and the
corresponding instantaneous optimal q∗k. Both plots are averaged over 30 random realizations of
the nominal voltage series to approximate the expected values. The maximum value  = 0.0061
is chosen according to the bound 2/(C + M) in Theorem 2. As shown more clearly in Fig. 3.5,
a larger step-size  leads to slightly faster convergence of the tracking error. However, the steady-
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Figure 3.4: Iterative voltage mismatch error performance averaged over 30 random realizations
under different  values.
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Figure 3.5: Iterative tracking error averaged over 30 random realizations under different  values.
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state voltage mismatch error is higher for the largest  as shown in Fig. 3.4. This observation
coincides with the analytical results of Theorem 2. The convergence geometric rate ρ depends on
an appropriate choice of , while the steady-state error related constant Θ tends to increase with
a larger  choice. Thus, the choice of  would be able to trade the steady-state tracking error off
the convergence speed. Under this trade-off, the optimal selection of  would also depend on the
dynamics of the AR(1) process. If the nominal voltage evolves very fast, it is preferred to have a
large  for a better tracking performance. Otherwise, if the dynamics of the nominal voltage series
has a large time constant, we can afford to have a small  in order to achieve a better tracking error
performance. By analyzing the bounds in Theorem 2, it is possible to provide a general guideline
on selecting a proper  value based on the dynamics of v¯k.
The forgetting factor α: We have also varied the parameter α for the AR(1) process used to
generate the nominal voltage series, with values ranging from 0.1 to 0.999. The step-size  is fixed
at 0.0031. For comparison purposes, the variance of the nominal voltage at every bus is aligned
to be the same for different α values by setting it to be σ2/(1 − α2) = 10−5. Hence, when α =
0.999 very closely approaches 1, the {v¯k} series would almost stays flat with minimal temporal
variations. Accordingly, the consecutive voltage mismatch error bound B1 in Prop. 2 decreases as
α approaches its upper bound 1. Fig. 3.6 plots the iterative voltage mismatch error for various α
values, while Fig. 3.7 again plots the corresponding weighted tracking error performance. These
curves are also averaged over 30 random realizations. The performance under either mismatch
error metrics improves with a larger α value since the constant B1 and thereby B2 would decrease.
Accordingly, this leads to a smaller Θ value and reduces the steady-state tracking error. This
numerical result points out that B2, which bounds the optimizer drift, could be related to the
consecutive voltage difference B1.
The noise variance σ2: A similar test has been conducted with varying parameter σ for the AR(1)
process ranging from 7.7 × 10−4 to 7.7 × 10−3. With the same step-size  = 0.0031 and param-
eter α = 0.1, Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9 plot the average voltage mismatch and weighted tracking
error over 30 realizations. Similar to the observations under various α values, using a smaller σ2
would decrease the steady-state error bounds since the constant Θ tends to be positively related to
the parameter σ2. As the parameter α is fixed, the variance of the nominal voltage at every bus
decreases as the noise variance diminishes. Accordingly, the performance of no voltage control
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Figure 3.6: Iterative voltage mismatch error performance averaged over 30 random realizations
for the voltage control scheme with various values of forgetting factor α.
Figure 3.7: Iterative tracking error averaged over 30 random realizations for the voltage control
scheme with various values of forgetting factor α.
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Figure 3.8: Iterative voltage mismatch error performance averaged over 30 random realizations
under various σ values.
Figure 3.9: Iterative tracking error averaged over 30 random realizations under various σ values.
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slightly improves with smaller noise variance.
All numerical results in this test case have verified our analytical bounds on the tracking error
performance. To sum up, the convergence speed depends on the choice of step-size . Depending
on the time constant of nominal voltage dynamics, the step-size needs to be properly chosen trad-
ing off the convergence speed and the steady-state error performance. The dynamics of nominal
voltage series based on the AR(1) process parameters does not affect the convergence speed per
se, yet is more significantly related to the steady-state tracking error performance. Note that the
analytical bounds of Theorem 2 are not tight, because of the scalar β′ used to eliminate the cross-
product terms from the squared sum norm. However, they are very effective to characterize the
error performance of dynamic decentralized voltage control scheme while facilitating the selection
of step-size.
3.4.3 Local Voltage Control under an Unbalanced Multi-Phase Network
We have also tested the decentralized voltage control scheme using a realistic multi-phase distri-
bution network, namely the IEEE 123-bus system model [55]. This test case incorporates both
the asynchronous updates among multiple buses and dynamical nominal voltage, with similar set-
tings as in the earlier two test cases. Moreover, the line segments of the 123-bus system involve
inter-phase mutual couplings. Hence, this test provides an accurate representation of how the de-
centralized voltage control would perform in practice with uncertainties in the DER hardware and
network operating conditions. Fig. 3.10 plots the iterative network voltage mismatch error under
various choices of duty cycle parameter η. The step-size  = 0.01 has been chosen for every
scenario to ensure stability. Different from the earlier two test cases, the control implementation
has incorporated both the asynchronous updates and the dynamic voltage profile. Although we
have not be able to derive the tracking error bounds under both sources of uncertainty, Fig. 3.10
demonstrates that its convergence speed result is similar to the solely asynchronous case as in Fig.
3.1, while the steady-state tracking error may have similar bounds as in the dynamic control anal-
ysis. In addition, Fig. 3.11 illustrates the voltage mismatch error performance versus the expected
number of total control updates. Similar to its single-phase counterpart, the convergence speed in
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Figure 3.10: Iterative voltage mismatch error performance on the IEEE 123-bus system under
both the asynchronous updates and the dynamic network operating conditions with different η
values.
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Figure 3.11: Voltage mismatch error versus the total number of updates across the IEEE 123-bus
system for the asynchronous voltage control scheme under dynamic operating conditions with
various choices of duty cycle η.
39
this plot is analogous for a fixed step-size  value, regardless of the asynchronous metric η. Thus,
we are confident that the analysis of this chapter can be integrated into a joint framework that
characterizes the tracking error performance under both uncertain sources.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have developed a local dynamic optimization framework for analyzing the
performance of a voltage control scheme based on gradient-projection (GP) methods for online
system implementations. By constructing the linearized flow model for power distribution net-
works, one can design a voltage control scheme by minimizing a surrogate voltage mismatch error
using the GP iterations. Thanks to the physical power network coupling, this GP-based scheme
boils down to a local voltage control design where every bus can measure its local voltage to obtain
the instantaneous gradient direction. Compared to earlier results for a static optimization scenario,
we have significantly extended the analysis on convergence conditions and error performance to
account for two dynamic scenarios: i) the nodes perform the local update in an asynchronous fash-
ion; and ii) the network operating point is dynamically changing. Assuming the nominal voltage
evolves following an AR(1) process, the weighted tracking error can be bounded by an exponen-
tially decreasing term plus a constant term that would depend on the successive difference of the
transient optimal solution. Interestingly, the choice of step-size may need to be more conservative
depending on the trade-off between the convergence speed and the steady-state tracking error for
the dynamic control design. Several numerical tests have been performed to demonstrate and val-
idate our analytical results on the performance of the local voltage control scheme under realistic
dynamic scenarios using practical power network models.
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CHAPTER 4
ONLINE DISTRIBUTED VOLTAGE CONTROL
To engage heterogeneous DERs for voltage regulation, a key challenge is to design efficient and
robust schemes that can coordinate distributed inverters at minimal sensing and communication
complexity. Albeit the voltage control problem can be formulated using an optimal power flow
(OPF) approach that minimizes certain network-wide operational objective, e.g., the total volt-
age mismatch error [25] (the unweighted version of (3.2)), such a centralized framework fails to
account for the limited and low-quality communication infrastructure currently deployed in distri-
bution networks. Chap. 3 addresses this issue by adopting a voltage control design which only
relies on locally available voltage information. This local design, already standardized in [56],
may suffer from degraded performance due to lack of information exchange, especially when
VAR resources are limited [3,17]. There also exist several distributed designs by leveraging infor-
mation exchange among only neighboring nodes (see, e.g., [13, 15]). Nonetheless, they have been
developed under a static optimization framework and do not directly apply to an online control
implementation. In addition, none of the existing work has considered imperfect communication
regimes, which are foreseen to be the reality for distribution networks in the near future.
In this chapter, to address the aforementioned issues, we develop a distributed voltage control
(DVC) design that seamlessly adapts to dynamically varying system operating conditions. Ac-
counting for practical communication constraints in bandwidth and network capacity, we further
make the proposed DVC design to be robust against random link failures. To this end, we formulate
the centralized problem using the linearized approximation modeling of both single- and multi-
phase distribution networks (2.5) and (2.12) [3, 12, 15]. To solve this convex quadratic problem of
box constraints, a distributed solver adopted from the alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMM) [57] is offered to tackle the coupling of neighboring bus voltage variables. This DVC
design is further improved for online dynamic implementations under imperfect communications.
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Although the linearized power flow model has been used to develop and analyze the proposed al-
gorithms, we have tested and validated the performance using the non-linear multi-phase systems
with line losses and phase coupling.
Compared with existing work on (distributed) voltage regulation, our main contributions are
three-fold. First, the proposed DVC enjoys minimal sensing and communication requirements
by measuring and sharing voltage magnitude among neighboring nodes only. The open-loop dis-
tributed algorithms in [13,15] require all the variables to be stored and exchanged among neighbors
(i.e., real and reactive line power flows), whereas our ADMM-based DVC scheme effectively in-
corporates only the voltage measurements as the control feedback signal. Thus, our design can
cope with fast system dynamics and reduces both sensing and communication overhead. Second,
most of the previous work in distributed voltage control has not considered cyber resource con-
straints, e.g. communication link failures. We further leverage the work by [58, 59] to develop
an asynchronous ADMM-based solver using the freezing strategy. Accordingly, our approach is
robust against random communication link failures with guaranteed optimality and stability for
real-time implementations. Last but not least, numerical tests have corroborated that the feedback-
based scheme can effectively mitigate the impacts of modeling mismatches [47, Sec. 8.9] intro-
duced by the linearized power flow model. In practical implementations, this feedback signal
also provides the most up-to-date system operating conditions. Thus, our algorithm can be im-
plemented in an online fashion whereas the static problem formulation in [13, 15] needs further
modifications to account for system dynamics. Clearly, with its features of feedback control design
and asynchronous updates, our proposed DVC approach is very related to a competing solution re-
cently developed in [60]. Nonetheless, the VAR constraint limits in [60] have been relaxed using
Lagrangian multipliers, and thus the iterative VAR control signal could become infeasible with
respect to the resource limits. Our proposed DVC has successfully tackled this issue by projecting
the VAR iterates to achieve feasible instantaneous control signal.
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4.1 Distributed Voltage Control Problem
Voltage control aims to manage the output qg from local inverters to maintain a desired voltage
profile, i.e., v → µ. We formulate the problem under a static setup to develop distributed solvers.
Note that qg is replaced by q in the rest of the thesis; hence, the single-phase problem is formulated
as
{v?,q?} :=arg min
v,q
f(v,q) :=
1
2
N∑
j=1
{
(vj − µj)2 + cjq2j
}
(4.1a)
subject to
∑
i∈Nj Bjivi = qj + wj (4.1b)
q
j
≤ qj ≤ qj, ∀j ∈ N , (4.1c)
where the subset Nj ⊆ N contains bus j and all neighboring buses. The coefficient cj ≥ 0
is chosen for regularizing qj . The squared voltage mismatch error norm in (4.1a) is effective
for penalizing a high level mismatch of |vj − µj|. This quadratic error objective can also be
generalized to more robust error criterion such as the Huber loss function; see e.g., [45, Ch. 7].
Additionally, due to the sparse structure of B, (4.1b) is equivalent to the power flow constraints
in (2.5). Coupling involving only the neighborhood Nj in (4.1b) is instrumental for distributed
control design in Sec. 4.2. Last, the bound constraints in (4.1c) are either due to the inverter
apparent power limit or depend on certain inverter power factor limits as depicted in Fig. 2.2 [29].
Clearly, if cj = 0 for every j, the objective in (4.1a) is reduced to minimizing the voltage mis-
match with no VAR regularization. A positive cj would sometimes be preferred. The reason is
three-fold. First, as shown in [3, 17], the celebrated droop voltage control naturally enforces cer-
tain regularization on q using a positive cj , which inversely scales with the droop slope. Second,
it is possible that a network with larger VAR bus injections may result in a higher level of line cur-
rent magnitude and accordingly increase the reactive power flow and network-wide power losses.
Thus, a positive cj to regularize qj could diminish the total power losses. Finally, from a numer-
ical perspective, a larger cj would benefit the conditioning of the Hessian of f and thus reduce
computation time for solving (4.1) [46, Ch. 2]. This feature may prevent the inverter control from
adversely affecting the operation of OLTC and other slower time-scale voltage regulating devices.
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Therefore, it is attractive when coping with fast dynamics and disturbances.
Remark 3. (Voltage Regulation Criterion.) The classical voltage regulation operations aim to
maintain the voltage within ±5% of the rated value. This operational objective can be included in
our ensuing approach by adding additional constraints 0.95 ≤ vφj ≤ 1.05,∀j, φ to (4.1), assuming
the existence of feasible solutions. Interestingly, it turns out that our proposed solution can ac-
commodate such voltage bounds, as detailed soon in Sec. 4.2. As for the squared Euclidean norm
error, it is more effective in mitigating the maximum voltage deviation by coordinating network-
wide VAR resources, as compared to the traditional paradigm of maintaining the voltage within
limits as in voltage regulators. Additionally, this quadratic voltage mismatch error norm in (4.1a)
can also effectively mitigate much larger voltage deviation that is potentially > 5%.
Extending (4.1) to include multi-phase networks, we define vector q := [qa; qb; qc] to concate-
nate the controllable VAR injection vector qφ per phase-φ, and similarly vector v := [va; vb; vc]
for the voltage magnitude. One can formulate the following problem to achieve v→ u:
{v?,q?} := arg min
v,q
f(v,q) :=
1
2
‖v − u‖22 +
1
2
qTCq (4.2a)
subject to Bv = q+w (4.2b)
q ≤ q ≤ q, (4.2c)
where the diagonal matrixC contains non-negative coefficients for regularizing q. The multi-phase
problem (4.2) has the same features as (4.1), and both are convex quadratic programming (QP)
problems. As matrix B := [Ba; Bb; Bc] has a block sparse structure that couples only neighboring
buses, the control designs developed for (4.1) are also expected to apply for (4.2). Hence, this
chapter focuses on presenting voltage control schemes developed for single-phase networks. These
can be easily generalized for multi-phase networks; see Remark 4.
Both problems (4.1) and (4.2) are convex quadratic programming (QP) ones, efficiently solv-
able once all the information on the system model and operating conditions is centrally available.
However, this centralized framework will be challenged by the increasing variability of DERs. The
ensuing section will develop fast distributed solvers only requiring information exchange among
neighboring buses.
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4.2 ADMM-based Distributed Solver
To overcome the issues involving centralized control designs, we exploit the decomposable struc-
ture of (4.1) to solve it in a distributed fashion. Specifically, we propose to adopt the alternated-
direction method-of-multipliers (ADMM), a distributed optimization technique that has been ef-
fectively applied to a variety of scientific disciplines including signal processing, statistical learn-
ing, and more recently, power systems (see e.g., [11, 15, 57]). Based on ADMM, we design a
distributed voltage control (DVC) scheme that needs only to measure and incorporate the dynamic
voltage magnitude. This feedback-based design is quite different from existing approaches of
distributed operations in power systems, developed as a static optimization problem [11, 15]. In
addition to minimal sensing overhead, the voltage-feedback control design is likely to be more
robust to mismatch and imperfection in system modeling and implementation (see e.g., [47, Sec.
8.9]). It is also robust to imperfect bus-to-bus communication link as established in Sec. 4.4.
Specially, ADMM requires much simpler communication architecture than that of a centralized
framework since the optimization problem is divided into sub-area size instead of the full network
size. To this end, we first reformulate the problem (4.1) to be suitable for decomposition with
consensus version of ADMM. It turns out that the resultant algorithm will introduce simple local
update rules at each bus. Consider first the static setup in which bus j has the value wj available.
The dynamic scenario with time-varying wj will be considered in Sec. 4.3. To solve (4.1) using
ADMM, define two groups of variables: x := {x1,x2 ...,xN} and z as
xj :=
{{νji }i∈Nj , δj} , ∀j ∈ N ,
z := {vj, qj}j∈N .
Clearly, the vector z includes all the optimization variables of (4.1), termed the decision variables.
Each auxiliary variable xj contains a local copy of some decision variables in z relevant to bus j.
For example, the auxiliary variable νji at bus j corresponds to vi in z while δj corresponds to qj .
By enforcing the auxiliary and decision copies of each variable to consent, one can reformulate
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(4.1) as
min
{xj∈Xj}j∈N ,z∈Z
N∑
j=1
fj(xj) :=
1
2
N∑
j=1
{
(νjj − µj)2 + cjδ2j
}
subject to λji : ν
j
i = vi, ∀j, i ∈ Nj (4.3)
θj : δj = qj, ∀j ∈ N ,
where the constraint sets are Xj := {xj|
∑
i∈Nj Bjiν
j
i − δj = wj} and Z := {(vj, qj)j∈N |qj ≤
qj ≤ q¯j}. Each equality with the corresponding multiplier denoted in (4.3) represents a consensus
constraint for a pair of auxiliary and decision variables, which make (4.1) equivalent to (4.3).
The augmented Lagrangian function for (4.3) with a given parameter ρ > 0 is L(x, z,y) =∑N
j=1 Lj(xj, z,y) where
Lj(xj, z,y) = 1
2
(νjj − µj)2 + cjδ2j +
∑
i∈Njλji(ν
j
i − vi)
+θj(δj − qj)+ρ
2
∑
i∈Nj(ν
j
i − vi)2 + ρ2(δj − qj)2, (4.4)
and y := {{λji}i∈Nj , θj}j∈N containing all multipliers. Note that L is different from the typical
Lagrangian function; all equality constraints are regularized by quadratic terms. The additional
term does not affect the optimality conditions, since it is essentially zero at any feasible solution to
(4.3). Based on the augmented Lagrangian L(x, z,y), the ADMM works by cyclically minimizing
each of the three variable groups, x, z, and y, while fixing others. Its k-th iteration involves the
following three steps:
(S1) Update x: For given z[k] and y[k], the augmented Lagrangian L totally decouples into Lj
for each xj . Hence, the local auxiliary variable xj can be updated as
xj[k + 1] := arg min
xj∈Xj
Lj(xj, z[k],y[k]), (4.5)
and this subproblem is a QP with efficient convex solvers. Closed-form solutions can be
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obtained under the single-phase setup by re-writing (4.5) as
xj[k + 1] := arg min
hTj xj=wj
1
2
xTj Ajxj + b
T
j [k]xj, (4.6)
where Aj is a diagonal and non-singular matrix, bj[k] is obtained from z[k] and y[k], and hj
relates to a single linear constraint inXj . Upon defining tj[k] := (wj+hTA−1b[k])/(hTA−1h),
the local update (4.5) becomes
νjj [k + 1] =
1
ρ+ 2
(
tj[k]Bjj + 2µj − λjj[k] + ρvj[k]
)
,
νji [k + 1] =
1
ρ
(
tj[k]Bji − λji[k] + ρvi[k]
)
, ∀i 6= j,
δj[k + 1] =
1
ρ+ 2wj
(− tj[k]− θj[k] + ρqj[k]).
(S2) Update z: Likewise, the decision variables are updated as
z[k + 1] := arg min
z∈Z
L(x[k + 1], z,y[k]), (4.7)
which is a box-constrained QP problem, solved by projecting the unconstrained solutions to
Z [46, Ch. 2]. When all multipliers are initialized to zero by setting y[1] = 0, the summand∑
i∈Nj λij[k] remains zero throughout the ADMM iterations. Now, by setting the gradient
of (4.7) to zero, (4.7) decouples into the following updates per bus j:
vj[k + 1] =
1
|Nj|
∑
i∈Nj
νij[k + 1], (4.8a)
qj[k + 1] = Pj
[
θj[k]/ρ+ δj[k + 1]
]
, (4.8b)
where Pj projects any input to the interval [qj, qj].
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(S3) Update y: Each multiplier is linearly updated per bus j using the iterative mismatch:
λji[k + 1] =λji[k]+ρ(ν
j
i [k + 1]−vi[k + 1]), ∀i ∈ Nj,
θj[k + 1] =θj[k] + ρ(δj[k + 1]− qj[k + 1]). (4.9)
Thus, the summand
∑
i∈Nj λij[k + 1] is guaranteed to stay zero if properly initialized. This
corroborates the derivations for (4.8).
The ADMM iterations in (S1-S3) constitute the basis for our proposed distributed voltage con-
trol design. Its optimality can be established using the linear convergence results for general
ADMM solvers in [61]. Since each local objective fj(xj) in (4.3) is quadratic, it is closed, proper,
and strongly convex, while its gradient is also Lipschitz continuous, leading to Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Under fixed w and for any initialization {z[1], y[1]}, the ADMM iterates given by
(S1-S3) converge to the optimal solutions of (4.3) at a rate of at worst 1/k. Thus, the iterates q[k]
converge to the decision optimal VAR solution q? in (4.1) because the two problems are equivalent.
Remark 4. (Multi-Phase Networks.) The ADMM-based voltage control algorithm in (S1-S3) can
be readily generalized to solve the multi-phase network problem (4.2). Each scalar variable per
bus j in the single-phase problem must to be converted to a 3× 1 vector containing all three-phase
variables. For example, the voltage variable vj in (4.1) becomes the vector v˜j in (2.6). Hence, the
block sparse structure of B allows for a local update of xj[k + 1] by solving a linearly constrained
QP. The update of z[k + 1] is again a box-constrained QP which follows the same computing
rules in (4.8b). Thus, it suffices to replace all scalar variables in the single-phase problem by their
corresponding vector counterparts to extend (S1-S3) to a multi-phase problem. The optimality and
convergence claims in Proposition 3 still hold. See Appendix A for detailed derivations.
4.3 Online Voltage Control Design
The ADMM iterations in (S1-S3) assume the availability of wj at every bus j, which depends on
system operating conditions. If full information on complex power injection becomes available,
it is possible to compute w based on (2.5). However, such a centralized approach would require
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Figure 4.1: Online implemtation of the proposed DVC design that adapts to dynamic system
conditions and constantly updates the VAR control inputs. Rectangular blocks denote local
computational tasks of ADMM iterations and control updates, while the two vertical arrows
correspond to the communications between bus j and its neighborings buses.
two-way communications between each local controller and a centralized computer. This is greatly
challenged by fast system dynamics. Moreover, a direct approach to calculate w suffers from the
approximation error since (2.5) is obtained by linearizing the actual flow model.
To allow for fully distributed control design, we propose to obtain the possibly time-varying
wj[k] at every iteration k through local information exchange. Specifically, we design an online
voltage control scheme that uses the latest ADMM iterate qj[k] as the instantaneous VAR control
input. Under the ADMM update rule (4.8b), it is guaranteed that every qj[k] ∈ [qj, qj] thanks to
projection operator Pj . Hence, the local VAR injection output is set to be qj[k] once its latest value
is updated using (S2), without requiring the algorithm to achieve convergence. Under this setup,
the instantaneous bus voltage measurement is updated to v¯j[k] per bus j. Thus, bus j can obtain
wj based on all neighboring bus voltage measurements, as
wj[k] =
∑
i∈Nj Bjiv¯i[k]− qj[k]. (4.10)
This update only needs all incident line reactance values, assumed available locally at each bus. In
addition, this control design nicely adapts to dynamically varying operating conditions because it
is updated with the latest system information by incorporating the instantaneous voltage measure-
ments. Such an online feedback-based control design is attractive for dealing with the increasing
variability of renewable generations and elastic loads in future distribution networks.
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The proposed online implementation of DVC design follows the stochastic optimization frame-
work. It resembles the stochastic approximation iterations to determining q[k + 1] by adapting
to the instantaneous w[k] information (see e.g., [14, 35]). Stochastic approximation is known to
lead to the optimum solutions in the averaging sense. This shows that our proposed online DVC
design can take random disturbance into account and provide a smooth control action on the fly
that closely approximates the optimal control strategy under real-time implementation.
The implementation of our proposed ADMM-based online DVC design is illustrated in Fig. 5.1.
Every iteration consists of the local computations of (S1-S3) per bus j (denoted by the blocks), in
addition to two steps of information exchange among all neighboring buses (denoted by vertical
arrows). The sensing hardware requirement is minimal while the communication architecture is
fully local since the local computations would just require voltage measurement from neighboring
buses. Furthermore, the local computation subproblem, either QP in (S1) or linear updates in (S2-
S3), can be solved efficiently. Upon obtaining qj[k + 1] in (S2), bus j uses it to control local VAR
resources for maintaining the voltage v¯j[k + 1]→ µj .
Remark 5. (Cyber Network Topology) The node-to-node architecture of the DVC design can be
generalized to instead coordinate clusters of buses as long as the cyber network is connected; see
e.g., [27]. This way, it is not necessary to have DERs to be connected to each other by a line
segment. Additionally, even if the distribution network is not a complete entity (i.e., a DER is not
necessarily attached to every bus), we may eliminate all the buses with no DERs to create an equiv-
alent network by adopting the Kron reduction method [62]. Thus, this reduced network consists
of only buses with DERs installed. By adopting the voltage-based feedback signal w in (4.10), the
corresponding reduced Bbus matrix B would explicitly account for all system characteristics as
to the original network. Accordingly, the performance of our DVC design can still be guaranteed
under a generalized distribution network where DERs are not attached to each and every bus.
4.4 Robustness to Communication Link Failures
The proposed DVC performance depends on the quality of the communication links. Although it
has been assumed that the node-to-node communication is perfect with ideal links throughout the
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algorithmic implementation, for contemporary digital communication systems, random link fail-
ures are common due to either network congestion, or poor signal-to-noise ratios in some wireless
environments. Investigating how the ADMM-based DVC design copes with random link failures is
related to the so-termed asynchronous ADMM problem. This has attracted considerable attention
from the parallel optimization/computation communities (see e.g., [63,64] and references therein).
Most of these approaches consider parallel implementation of ADMM algorithms with potential
information exchange delays among peer processors. Under this setup, updating the decision vari-
able z[k + 1] is implemented at a centralized processor and thus would incur no synchronization-
related issues. For our DVC design as illustrated in Fig. 5.1, the updates of vj[k+1] and qj[k+1] in
(S2) are executed in each local bus j and could become asynchronous due to random link failures.
To tackle this, we extend our earlier work [59] on developing ADMM-based consensus averag-
ing algorithms under random link failures. A “freezing” strategy is advocated for every ADMM
variable update, which is unchanged until new information becomes available from neighboring
nodes’ message packets. The asynchronous consensus averaging algorithm under such a freezing
strategy has been proven convergent in [59] if the failure of each link follows a Bernoulli distri-
bution, independent across time. We propose to extend the DVC design shown by Fig. 5.1, by
modifying update steps (S1) - (S3) to incorporate only the information from the active links at
every iteration k. We denote Bj[k] ∈ Nj as the subset of neighboring buses actively connected to
bus j at iteration k. Hence, j ∈ Bj[k] always holds. Our proposed asynchronous (A-)DVC design
Algorithm 1 Asynchronous DVC (A-DVC) algorithm
1: for every iteration k = 1, 2, . . . do
2: for every bus j with |Bj[k]| ≥ 2 do
3: (AS1): update xj[k + 1] as in (4.5);
4: (AS2): update vj[k + 1] = 1|Bj [k]|
∑
i∈Bj [k] ν
i
j[k + 1]
5: update qj[k + 1] as in (4.8b);
6: Freeze v¯i[k + 1] = v¯i[k], ∀i /∈ Bj[k];
7: Update wj[k + 1] as in (4.10);
8: (AS3): update θj[k+ 1], {λji[k+ 1]}i∈Bj [k] as in (4.9), and {λji[k+ 1] = λji[k]}i/∈Bj [k];
9: end for
10: for any other bus j with |Bj[k]| = 1 do
11: Set all associated xj[k + 1], z[k + 1], and y[k + 1] values as the last iterates.
12: end for
13: end for
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is tabulated in Algorithm 1 assuming Bj[k] is known per bus j.
Proposition 4. The failure of each link follows an independent Bernoulli distribution. The iterates
of the A-DVC method as tabulated in Algorithm 1 asymptotically converge to the optimal solution
in (4.3), for both single- and multi-phase voltage control problems.
Proof of this proposition follows directly from the convergence analysis results of the random-
ized ADMM algorithm in [58]. By introducing the so-termed Douglas-Rachford (DR) operator,
a randomized DR splitting algorithm is convergent based on the non-expansiveness of random
Gauss-Seidel iterations. This framework with minor assumptions becomes equivalent to an asyn-
chronous ADMM algorithm. Thus, the convergence proof follows. The proposed A-DVC design
adopting the freezing strategy exhibits robustness against potential random communication link
failures. This will be further verified through numerical simulations.
4.5 Numerical Tests
Numerical tests are performed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed (A-)DVC scheme
for single- and multi-phase networks. Both static and dynamic tests using realistic system loading
and generation data are considered. For simplicity, the desired voltage magnitude µj is chosen
to be 1 in p.u. at every bus j, whereas the substation OLTC-based voltage regulation maintains
unit voltage level at the feeder head. Each bus is assumed to have a certain number of PV panels
installed and be able to provide voltage support via efficient inverter design. To demonstrate the
practical values of the proposed methods, the open-source simulator OpenDSS [65] is used to solve
for the non-linear multi-phase power flow and generate the output voltage profile.
4.5.1 Single-Phase 21-bus Radial Feeder
We first test on a simple case for better investigating the performance of ADMM-based voltage
control design. Specifically, consider a 12kV single-phase radial distribution feeder of 21 buses;
see, e.g., Fig. 2.1 for N = 20. Hence, the phase index φ can be ignored as well. Each line
segment has impedance value (0.233 + j0.366)Ω and power base Sbase=100MVA. Static tests are
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Figure 4.2: Log-scale voltage mismatch squared error versus iteration index for various cj values
for the static test settings.
implemented for comparison purposes where each bus has a constant load at (70 + j20)kVA and
abundant VAR resources qj ∈ [−100, 100]kVA corresponding to constraint (4.1c) such that a
solution for v = 1 always exists under no VAR penalization (c = 0).
We test the DVC algorithm with various choices of regularization coefficient cj in (4.1a). To
verify the aforementioned claim on improving the computational speed and dynamic stability using
a larger cj , we plot in Fig. 4.2 the iterative log-scale voltage mismatch squared error norm ‖v˜−1‖2
for each cj with all other settings the same, e.g., ρ = 1. Again, this squared error norm is based on
the voltage profile solved by the AC power flow. With an increasing cj , the oscillation level of the
corresponding curve decreases gradually, corroborating the numerical conditioning comment in
Sec. 4.1. Moreover, to verify our feedback-based design, we also test the scenario using a constant
and known w with cj = 0.08, as opposed to our DVC design that updates w recursively using
(4.10). Fig. 4.2 illustrates that our feedback-based approach has reduced the steady-state mismatch
error of the constant-w approach, justifying its capability in mitigating modeling mismatch of the
linear approximation in (2.5). The value of cj = 0.08 has been chosen for this feeder, as it induces
no voltage oscillation with preferred convergence speed (around 50 iterations until convergence).
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Last, we let cj = 0.8 to investigate the effect on optimal voltage profile to a highly regulated
qj . Based on (3), a larger regularization coefficient would result in increasing voltage mismatch
error. Thanks to our feedback-based design in Sec. 4.3, Fig. 4.2 verifies that the obtained voltage
mismatch is not sensitive to the varying level of VAR penalty, as the voltage mismatch ‖v˜−1‖2 →
0 for a wide range of cj values. Accordingly, this results in the same system operating conditions
when v˜ = 1, e.g., the total line losses and optimal VAR setting are the same for different cj
considered. To sum up, one may tune the regularization coefficient cj to achieve certain control
performance specifications in terms of convergence rate and oscillation level while still being able
to closely approach the flat voltage profile.
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Figure 4.3: Log-scale voltage mismatch squared error comparison between the proposed DVC
scheme and the algorithm of [15] with different ρ values.
We further investigate the effects of ρ value with cj=0.08 fixed. Fig. 4.3 plots the log-scale
voltage mismatch error for both the proposed DVC method and an earlier open-loop design in
[15]. The latter algorithm, developed solely for single-phase networks but also based on ADMM,
requires measuring and exchanging information regarding active/reactive flow of incident lines. It
incurs much higher complexity in sensing and communication as compared to our DVC approach.
Generally for both ADMM-typed methods, the level of regularization in the Lagrangian function
54
(4.4) would affect the convergence speed. For our DVC design, extensive testing has shown that
a reasonably large ρ , such as the choice of ρ = 1, would be preferred. Generally speaking, it
is challenging to obtain the best choice of ρ, which is beyond the scope of this thesis (see, e.g.,
[66] for relevant discussions on this topic). For practical implementations, we suggest adaptively
adjusting the ρ value at each node depending on the oscillation level of the resultant voltage.
More interestingly, with proper choice of ρ our proposed DVC design significantly outperforms
the approach in [15], in terms of both convergence speed and the oscillation level. Although the
oscillation of the open-loop method is observed to be bounded by an envelope that asymptotically
converges, such behavior could still be problematic as it would negatively affect the operations of
capacitors and voltage regulators. We expect the same observations would hold when comparing
our voltage-feedback design and other open-loop methods in [13,15], also when applied for multi-
phase networks. Henceforth, all static tests have validated the effectiveness of our DVC scheme,
which can achieve the optimal VAR control solution at minimal sensing/communication overhead
and no centralized coordination.
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Figure 4.4: Voltage mismatch squared error versus iteration index under various rates of link
failure.
Furthermore, we validate the robustness of our DVC scheme against imperfect communication
links. The failure of every link is set to follow a Bernoulli distribution with the same probability
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of being active; all other settings follow from earlier tests with ρ = 1 and cj = 0.08. Fig. 4.4
compares the error performance of the proposed A-DVC design under various rates of link failure,
ranging from 0% to 90%. The case of zero failure rate corresponds to that of all ideally perfect
links, under which the A-DVC algorithm boils down original DVC one. Fig. 4.4 demonstrates
the guaranteed convergence to the optimum for any failure rate, as established by Proposition 4.
Intuitively, a lower failure rate would lead to a faster convergence speed, where the synchronous
DVC scenario with no link failure at all exhibits the fastest convergence. To test the dynamic
performance of the A-DVC algorithm, a decrease in generation output is introduced at iteration
k = 300 that could represent the scenario of PV variability under sudden cloud coverage. Under
this setting, our A-DVC scheme is still convergent to a nearly flat steady-state voltage profile.
This test validates the robustness and stability of the proposed A-DVC design under imperfect
communication scenarios.
4.5.2 IEEE 123-bus Multi-Phase Feeder
Our proposed DVC scheme is also validated using the unbalanced 123-bus feeder case considering
dynamic operating conditions [55]. In particular, we use the real data on residential load and solar
generation profiles shown in Fig. 4.5. These minute-sampled profiles including reactive power
loading are taken from an online data repository [67], and were collected at a US residential home
on Friday, June 20th, 2010. As for the test settings, the tap positions of voltage regulators are held
constant as the original test case in order to better capture the performance of different inverter-
based voltage control designs. The voltage at the substation of the feeder head is kept to be 1
p.u. A certain number of residential homes with solar generation rated at 3.5kW peak capacity
are attached to each node. This number is determined and rounded up by dividing the IEEE 123-
bus active spot load profile by the maximum daily active load (≈6kW) of a home as shown in
Fig. 4.5. Thus, the location of DERs corresponds to nodes with active power loading in the IEEE
123-bus test case. Once the number of homes for each node is computed, both the active and
VAR loading can be directly assigned according to the dataset in [67]. Additionally, we diversify
the loading by small random additive noises. At every slot, the VAR limits [q,q] are updated
based on the given inverter rating (i.e., 3.5kVA per inverter at a home) and the instantaneous solar
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Figure 4.5: Sample daily load and solar PV generation profiles of a US home.
power output. Under these settings, it turns out that VAR resources of inverters are insufficient to
achieve perfectly flat voltage at all times. This implies that the control problem (4.2) turns out to
be constrained by limited VAR resources. Thus, one can encourage a higher level of VAR support
by choosing a reasonably small cφj = 0.08.
The proposed online DVC implementation in Sec. 4.3 is tested to tackle the under- and over-
voltage dynamics in this feeder due to load and solar variations. Each ADMM iteration is updated
every 2 seconds (a total of 30 updates per minute) assuming a constant minute-to-minute system
operation condition w. This update rate is sufficient for DVC design with an uniform cφj = 0.08
to achieve a satisfactory convergence property within a minute interval. The local control design
developed in [3, 17] is also included to demonstrate the improved performance achieved by co-
ordinating network-wide VAR resources through information exchange. It uses locally available
voltage measurements and follows either a droop curve [17] or the integral control principle [3],
with no communications among nodes. Fig. 4.6 plots the daily voltage mismatch error for the a-
phase of the 123-bus, where the other two phases are observed to exhibit similar comparisons. The
scenario of no inverter VAR output is included as a benchmark. For all three schemes, the voltage
mismatch error is almost the same around noon due to higher solar generation and accordingly
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smaller limits of VAR capability. For the rest of the day, especially morning and evening hours
when the loading is at the highest, the voltage violation is extremely severe at no VAR support
while the inverter-based DVC ideally maintains the nearly flat voltage profile. The local control
scheme is also able to reduce the high-level voltage violation based on local voltage information.
However, due to lack of network-wide information to support centralized coordination of VAR
resources, the local design suffers from visible mismatch error, especially during evening hours in
the zoom-in view. Thanks to information exchange among neighboring nodes, the DVC scheme
efficiently percolates local voltage violation to the rest of network to solicit VAR support from
remote inverters. It attains the globally optimal performance as if all information were available
at a centralized controller, leading to around 50% reduction in voltage mismatch error from local
control.
In summary, the proposed (A-)DVC design can efficiently improve the performance of local
strategies by coordinating network-wide VAR resources. This capability is more valuable when
VAR resources are significantly constrained at some locations, a scenario that will represent a ma-
jority of distribution feeders into the near future. Meanwhile, its robustness to communication link
failures is also attractive, considering the limited deployment of cyber infrastructure in distribution
systems. Thus, we envision the proposed DVC designs will be instrumental in engaging inverter-
based VAR resources to improve voltage support by accounting for practical constraints in both
physical and cyber layers.
4.6 Summary
This chapter has developed a fully distributed voltage control (DVC) design to manage VAR-
capable DERs deployed in an increasingly dynamic and variable distribution network. We have
cast the voltage control problem as one of quadratic programming that minimizes the voltage mis-
match under VAR resource limits. The ADMM distributed optimization algorithm is adopted to
develop the decentralized structure for the proposed DVC design. To reduce the communication
complexity, the power flow coupling is linearized to involve only neighboring nodes. Thus, the
DVC design only relies on information exchange among neighboring nodes with local computa-
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Figure 4.6: Daily voltage mismatch squared error at phase a of the 123-bus feeder.
tions. Furthermore, we have extended the implementation of the proposed ADMM-based control
in an online fashion that is robust to random communication link failures. The effectiveness and
robustness of our proposed design have been validated through extensive numerical tests using
realistic multi-phase feeders under dynamic testing environments.
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CHAPTER 5
COMMUNICATION-COGNIZANT HYBRID
VOLTAGE CONTROL
The distributed voltage control (DVC) design in Chap. 4 can effectively coordinate network-wide
VAR resources to attain a globally optimal voltage profile. Albeit the DVC design is robust against
random communication failures, it would fail to work and incorporate any local voltage informa-
tion under the worst-case scenario of total communication outages. This is because each node
needs to freeze all variable updates in order to stay coordinated with neighboring nodes. Hence, to
reduce communication complexity and enhance robustness to imperfect communications, it is im-
perative to develop an integrated design that can achieve the dual objectives of flexible adaptivity
to variable rate of communications and global optimality of voltage regulation performance. Such
an innovative design has the potential of unifying the currently separated framework of either local
or distributed control design of [3–5].
The present chapter aims to design a hybrid voltage control (HVC) strategy that can dynamically
adapt to varying system operating conditions while being fully cognizant of the instantaneous rates
of communication links. To cope with practical communication limitations, the proposed HVC
scheme consists of both distributed and local control architectures and does not require a central-
ized authority. We formulate the network-wide VAR optimization problem based on the linearized
power flow model for analysis purposes only. The resultant quadratic programming problem is
solved by a partial primal-dual gradient (PPD) algorithm in discrete-time domain, which is a vari-
ant of the classical primal-dual (sub)gradient method; see e.g., [68]. We provide the analysis in
step-size choices that can guarantee convergence. We further use the PPD-based solver to design
an online HVC strategy where each bus can integrate both the local voltage measurement and
the communication information shared by neighboring buses. Although a linearized model has
been adopted for the algorithmic development and analysis, performance of the proposed HVC
design has been verified using the full ac power flow model for unbalanced and lossy distribu-
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tion networks. Compared to existing voltage control approaches, the main contributions of our
HVC design are three-fold. First, it explicitly accounts for the VAR limits by using the projection
operator. Due to the discontinuity of projection mapping, general Krasovskii’s methods [69] for
analyzing the stability of primal-dual gradient flow method would not hold. To tackle this problem,
we have expressed the operation as a subgradient step featured by an indicator function in order to
establish the stability of the PPD-based HVC design in Sec. 5.2.1. Second, the HVC design only
requires each bus to measure its local voltage magnitude and communicate it to neighboring buses.
The sensing requirement and communication overhead are minimal in addition to simple control
algorithmics compared to most (de)centralized strategies. Last but not least, our hybrid design can
integrate both the neighboring bus voltage information and local voltage measurements regardless
of the communication link conditions. This way, the HVC design is cognizant of the instantaneous
availability of communication links while effectively tracking the globally optimal VAR setting.
Interestingly, although the HVC updates have been developed using the distributed PPD-based
solver, it would boil down to a surrogate local voltage control update during a total communica-
tion outage. Under this worst-case scenario, satisfactory performance can still be achieved as it
responds to local voltage variations.
5.1 Hybrid Voltage Control Problem
For ease of presentation, we design the HVC design based on the single-phase network. Its multi-
phase counterpart could be readily extended by considering the power flow model (2.12). To this
end, we start with the static problem formulation where the operating condition w stays constant.
The HVC algorithm design will be eventually extended to be fully online and distributed where
each bus j only needs the neighboring voltage information to dynamically track wj . The voltage
mismatch error objective f1(v) := 12‖v − µ‖2 is introduced to provide the globally optimal VAR
setting. Minimizing f1 subject to (2.5) could be solved collaboratively by the buses using dis-
tributed optimization techniques; see e.g., [5,16,27]. Nonetheless, these distributed designs would
fail to adapt to a total communication outage, during which isolated buses have to freeze all local
variables in order to remain coordinated with neighboring buses. To make the control design more
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robust, we introduce also a weighted error objective f2(v) := 12‖v − µ‖2B where ‖y‖2B := yTBy
for any vector y. It will turn out that the gradient direction for minimizing f2 only depends on the
local voltage deviation, as in the droop design [3]. Under limited VAR resources, this weighted
objective f2 is not equivalent to the original one f1. However, incorporating the former turns out to
be extremely useful for achieving the HVC design that can seamlessly perform local updates even
with no incoming messages from neighboring buses.
Towards achieving the attractive features of both distributed and local control designs, we cast
the HVC problem as
(v?,q?) := arg min
v,q
[
f1(v) + γf2(s(q))
]
(5.1a)
subject to Bv = q + w (5.1b)
q ≤ q ≤ q, (5.1c)
where s(q) := X(q + w) = v according to (2.5), and qg is replaced by q in the rest of the thesis.
Both v and q are the decision variables in the problem (5.1), with either one uniquely determined
by the other. However, expressing f2 as a function of q would allow for conveniently forming its
instantaneous gradient direction using local voltage mismatch error. Note that the problem (5.1)
is strongly convex because B is positive definite [3], and thus the optimum (v?,q?) is unique.
The objective function (5.1a) uses a positive parameter γ > 0 to balance between f1 and f2,
depending on the communication rates. Under very frequent link failures, γ needs to increase to
weigh more on f2 and thus the local voltage error information. If high-rate communications are
available, a small γ value would be preferred to minimize the global voltage mismatch error f1.
Hence, the choice of γ can be determined upon assessing the quality of communication network
in order to balance between the global voltage mismatch error and the local one. Furthermore,
the sparsity structure of B based on the network topology would induce coupling only among the
neighborhoodNj in (5.1b). This is instrumental for the development of a distributed HVC solution.
Moreover, the bounds on each local VAR resource in (5.1c) are constrained by inverters’ apparent
power limit and/or power factor limit, and thus they depend on the instantaneous active power
outputs. If there are abundant VAR resources, (5.1c) would become inactive. Under this scenario,
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the optimal VAR output q? is the same regardless of the choice of γ, as v? = µ can always
be achieved. This fact justifies the inclusion of f2 as its solution could closely approximate the
globally optimal one to f1. Last, the modeling of inverter controllers is not needed for our system-
level problem [15, 17, 27]. Thanks to the time-scale separation between the dynamics of internal
inverter control and distribution system level disturbances [23], the former has very minimal effect
on the network VAR control problem [24].
5.2 Communication-Cognizant Hybrid Voltage Control Design
This section presents our proposed hybrid voltage control (HVC) framework. Combining the
distributed and local control features, we aim to solve (5.1) by adopting the partial primal-dual
(PPD) algorithm, a distributed optimization technique based on saddle point flow method that has
been studied and applied in different literature (see, e.g., [69–71]). Based on the PPD, we design
the HVC scheme that needs only to measure and incorporate the dynamic voltage magnitude. As
detailed soon, the proposed feedback approach is very different from existing distributed control
schemes in power systems since most of them are developed as a static optimization problem and
overlook the communication imperfectness and online implementations. Most importantly, our
HVC scheme would boil down to a surrogate local voltage control problem under the worst-case
scenario of a total communication failure. Thus, it enjoys a satisfactory performance by having the
cognizance of varying communication scenarios.
Introducing the Lagrangian multiplier λ for the equality constraints in (5.1b), we obtain the
following Lagrangian function for the given static optimization problem (5.1):
L(v,q,λ)
q∈Q
= 1
2
‖v − µ‖2 + γ
2
‖X(q + w)− µ‖2B
+〈λ,Bv − q−w〉,
(5.2)
where we define Q := {q∣∣q ∈ [q,q]} and 〈·, ·〉 represents the inner product. Based on this La-
grangian function, the primal-dual algorithm works by cyclically minimizing the primal variables
v and q, followed by the gradient ascent-based update of the dual variable λ. To account for total
communication failures, we adopt a modified version, namely, the partial primal-dual (PPD) algo-
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rithm, which iteratively updates q in a gradient-descent fashion instead of finding the minimum at
every step [72]. Specifically, the (k + 1)-th iteration at bus j by communicating with neighboring
buses consists of the following three steps:
(S1) Update v: For given qk and λk, v is updated by solving vk+1 = arg minv L(v,qk,λk),
which is an unconstrained quadratic program, for which there exists closed-form solution.
Note that the Lagrangian L in (5.2) is separable over vj’s, and thus the update decouples into
each bus j as
vk+1j = −
∑
i∈Nj
Bjiλ
k
i + µj. (5.3)
The iterates vk can be viewed as an estimate of the network voltage based on the power
flow model (2.5). This v update via direct minimization is different from the classical
gradient flow algorithm, which would resort to a gradient descent-type update like v˙ =
− ∂
∂v
L(v,qk,λk). Hence, the term partial is used here to acknowledge this difference. A
similar strategy of “partial gradient update” has been explored in [71] for a continuous-time
setting whereas our focus is on the discrete-time update.
(S2) Update q: Using the step-size α > 0, we perform a gradient-projection based update on q,
as given by
qk+1 := P{qk − α∇qL(vk+1,qk,λk)}, (5.4)
where the operator P{·} projects any input into the box Q. Hence, qk ∈ [q,q] always holds
at any time k, and this iterate serves as the feasible control signal to command the VAR
resources. Under this setting and using XB = I, the gradient direction in (5.4) becomes
∇qL(vk+1,qk,λk) = γXB[X(qk + w)− µ)]− λk
≈ γ(v˜k − µ)− λk, (5.5)
where the actual system voltage v˜k ≈ X(qk+w) if the VAR outputs equals to qk, following
from the linearized model (2.5). Note that each v˜kj can be easily measured per bus j. Thus,
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computing the gradient direction in (5.5) completely decouples per bus j upon measuring its
voltage v˜kj and forming its multiplier λ
k
j . As both matrices X and B are uniquely invertible of
each other, any weighting matrices other than B will not lead to this decoupling feature. And
this is exactly the reason for choosing f2 in the objective function. Thanks to the separability
of box constraints, we further decouple the update (5.4) into each bus j as
qk+1j := Pj{qkj − α
[
γ(v˜kj − µj)− λkj
]}, (5.6)
where Pj denotes the projection at bus j to [qj, qj]. Even though these bounds would vary
under dynamic setting based on instantaneous active power outputs of inverters, they can be
easily updated at each bus. Note that the gradient update in (5.6) using the voltage mea-
surement also nicely adapts to dynamic setting, as the physical power flow coupling always
guarantees it has the latest network-wide information. This unique feature will enable the
robustness of our proposed HVC design against link failures. Thus, the iterate qk+1j can
be considered as an implementable transient solution that is actively tracking the dynamic
optimality under time-varying operating conditions.
(S3) Update λ: For a given step-size β > 0, each multiplier per bus j is linearly updated using
the iterative mismatch of the respective equality constraint, as given by
λk+1j := λ
k
j + β
∑
i∈Nj
Bjiv
k+1
i − qk+1j − wj
 . (5.7)
The PPD-based iterations in (S1-S3) constitute the basis for our proposed hybrid voltage control
design. Similar to DVC design in Ch. 4, for multi-phase networks, the generalized matrix B
in Sec. 2.1.2 would also have a block sparse structure [12]. Hence, it suffices to replace each
scalar variable in the single-phase formulation by its three-phase vector counterpart for the multi-
phase extensions of (S1)-(S3). In addition, the bus-to-bus architecture of the HVC design can also
be generalized to coordinate clusters of buses likes those for DVC designs as long as the cyber
network is still connected; see Remark 5.
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5.2.1 Convergence Analysis
With no projection operation in the q-update (5.4), the convergence problem of PPD boils down
to a straightforward stability analysis of a discrete-time linear system. However, the presence of
projection is equivalent to the so-called saturation effects in linear systems, for which the stability
analysis could be much more challenging [73]. To tackle this problem, we instead adopt a convex
analysis approach.
To streamline the presentation, consider the following general form of (5.2):
L(v,q,λ) = f(v) + g(q) + I(q) + 〈λ,Bv − q−w〉, (5.8)
where both functions f and g are strongly convex and have Lipschitz gradients. To account forQ,
define the following indicator function
I(q) =
 0, if q ∈ Q,+∞, if q /∈ Q.
Thus, (5.2) is a special case of (5.8) with f(v) , f1(v) = 12‖v − µ‖2 and g(q) , f2(s(q)) =
γ
2
‖X(q + w) − µ‖2B. Thus, there exist positive constants η and L such that g(·) is a η-strongly
convex function with L-Lipschitz gradient; i.e., it holds that
〈x− y,∇g(x)−∇g(y)〉 ≥ η‖x− y‖22, ∀x,y
‖∇g(x)−∇g(y)‖2 ≤ L‖x− y‖2, ∀x,y.
In addition, f(·) is c-strongly convex for any c = 1 while I(·) is a convex function.
The saddle point (v?,q?,λ?) to (5.8) containing the optimal solution (v?,q?) to (5.1) satisfies
the following KKT conditions:
∇f(v?) + BTλ? = 0, (5.9a)
∇g(q?)− λ? + ∂I(q?) 3 0, (5.9b)
Bv? − q? −w = 0, (5.9c)
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where ∂I(q?) is the subdifferential set of I(·) at q?, which contains any subgradient of I(·) at
q ∈ Q, denoted by ∇˜I(q); i.e., ∇˜I(q) ∈ ∂I(q). Thus, the subdifferential inclusion condition in
(5.9b) can be replaced by
∇g(q?)− λ? + ∇˜I(q?) = 0, for some ∇˜I(q?). (5.10)
The ensuing analysis will rely on (5.10) as a more tractable version of (5.9b). This subgradient
based treatment of KKT conditions is popular among many recent references including [74, 75].
The subgradient ∇˜I(q?) in (5.10) can be expressed as λ? −∇g(q˜?) where
q˜? , arg min
q∈Q
g(q)− 〈λ?,q〉.
Note that q˜? is well-defined when g(q) is strongly convex orQ is compact, exactly the case in our
problem. Using these notations, the PPD updates in (S1)-(S3) are equivalent to
v-update: vk+1 = arg minv f(v) + 〈λk,Bv〉;
q-update: qk+1 = P{qk − α∇g(qk) + αλk};
λ-update: λk+1 = λk + β(Bvk+1 − qk+1 −w).
(5.11)
The recursive relation of the iterate {vk,qk,λk} in (5.11) can be further written as1
∇f(vk+1) + BTλk = 0, (5.12a)
qk+1 = qk − α∇g(qk) + αλk − α∇˜I(qk+1), (5.12b)
λk+1 = λk + β(Bvk+1 − qk+1 −w). (5.12c)
The gist of our analysis is to show that all first-order residuals of (5.12), namely ‖∇f(vk+1) +
BTλk‖, ‖qk − qk+1‖22, and ‖λk − λk+1‖22, will asymptotically converge to zero. Due to the
existence and uniqueness of (v?,q?) under strong convexity, a vanishing property of first-order
residuals leads to the asymptotic convergence of the iterates (vk,qk). The conditions of step-size
1Using the subgradient and indicator function, one can write a general gradient projection update as a subgradient
update.
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choice will be given here for achieve the vanishing property.
Theorem 3. Let η˜ and L˜ be the smallest and largest singular values of matrix B, respectively. If
the positive α and β are chosen such that α < 2/[γ(L˜−1 + η˜−1)],β < 2/[L˜2 + γ−1(L˜+ η˜)], (5.13)
then the sequence {qk} generated by the PPD updates (S1)-(S3) converges to the optimum q?.
Proof: We first show that the successive difference {‖qk−qk+1‖22+‖λk−λk+1‖22} is an infinitely
summable sequence and thus converges to zero. We will form the difference between the iterates
and their corresponding optimum solutions. To this end, substituting the update (5.12c) for λk
into (5.12a) and (5.12b), respectively, and then subtracting the two latter equations by the KKT
conditions (5.9)-(5.10), we have
∇f(vk+1)−∇f(v?) + BT(λk+1 − λ?)
− βBT(B(vk+1 − v?)− (qk+1 − q?)) = 0, (5.14a)
qk+1 = qk − α(∇g(qk)−∇g(q?)) + α(λk+1 − λ?)
− αβ(B(vk+1 − v?)− (qk+1 − q?))
− α(∇˜I(qk+1)− ∇˜I(q?)), (5.14b)
λk+1 = λk + β(B(vk+1 − v?)− (qk+1 − q?)). (5.14c)
Additionally, by the strong convexity and gradient Lipschitz continuity of g(·), we have
2ηL
η+L
‖qk − q?‖22 + 2η+L‖∇g(qk)−∇g(q?)‖22
≤ 2〈qk − q?,∇g(qk)−∇g(q?)〉
≤ 2〈qk+1 − q?,∇g(qk)−∇g(q?)〉
+ η+L
2
‖qk − qk+1‖22 + 2η+L‖∇g(qk)−∇g(q?)‖22.
(5.15)
The first inequality of (5.15) is a standard result under strong convexity and gradient Lipschitz
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continuity; see e.g, [76, Thm 2.1.11]. Reorganizing (5.15) gives rise to
2αηL
η+L
‖qk − q?‖22≤2〈qk+1−q?, α(∇g(qk)−∇g(q?))〉
+α(η+L)
2
‖qk − qk+1‖22.
(5.16)
Substituting (5.14b) into (5.16) for α(∇g(qk)−∇g(q?)) leads to
2αηL
η+L
‖qk − q?‖22
≤ 2〈qk+1 − q?,qk − qk+1〉+ 2〈qk+1 − q?, αλk+1 − αλ?〉
−2〈qk+1 − q?, αβB(vk+1 − v?)〉
+2〈qk+1 − q?, αβ(qk+1 − q?)〉
−2〈qk+1 − q?, α(∇˜I(qk+1)− ∇˜I(q?))〉
+α(η+L)
2
‖qk − qk+1‖22
≤ 2〈qk+1 − q?,qk − qk+1〉+ 2α〈qk+1 − q?,λk+1 − λ?〉
−2αβ〈qk+1 − q?,B(vk+1 − v?)〉+ 2αβ‖qk+1 − q?‖22
+α(η+L)
2
‖qk − qk+1‖22.
(5.17)
As for the function f(·), by the strong convexity we have
2c‖vk+1−v?‖22 ≤ 2〈vk+1−v?,∇f(vk+1)−∇f(v?)〉. (5.18)
Substituting∇f(vk+1)−∇f(v?) of (5.14a) into (5.18) leads to
2αc‖vk+1 − v?‖22
≤2α〈vk+1 − v?,BT(λ? − λk+1)〉
+ βBT(B(vk+1 − v?)− (qk+1 − q?))〉
=2α〈B(vk+1 − v?),λ? − λk+1〉+ 2αβ‖vk+1 − v?‖2BTB
− 2αβ〈B(vk+1 − v?),qk+1 − q?〉. (5.19)
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Summing up (5.17) and (5.19) results in
2αηL
η+L
‖qk − q?‖22 + 2αc‖vk+1 − v?‖22
≤2〈qk+1 − q?,qk − qk+1〉+ 2α〈qk+1 − q?,λk+1 − λ?〉
− 2αβ〈qk+1 − q?,B(vk+1 − v?)〉+ 2αβ‖qk+1 − q?‖22
+ α(η+L)
2
‖qk − qk+1‖22
+ 2α〈B(vk+1 − v?),λ? − λk+1〉+ 2αβ‖vk+1 − v?‖2BTB
− 2αβ〈B(vk+1 − v?),qk+1 − q?〉. (5.20)
Consider a basic inequality rule for Euclidean norm
2〈√ρa,
√
ρ−1b〉 ≤ ρ‖a‖2 + ρ−1‖b‖2,
which holds for any ρ > 0 and vectors a and b of the same dimension. Using this inequality and
(5.14c), the right-hand-side of (5.20) can be relaxed by
2〈qk+1 − q?,qk − qk+1〉+ 2α
β
〈λk − λk+1,λk+1 − λ?〉
+( (1−ε)α
β
+ (1+ε)α
β
)‖λk − λk+1‖22 + α(η+L)2 ‖qk − qk+1‖22
≤ ‖qk − q?‖22 − ‖qk+1 − q?‖22 − ‖qk − qk+1‖22
+α
β
(‖λk − λ?‖22 − ‖λk+1 − λ?‖22)− ε‖λk − λk+1‖22
+α(η+L)
2
‖qk − qk+1‖22 + (1 + ε)αβ(1 + ρ)‖B(vk+1 − v?)‖22
+(1 + ε)αβ(1 + 1
ρ
)‖qk+1 − q?‖22,
(5.21)
where ε is any arbitrary constant within (0, 1). It then follows from (5.20) and (5.21) that
(1− α(η+L)
2
)‖qk − qk+1‖22 + ε‖λk − λk+1‖22
≤ (1− 2αηL
η+L
)‖qk − q?‖22 + αβ (‖λk − λ?‖22 − ‖λk+1 − λ?‖22)
−(1− (1 + ε)αβ(1 + 1
ρ
))‖qk+1 − q?‖22
−(2αc− (1 + ε)αβ(1 + ρ)σmax‖vk+1 − v?‖22,
where σmax is defined as the largest singular value of BTB. This inequality is crucial for showing
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the iterative difference is infinitely summable. By comparing the coefficients corresponding to
each term, we come up with the following set of necessary conditions:
1− α(η+L)
2
> 0,
ε > 0,
1− 2αηL
η+L
≤ 1− (1 + ε)αβ(1 + 1
ρ
),
2αc− (1 + ε)αβ(1 + ρ)σmax ≥ 0,
(5.22)
which is equivalent to having
α < 2
η+L
,
β < min
{
2ηL
(η+L)(1+ 1
ρ
)
, 2c
(1+ρ)σmax
}
.
(5.23)
The best range of β is achieved by setting ρ = c(η+L)
ηLσmax
. Accordingly, the step-size rule for β
becomes
β < 2cηL
ηLσmax+c(η+L)
. (5.24)
The choice of α and β given by (5.23)-(5.24) guarantees the infinite summability of the sequence
{‖qk − qk+1‖22 + ‖λk − λk+1‖22}. Hence, each one of the summands, namely ‖qk − qk+1‖ and
‖λk − λk+1‖2, converges to zero. Based on (5.12), we thus assert
‖∇f(vk+1) + BTλk‖2 = 0, (5.25a)
lim
k→∞
‖∇g(qk)− λk + ∇˜I(qk+1)‖2 = 0, (5.25b)
lim
k→∞
‖Bvk+1 − qk+1 −w‖2 = 0. (5.25c)
Comparing (5.25) with (5.9)-(5.10), one can conclude that the KKT conditions hold for the limit
and thus the sequence {qk} converges to q?.
Last, for the specific forms of f = f1 and g = f2, their respective Hessian is ∇2f = I and
∇2g = γX. Since η˜ and L˜ denote the smallest and largest singular values of B, respectively, we
have η = γL˜−1 and L = γη˜−1 for its inverse X. As c = 1 for the function f1, the step-size
conditions in (5.24) are equivalent to (5.13).
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Remark 6. (General Error Objective Functions) Our convergence analysis is performed by as-
suming both functions f and g are strongly convex. This assumption can be relaxed to the so-
termed restricted strongly convex functions [77], such as the Huber loss function. To this end, the
first inequality in (5.15) needs to be modified to have more conservative coefficients on the left-
hand side, leading to a narrower region of step-size choice. In addition, it is possible to completely
remove the (restricted) strong convexity assumption on f1. Specifically, the v-update in (5.11) can
be simply modified as
vk+1 = arg min
v
f1(v) + 〈λk,Bv〉+ ϑ‖v − vk‖2
to tackle the case of lacking (restricted) strong convexity. Compared to the previous update
scheme, one more proximal term is augmented to stabilize the system. Informally speaking, the
additional term ϑ‖v− vk‖2 can enhance the stability region of step-sizes for non-strongly convex
functions. In this case, the step-size rule would depend on the choice of ϑ. Although the modified
update would allow more general error objective functions, such generalization is likely to reduce
convergence speed in practice and thus is not employed in our current HVC strategy.
In general, a larger network size increases the value of L˜, and thus may reduce the range of β.
Fortunately, our empirical experience suggests that the choice of β minimally affects the conver-
gence speed, while the step-size α for q-update plays a more important role. As for the smallest
eigenvalue η˜ for the reduced graph Laplacian, it is strongly related to the connectivity2 of the
network. As long as the network is connected, this quantity is lower bounded away from zero.
Empirically, a larger α value leads to increased convergence speed. Thus, a more clustered power
network would result in a faster convergence, which coincides with the common wisdom. A thor-
ough investigation of convergence rate would involve the spectral analysis on the eigenvalues of
matrix B, which is an interesting future research direction.
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Figure 5.1: Online implementation of the proposed HVC design that adapts to dynamic system
conditions and constantly updates the VAR control inputs. Rectangular blocks denote local
computational tasks of PPD iterations and control updates, while the two vertical arrows
correspond to the communications exchange among bus j and its neighboring buses.
5.2.2 Online Feedback Design
Thus far, we assume the availability of staticwj per bus j. However, it would change in accordance
with the system operating condition. To account for system dynamics based on (2.5), we need to
compute and update wj which requires network-wide complex power injections. To this end,
two-way communications between each bus and a centralized computer are necessary. Generally,
this is not feasible due to limited communication in the distribution network in addition to fast
system dynamics. Similar to Sec. 4.3, thanks to the sparsity of B, its entry is zero for any pair of
buses whose corresponding buses are not connected by a line segment. Accordingly, we propose
to obtain a time-varying wkj through neighboring voltage measurement exchanges. Each bus j
measures its voltage magnitude v˜k+1j after (S2) and broadcasts to its neighboring buses. Assuming
all incident line reactance values are known at each bus, we update wk+1j as
wk+1j :=
∑
i∈Nj
Bjiv˜
k+1
i − qk+1j , (5.26)
which is computed locally and adopted in (S3). The attractive features of the proposed feedback
design are three-fold. First, we can obtain wk+1j locally at each bus by adopting bus-to-bus com-
munication architecture. This is nicely designed to our HVC scheme as the distributed feature
2Note that the algebraic connectivity of the graph is defined as the second smallest eigenvalue of the standard
Laplacian. Thus, the exact relation between the algebraic connectivity and η˜ needs further investigation in future.
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is maintained. Second, the instantaneous voltage measurements contain the latest system infor-
mation, and hence wk+1 accurately approximates the dynamically varying operating conditions.
Last but not least, the voltage feedback control design improves the robustness to mismatch and
imperfection in system modeling (see e.g., [47, Sec. 8.9]) since the voltage measurements could
potentially capture the underlying non-linearity in the power networks. Fig. 5.1 offers a schematic
of the proposed PPD-based HVC implementation. Every iteration consists of the local computa-
tions of (S1)-(S3) per bus j (the blocks), in addition to two steps of information exchange among
all neighboring buses (the vertical arrows). All the computational tasks for (S1)-(S3) are simple
linear updates and thus can be executed efficiently. After updating qk+1j in (S2), bus j inputs it as
the control signal for the local VAR resource and then measures and broadcasts the voltage v˜k+1j
to neighboring buses for updating ωk+1j in (5.26).
5.2.3 Imperfect Communication
The performance of the proposed HVC design relies on the quality of bus-to-bus communication
links, which we have assumed to be perfect throughout the algorithmic design. However, random
link failures and messaging delays are common because of either network congestion, or poor
signal-to-noise ratios in some wireless environments for a contemporary digital communication
system. It is imperative to examine how the PPD-based HVC scheme works under imperfect
communication, which leads to the following two different scenarios. One is often referred to as
asynchronous networking and consists of both link failures and messaging delays [64, 78], while
the other only considers link failures. The later scenario can be also referred to as a time-varying
network [79, 80]. Albeit the second scenario seems to be a special case of the first, by playing a
simple trick of embedding a time stamp in the message between each pair of buses, delays can
also be treated as link failures.3 Informally speaking, as long as the delay is bounded and the time-
varying communication network isB-connected,4 one should be able to choose small enough step-
sizes to stabilize the proposed algorithm. There have been some analyses of algorithms under these
3We assume that each bus has a clock that is aligned. As the information exchanges and dual updates could be
performed at a relatively low speed, a slight mismatch between clocks does not break the viability of this approach.
4It is a connectivity description of graphs under time-varying scenarios. Readers are referred to Assumption 2 at
page 7 of reference [80] for detailed definition.
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conditions in the literature (see, e.g., [58, 81]). Though rigorous proof of convergence properties
under these conditions is beyond the scope of this thesis and will be a project for future work, we
will test and validate our proposed design with a real distribution feeder in Sec. 5.3.
To tackle the challenge posed by imperfect communication networks, we leverage the work
in [58, 59, 81] regarding the “freezing” strategy for distributed optimization problems. Conven-
tionally, this scheme is advocated for every PPD variable, which remains unchanged until new
information is available from neighboring buses’ message packets. The asynchronous version of
a related distributed primal-dual algorithm in [81] has been proven to be convergent under ran-
dom activation of agents, i.e., link (i, j) ∈ E is available only when i and j are both randomly
activated. It is assumed that the activation of each bus follows a Bernoulli distribution, indepen-
dent across time. Nonetheless, under this strategy, the aforementioned PPD-based HVC updates
would completely halt under the case of a total link failure in the communication network. The
novelty of our work lies in the extension of the HVC scheme by modifying update steps (S1)-(S3)
to have: a) satisfactory performance under partial link failures, b) capability to continue providing
VAR regulation under a total link failure scenario. To this end, we freeze the variables vj and λj
associated with the inactive bus j while always updating the VAR control signal according to (5.6)
by adapting local gradient information from v˜kj . Since the voltage measurements always contain
the most updated network information, the local voltage control design objective f2 is advocated
to continue providing the VAR support. As a result, under a total communication failure, our HVC
framework boils down to a surrogate local controller design based on the current value of λj . This
is similar to the microgrid secondary frequency/voltage control design, where λj can be treated as
an offset signal to a local droop controller [7]. We denote N ka ⊆ N as the subset activated nodes
at iteration k. Our proposed asynchronous (A-)HVC algorithm is tabulated in Algorithm 2.
5.3 Numerical Tests
The numerical tests presented in this section demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed HVC
design which has an attractive communication-cognizant feature for a practical distribution feeder.
We investigate the performance of our scheme under the settings of both static and dynamically
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Algorithm 2 Asynchronous HVC (A-HVC) algorithm
1: for every iteration k = 1, 2, . . . do
2: for bus j ∈ N ka do
3: (AS1): update vk+1j as in (5.3);
4: (AS2): update qk+1j as in (5.4);
5: Update wk+1j as in (5.26);
6: (AS3): update λk+1j as in (5.7);
7: end for
8: for bus j /∈ N ka do
9: vk+1j = v
k
j ;
10: (AS2): update qk+1j as in (5.4);
11: wk+1j = w
k
j ;
12: λk+1j = λ
k
j ;
13: end for
14: end for
time-varying network operating conditions. A single-phase radial power distribution feeder that
consists of 21 buses with v0 = 1 at the substation is adopted to test the algorithm. This network is
equivalent to the system in Fig. 2.1 for N = 20 with the impedance of each line segment setting
to be (0.233 + j0.366)Ω. The desired voltage magnitude µj is chosen to be 1 p.u. at every bus j.
Furthermore, each bus is assumed to have a certain number of PV panels installed, and thus it is
able to control/provide VAR via advanced inverter design. Albeit the HVC design is based on the
linearized model (2.5), we test and validate the performance using the full AC power flow model.
All numerical tests are performed in MathWorks R© MATLAB 2014a software and OepnDSS for
solving the actual power flow. Accordingly, the bus voltage magnitude, instead of the one obtained
from (2.5), is used for VAR control outputs in (5.6) and the following numerical tests.
5.3.1 Static System Operating Conditions
Per bus j, we fix the loading pcj = 70kW and q
c
j = 20kVAR while choosing the inverter rating to be
(70+ψ)kVA where ψ is zero-mean Gaussian having variance 13.33, thus modeling the variation in
inverter sizing by 50%. Accordingly, the VAR constraints in (5.1c) would become active at some
locations. We test the HVC algorithm with various choices of importance factor γ. To demonstrate
the trade-off between distributed and local control designs, we plot in Fig. 5.2 the optimal voltage
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Figure 5.2: Voltage mismatch squared error versus various values of importance factor γ across
the network under the static system setting.
mismatch squared error norm ‖v? − 1‖2 for each γ value with all other settings the same. Notice
that increasing the γ value by adding more weight on the local control objective f2 results in a
larger voltage mismatch error. This corroborates our earlier claim that local control schemes attain
a sub-optimal VAR setting under limited VAR resources. Given a system model, one may study
this trade-off offline to tune the importance factor γ accordingly.
Based on the convergence properties in Theorem 3 with γ = 0.5, we have α < 0.092 and β <
0.0073. Fig. 5.3 plots the iterative voltage mismatch squared error norm ‖vk−1‖2 in log-scale for
various step-size choices assuming a perfect communication. To violate the steps-size constraints,
we let α = 0.099 and β = 0.01 in two different scenarios, respectively. It clearly shows that the
HVC design fails to converge under these cases. To stabilize our design, we bound the step-size
values to be within their limits as depicted in Fig. 5.3. Note that the effect of step-size choices
shows a trade-off between the stability and convergence rate. Accordingly, the larger α and β
are, the faster the updates converge. Nonetheless, this could potentially lead to oscillations in
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Figure 5.3: Voltage mismatch squared error versus the total number of updates across the network
with different step-size choices of α and β under the static system setting.
the error performance, exhibiting instability under fast dynamics. To tackle this problem, once
the full feeder information becomes available, our convergence properties in Theorem 3 are very
useful in terms of proper step-size choices. Otherwise, it is also possible to adjust the step-size
on-the-fly by decreasing the values based on the local bus’s voltage oscillation intensity. To sum
up, under appropriate step-size choices, Fig. 5.3 validates the effectiveness of our scheme, in terms
of achieving the optimal VAR setting while requiring no centralized coordination.
Moreover, to validate the robustness of our A-HVC scheme under imperfect communication
links, we model the activation of every bus j as a Bernoulli distribution with the same probability.
Since the distributed parts of the HVC are most likely to be affected by random communication
link failures, we let β > α to investigate the performance of A-HVC design. To this end, we have
α = 0.005, β = 0.007, and γ = 0.05 while fixing other settings to be the same as earlier tests. Fig.
5.4 plots the iterative voltage mismatch squared error in log-scale under various bus activation rate
ranging from 10% to 100%, where the case of 100% corresponds to the perfect communication
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Figure 5.4: Voltage mismatch squared error versus the total number of updates across the network
with fixed step-size choices of α and β and varying bus activation rate under the static system
setting.
scenario (synchronous case). It clearly depicts that our design enjoys a satisfactory performance
guarantee under random link failures for regulating the network voltage. Informally speaking, a
lower bus activation rate would lead to a slower convergence speed, with a no link failure scenario
exhibiting the fastest convergence. This test validates that our proposed A-HVC design is robust
against imperfect communication and thus able to cope with cyber resource constraints.
5.3.2 Dynamic System Operating Conditions
The proposed DVC scheme is also validated using the unbalanced 123-bus feeder case [55]. To
corroborate our HVC scheme for online implementation, we consider dynamic system operating
conditions caused by actual loading changes gathered from an online data repository [67] as shown
in Fig. 4.5. These residential minute-sampled data including reactive power consumption were
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Figure 5.5: Daily voltage mismatch squared error for three different control strategies at phase a.
A total communication link failure occurs from hour 16:00 to 24:00.
collected on a particular Friday in Summer 2010. Meanwhile, all settings are the same as the ones
in Sec. 4.5.2. For each minute time slot, physical VAR limits [q,q] are updated according to their
inverter ratings and instantaneous active power from solar generations.
Fig. 5.5 plots the daily network-wide voltage mismatch squared error norm for the a-phase of
the 123-bus. The plots for the other two phases are of similar trends and neglected here. Three
different control strategies including no VAR support, distributed design, and the proposed HVC
scheme are plotted. Under a quasi-static operating condition within each minute, the proposed A-
HVC algorithm is implemented with each iteration updated every 2 seconds (a total of 30 iterations
per minute). The same settings hold for the DVC strategy. This update rate turns out to be sufficient
for both the distributed and A-HVC algorithms to achieve satisfactory convergence within a minute
interval. For the benchmark case of no VAR support, there are some under- and over-voltage issues
due to load and solar variations. Around the noon hours, all three strategies have similarly high
voltage mismatch error. This is because the active solar power generation has reached inverter
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limits during these hours, and accordingly the VAR limits are nearly zero.
To corroborate A-HVC’s ability to adapt to varying communication rates, we have considered
the worst-case scenario of total communication outage from hour 16:00 to 24:00. The limits of
VAR resources would gradually increase from 16:00 on as the solar power generation reduces and
the inverters have more capability to control the VAR outputs. Nonetheless, the total link failures
during these hours render the distributed control design not responsive to the dynamic operating
point at all, resulting in a highest voltage mismatch error from 16:00-18:00 even compared to the
benchmark no VAR scenario. This is due to the fact that distributed design (DVC) would freeze
its VAR solution by setting qk+1j = q
k
j at every node. Meanwhile, the proposed A-HVC design
can still effectively minimize the network-wide voltage mismatch error and gracefully maintain
a nearly flat voltage profile. Thanks to its flexible adaptivity to communication availability, our
A-HVC design enjoys a satisfactory worst-case performance, and significantly outperforms the
distributed one under the total communication outage. To sum up, the proposed design can effi-
ciently regulate the voltage level by coordinating network-wide VAR resources. Meanwhile, its
cognizance to the instantaneous availability of communication links is also attractive, considering
the limited deployment of cyber infrastructure in distribution networks. Therefore, the proposed
HVC design would facilitate the future engagements in inverter-based VAR resources to improve
voltage support by accounting for practical constraints in both physical and cyber layers.
5.4 Summary
This chapter has developed the communication-cognizant hybrid voltage control (HVC) scheme to
coordinate network-wide VAR support in power distribution networks. We have cast the specially-
designed voltage control problem combining both attractive features of distributed and local con-
trol architectures in order to minimize the voltage mismatch error under limited VAR resources.
The PPD-based algorithm is evoked and only requires voltage measurement exchanges among
neighboring buses with local computations. In addition, we have provided the convergence prop-
erties of the aforementioned algorithm for proper step-size choices. To cope with cyber resource
constraints and lack of reliable communication links, we have further extended the HVC design
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to have robustness against random communication link failures and, in particular, communication-
cognizant feature to account for the worst-case scenario of a total communication outage. We
have extensively validated the effectiveness of the HVC design using a realistic distribution feeder
under both static and dynamic testing environments.
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CHAPTER 6
DISTRIBUTED FREQUENCY CONTROL FOR
ISOLATED MICROGRIDS
Thus far, we have proposed decentralized voltage control designs to improve the power system sta-
bility while distribution feeders are interconnecting with the transmission grids. Meanwhile, with
a high penetration of DERs in the distribution networks, it is possible to build a discrete energy
system, namely, a microgrid (MG), that is capable of operating in parallel with, or independently
from, the main transmission grids. To further enhance the power system reliability, MGs are fore-
seen to play an important role in distribution networks. However, these mostly power electronics-
interfaced distributed energy resources (DERs) exhibiting low-inertia characteristic have raised
major concerns over the frequency stability issues under isolated MGs [82]. Hierarchical con-
trol based on the time-scale separation principle for distributed energy resources (DERs) interface
converters (DICs) has recently become a standard operational paradigm for isolated MGs [83,84].
At the primary control level, a conventional power-frequency (P -ω) droop control assisted by the
faster inner-loop controls can help reduce the frequency and/or voltage mismatch error while pro-
viding power sharing capability [85]. Meanwhile, at the secondary control level, the grid-wide
information regarding the status of all DICs can be further used to minimize the mismatch error
attained by a local control in a centralized fashion.
Similar to distribution networks, the traditional centralized paradigm of secondary control falls
short in achieving scalability and flexibility goals of MG operations. To reduce the communication
overhead and enhance DICs’ plug-n-play ability, the distributed architecture has been increasingly
advocated [7, 86–88]. Under a connected communication network, the proportional power shar-
ing objective is equivalent to having pair-wise consensus between any two neighboring nodes.
By considering the DICs as the first-order systems, i.e., modeling of a zero inertia generator, the
distributed control problem becomes to minimize the frequency mismatch under linear consensus
constraints (see [7] and references therein). Nonetheless, such approach could face two issues re-
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garding control performance and stability. First, because DICs have no rotation mass, MGs with
a high penetration of DICs would exhibit a low inertia characteristic leading to a poor frequency
response under large disturbances [89]. Second, the formulation related to steady-state objec-
tives does not necessarily guarantee the stability of resultant online control updates [7, 86–88].
In [86], the first-order consensus-based updates have been proposed and the stability is established
by linearizing around the preferred equilibrium point. A variant of this consensus-based design
is developed in [90] while ensuring economic optimality. The convergence of the consensus is
guaranteed therein by the time-scale separation assumption in [87]. In addition, a ratio consensus
algorithm is proposed in [88] to account for lower and upper limits of DER outputs. To the best
of our knowledge, none of the existing work has explicitly included the original dynamical model
of network-coupled DICs in establishing the stability conditions of consensus-based distributed
control updates.
Meanwhile, a communication-based distributed frequency control framework also exposes the
microgrid assets to potential malicious cyber attacks. In general, attack detection for distributed
consensus algorithms under false-data injecting attacks has been considered in [91–93]. This type
of attack is also related to the so-called Byzantine consensus, a fairly popular research topic in
distributed computing. The goal of the Byzantine consensus algorithm is to find a near optimal
solution for an optimization problem despite the presence of malicious agents [94–97]. However,
in practice, this approach has significant drawbacks: i) online implementations are infeasible as
diminishing step-sizes fail to incorporate the most up-to-date system operating conditions; and ii)
most system operators are more concerned about determining the identity of a malicious agent as
settling with a near optimal solution with unidentified attackers presents a notable security threat
within a cyber communication network. Thus, it is extremely important to distinguish malicious
agents and isolate them within control frameworks. The concern about false-data injection attacks
has increasingly challenged the power grid infrastructures along with more smart grid deploy-
ments, see e.g. [98–104] and references therein, particularly for distributed power system state
estimation in [99, 101]. Earlier work has considered the impacts of cyber attacks on grid moni-
toring or its control operations, but mostly for wide-area transmission systems. Since there exist
fewer resources for cyber defense and less inertia for frequency stability in isolated microgrids,
it is of higher interest to investigate the cyber-security problems therein. However, none of the
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aforementioned approaches has considered (microgrid) distributed control settings, where physi-
cal grid measurements and optimization-related variables can provide additional information for
attack detection.
In this chapter, we tackle the low system inertia problem by adopting the concept of a virtual
synchronous generator (VSG). To this end, the DICs are designed with virtual inertia by modeling
a second-order system which results in effects of damping similar to the machine inertia in [89].
Based on the virtual inertia concept, we consider the full MG network dynamics in developing
the distributed control designs. The dynamics of the droop controlled DICs and power flow is
first introduced. The problem to minimize the frequency error while ensuring an accurate power
sharing operation is then formulated as a consensus optimization one. Motivated by the work
in [72] where the power transmission system dynamics can be interpreted as a partial primal-dual
(PPD) algorithm, we adopt this algorithm to solve the steady-state problem in closed-form under a
connected communication graph among DICs in a MG. Interestingly, two of the update rules boil
down to the network dynamics: i) the dynamics associated with power flow, and ii) the dynamics
relating to the VSG-base second-order DICs systems; both are seamlessly implemented by the
physical system itself. Accordingly, the proposed control design only requires the exchange of a
few variables, while its stability follows directly from that for the PPD algorithm. Distinct from
most of the previous work where the microgrid stability has only been ensured by the conventional
small-signal analysis, the proposed control design can guarantee the microgrid stability simply
through the selection of optimization stepsize. In addition to stability guarantees, the PPD-based
design with localized dual variable information could improve the capability of attack detection.
Earlier attack detection work for general distributed consensus methods typically requires system-
wide information collection and accordingly has a very high computational burden [91, 92]. To
overcome these limitations, we have developed the metrics for detection and identification only
using local physical measurements and neighboring dual variable information. With the central-
ized energy management system (EMS) making the final decision based on localized metrics, the
proposed implementation is very scalable. Therefore, compared with the previous work where the
cyber-security of the microgird secondary control has not been considered [86, 88, 105, 106], we
have taken it into consideration and provided possible response strategies for practical microgrids.
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Figure 6.1: A cyber-physical MG network with DICs and related controllers
6.1 Modeling of Microgrids
Fig. 6.1 depicts an isolated MG, including all grid components such as DICs, loads, and lines in
addition to controller communication of the cyber layer. This MG is modeled by a connected graph
(NM , EM) where the setNM consists of the subsetsND := {1, · · · , n} andNL := {n+1, · · · ,m}
representing the DIC and load buses, respectively. In addition, the set EM accounts for the line
segments connecting among the buses. We use j : i → j and k : k → i respectively to represent
the set of buses j such that (i, j) ∈ EM and the set of buses k such that (k, i) ∈ EM . Per bus-i, the
voltage magnitude and phase angle are denoted by vi and θi, respectively. In addition, we let Pi
represent the active power injection, PMi denote the active power rating of DIC-i ∈ ND, and PLi
to be the active power demand of a load at bus i ∈ NL. Meanwhile, ωi :=(θ˙i−ωb) is the frequency
deviation where θ˙i := dθi/dt is the frequency, and ωb is the nominal frequency set-point. To
develop the ensuing control design, we also make the following valid assumptions:
AS4. The power lines are lossless and relatively short.
AS5. Each bus voltage magnitude vi is constant.
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AS6. All possible load variations under the isolated MG are supported by DICs without violating
active power rating limits of DICs.
AS7. The active power demand PLi ,∀i ∈ NL is constant while the proposed control design is
being executed.
The short distance property in Assumption 4 commonly holds for power lines in microgrids, and
thus line losses are negligible compared to line flows. Constant voltage magnitude in Assumption
5 is also typically ensured through the fast inner-loop voltage control design at DICs. Together
with voltage-droop control, the inner voltage control can manager DICs’ reactive power output to
track a reference voltage level, at much faster time-scale than that of the frequency control. This
time-scale separation between frequency and voltage dynamics is well supported by earlier work
on microgrid modeling [88]. Consequently, the voltage magnitude at all nodes can be assumed to
be fixed, as in [86,88]. As for Assumption 6, it can be guaranteed through careful system planning
at the microgrid deployment stage. Last, the constant power demand assumption in Assumption 7
comes from designing the proposed controller to be sufficiently fast to restore the system nominal
frequency before another load disturbance occurs. Note that these assumptions have been made to
facilitate the development of the proposed secondary frequency control design. Nonetheless, the
effectiveness of this design will be demonstrated using a realistic microgrid network with e.g., the
voltage control loop.
6.1.1 P -ω Droop Control of DICs
The operational objectives of a secondary active power control in isolated MGs are two-fold:
(i) Zero frequency deviation from a nominal frequency under steady-state (synchronization).
ω1 = ω2 = · · ·ωn = 0. (6.1)
(ii) Autonomous active power sharing among all DICs. Specifically, DICs share the total loads
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Figure 6.2: Angle dynamics of VSG governed by a second order swing equation.
according to their nominal ratings such that
P1
PM1
=
P2
PM2
= · · · Pn
PMn
. (6.2)
The proliferation of DICs in MGs raises frequency stability concerns over insufficient system
inertia. To address this issue, integrating the concept of a virtual synchronous generator (VSG)
into the power-frequency droop control has been recently proposed in [43, 107, 108]. To this end,
the control diagram in Fig. 6.2 is motivated by mimicking the dynamical second-order swing
equation of a synchronous generator, as given by
Jiω˙i +Diωi = P
M
i − Pi − pi,∀i ∈ ND, (6.3)
where Ji > 0 relates to the virtual moment of inertia for DIC-i, and the positive droop coefficient
Di is designed in accordance with the rating of DIC-i. We set a uniform Di/PMi among DICs.
Compared to conventional P -ω droop control, an additional control input pi is appended in (6.3).
Considering Ji, Di, and PMi are fixed parameters based on the size of DIC-i, one can only change
the operating set-point by judiciously choosing pi, which serves as our secondary control input for
the ensuing control design. Accordingly, the resultant angle θi is used for inner voltage and current
controllers of the power electronics.
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6.1.2 Microgrid Dynamics
Power loads typically depend on both bus voltage (which is assumed constant under Assumption
5) and frequency. Without loss of generality, the load-i, ∀i ∈ NL is a frequency-sensitive load
where the power consumption increases linearly with the frequency deviation ωi and its velocity
ω˙i, e.g., motor-type [109]. Hence, the dynamics of a frequency dependent load is modeled as
Jiω˙i +Diωi = −PLi − Pi,∀i ∈ NL, (6.4)
where Ji > 0 and Di > 0 can be thought of as the physical inertia and time constant associated
with the dynamics of a load bus at bus i ∈ NL, respectively [110]. Note that both (6.3) and (6.4)
are again based on the standard time-scale separation between frequency and voltage dynamics.
Hence, the frequency is regulated to adjust active power injections.
As for the microgrid network power flow dynamics, based on Assumption 4, we separate the
bus injection Pi into branch flows as follows:
Pi(f) =
n∑
j=1
vivj
xij
sin (θi − θj) =
∑
j:i→j
fij−
∑
k:k→i
fki, (6.5)
where f =: {fij}∀(i,j)∈EM with fij denoting the line power flow from bus i to bus j, and xij
is the reactance of line (i, j). Additionally, the angular difference between any power line is
relatively small. Thus, the dynamics of the branch flow between node-i and node-j can be further
characterized by
f˙ij = bij (ωi − ωj) , (6.6a)
bij =
vivj
xij
cos
(
θ0i − θ0j
)
, (6.6b)
where bij is a constant with θ0i being the nominal phase angle at bus i [111]; see Appendix B for
detailed derivations. Interestingly, it turns out that by specially designing our ensuing distributed
control, the update rules would include the network dynamics of (6.6a) which is seamlessly imple-
mented by the physical system itself.
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6.1.3 Equilibrium Points of Droop Controlled DICs
By concatenating all scalar variables into vector form, the desired equilibrium point fulfilling op-
erational objectives of the droop control can be characterized into the following proposition:
Proposition 5. An equilibrium point (ω∗,P ∗(f∗),p∗) that fulfils objective (6.2) must also satisfy
p∗i
Di
=
p∗j
Dj
, ∀i, j ∈ ND.
This proposition is based on the synchronization of all DICs. By considering (6.6a) at the
equilibrium point, we have
f˙ ∗ij = bij
(
ω∗i − ω∗j
)
= 0,∀i, j ∈ NM .
This implies that a system-wise synchronization frequency is attained, i.e., ω∗i = ω
∗
j , ∀i, j ∈ NM .
Furthermore, dividing both side of (6.3) by PMi , we have
P ∗i
PMi
= 1− Di
PMi
p∗i
Di
− Di
PMi
ω∗i ,∀i ∈ ND.
Because of the aforementioned uniform setting of Di/PMi ,∀i ∈ ND, achieving an accurate power
sharing operation among DICs leads to the result in Prop. 5.
6.1.4 Consensus Optimization
We assume a connected communication network GD := (ND, ED) where the set ED accounts for
the communication links connecting among the DIC buses. Based on Prop. 5 under quasi-steady-
state ( i.e., ω˙ = 0), the secondary control problem can be cast as a consensus optimization one:
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(ω∗, f∗,p∗) := arg min
ω,f ,p
n∑
i=1
Di
2
ω2i (6.7a)
subject to Diωi = P
M
i − Pi(f)− pi,∀i ∈ ND (6.7b)
Diωi = −PLi − Pi(f), ∀i ∈ NL (6.7c)
pi
Di
=
pj
Dj
, ∀(i, j) ∈ ED. (6.7d)
The constraints (6.7b) ensure the DICs to mimic the dynamical second-order swing equation of
synchronous generators and thus are coupled with the network frequency. Similarly, the charac-
teristic of a frequency-dependent load is captured by (6.7c). Additionally, the equality constraints
(6.7d) are equivalent to satisfying Prop. 5 under a connected communication graph GD. This
is a quadratic program and thus can be solved using off-the-shelf convex solvers. However, the
difficulty in solving (6.7) lies in that active power injection P (f) is dynamical and dependent on
the power network couplings. It is imperative to find a method which respects the MG system
dynamics to steer the control to the optimum. In our previous work [7], this issue is tackled by
adopting a feedback approach to account for system dynamics. Interestingly, as detailed soon, our
proposed distributed partial primal-dual (PPD)-based control design not only effectively attains
a zero steady-state frequency deviation but also seamlessly integrates the MG network dynamics
into the control algorithm.
6.2 Distributed Secondary Control Design
This section introduces the proposed distributed secondary control framework. Introducing La-
grangian multipliers λ := {λi}∀i∈NM and η := {ηij}∀(i,j)∈ED for the equality constraints in (6.7),
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we form the following Lagrangian function:
L(ω, f ,p,η,λ) =
n∑
i=1
Di
2
ω2i +
∑
i∈ND
 ∑
j∈{j | (i,j)∈ED}
ηij
(
pi
Di
− pj
Dj
)
+λi
[
PMi −
(∑
j:i→j
fij −
∑
k:k→i
fki
)
− pi −Diωi
]}
+
∑
i∈NL
{
λi
[
−PLi −
(∑
j:i→j
fij −
∑
k:k→i
fki
)
−Diωi
]}
. (6.8)
Based on the Lagrangian function (6.8), we adopt the partial-primal dual (PPD) algorithm which
works by cyclically partially and fully minimizing the primal variable (ω, f ,p) while performing
gradient ascent-based update on the dual variable (η,λ) [72]. To reduce communication cost by
keeping the dual variables as local ones for each DIC-i, we modify the standard dual-ascent update
design by letting the dual variables associated to communication link (i, j) ∈ ED of DIC-i to have
the property of ηij =−ηji. This would always hold if η is initialed to be zero. The resultant PPD
algorithm of (6.7) then becomes
ωi = λi,∀i ∈ NM (6.9a)
f˙ij = −fij (−λi + λj) ,∀(i, j) ∈ EM (6.9b)
p˙i = −pi
2D−1i ∑
j∈{j | (i,j)∈ED}
ηij − λi
 ,∀i ∈ ND (6.9c)
η˙ij = ηij
(
pi
Di
− pj
Dj
)
, ∀(i, j) ∈ ED (6.9d)
λ˙i = λi
[
PMi −
∑
j:i→j
fij+
∑
k:k→i
fki − pi −Diωi
]
,∀i ∈ ND (6.9e)
λ˙i = λi
[
−PLi −
∑
j:i→j
fij+
∑
k:k→i
fki −Diωi
]
,∀i ∈ NL, (6.9f)
where fij , pi , ηij , and λi are positive parameter choices. Note that we solve minωi
Di
2
ω2i −
λiDiωi,∀i ∈ NM to obtain (6.9a) rather than follow the primal gradient algorithm with respect
to ωi. Thus, the so-termed partial primal-dual algorithm is adopted.
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Applying linear transform of (6.9a) from λi to ωi, we have
f˙ij = fij (ωi − ωj) ,∀i ∈ NM
ω˙i = λi
[
PMi −
∑
j:i→j
fij+
∑
k:k→i
fki − pi −Diωi
]
,∀i ∈ ND
ω˙i = λi
[
−PLi −
∑
j:i→j
fij+
∑
k:k→i
fki −Diωi
]
,∀i ∈ NL.
By selecting control parameter values specially to adapt to MG network dynamics, our PPD-based
algorithm (6.9) features the dynamics of both microgrid network and VSG-based DICs. Let fij =
bij, ∀(i, j) ∈ EM and λi = 1Ji , ∀i ∈ NM . The algorithm (6.9) becomes
f˙ij = bij (ωi − ωj) ,∀(i, j) ∈ EM (6.11a)
p˙i = −pi
2D−1i ∑
j∈{j | (i,j)∈ED}
ηij − ωi
 ,∀i ∈ ND (6.11b)
η˙ij = ηij
(
pi
Di
− pj
Dj
)
, ∀(i, j) ∈ ED (6.11c)
ω˙i =
1
Ji
[
PMi −
∑
j:i→j
fij+
∑
k:k→i
fki − pi −Diωi
]
,∀i ∈ ND (6.11d)
ω˙i =
1
Ji
[
−PLi −
∑
j:i→j
fij+
∑
k:k→i
fki −Diωi
]
, ∀i ∈ NL. (6.11e)
The dynamics of (6.11a), (6.11d), and (6.11e) exactly corresponds to that in MG network and
droop controlled DICs. This feature is very attractive as parts of the algorithm seamlessly incor-
porate MG network dynamics which is implemented by the physical system itself. Therefore, the
dynamical model of network-coupled DICs and power flow is inherently accounted for. Mean-
while, it turns out that the dynamics of (6.11b)-(6.11c) resonates with the distributed-averaging
proportional-integral (DAPI) controller where the stability analysis is based on the classic Ku-
ramoto model and phase cohesiveness principle in [86]. However, the DAPI controller is de-
veloped for the inertialess microgrid whereas the algorithm (6.11) incorporates virtual inertia for
improving frequency responses. Accordingly, our design has the capability to quickly regulate
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network frequency under large and rapid disturbances and preserve the power sharing property
while enhancing frequency stability. To sum up, the PPD-based algorithm (6.11) guarantees the
convergence to (ω∗, f∗,p∗) under proper parameter values of pi and ηij .
Lemma 2. (ω∗, f∗,p∗) is an unique equilibrium point for (6.7) only if ω∗i = 0,∀i ∈ NM , PMi =
P ∗i (f
∗) + p∗i ,∀i ∈ ND, and PLi = −P ∗i (f∗),∀i ∈ NL.
Proof: Based on (6.11a), we have a system-wide synchronization frequency, i.e., ωi = ωj,∀i, j ∈
NM at the equilibrium point. This corroborates the results in Prop. (5). Furthermore, if η is
initialed to be zero,
∑n
i=1
∑
j∈{j | (i,j)∈ED} η
∗
ij = 0 always holds because of the Laplacian for graph
GD. Additionally, from (6.11b), we have 2D−1i
∑
j∈{j | (i,j)∈ED} η
∗
ij − ω∗i = 0,∀i ∈ ND. Summing
over all the DIC buses in ND under a synchronized frequency leads to ω∗ = 0. Meanwhile, the
dynamics of (6.11d) implies PMi −
∑
j:i→j f
∗
ij+
∑
k:k→i f
∗
ki − p∗i −Diω∗i = 0,∀i ∈ ND. Because
of ω∗ = 0 and the linear mapping in (6.5), we have PMi = P
∗
i (f
∗) + p∗i ,∀i ∈ ND. Similarly,
PLi = −P ∗i (f∗),∀i ∈ NL holds. Last, as (6.7a) is strongly convex on ω, (ω∗, f∗,p∗) indeed is the
unique saddle point of (6.8) by applying the strong duality theorem [57].
For the updates in (6.11b) and (6.11c), a digital control implementation would convert them to
the discrete-time counterpart for each DIC-i. Nonetheless, it is difficult to measure ωi locally due
to fast power electronics’ switching frequency. Under the notion of a much faster dynamics of
the inverter-based DICs than that of secondary control updates (6.11b)-(6.11c), the dynamics of
ω˙i is insignificant to the secondary updates. Based on (6.3), we can approximate local frequency
deviation as
ωi ≈ P
M
i − Pi − pi
Di
,∀i ∈ ND. (6.12)
Thus, by denoting St as the sampling time and letting
Stpi
Di
= 1,∀i ∈ ND, the control updates
at (k + 1)-st iteration for DIC-i ∈ ND with an uniform step-size  := ηijSt,∀(i, j) ∈ ED and
frequency approximation (6.12) become
xk+1i = −2D−1i
(∑
j∈{j | (i,j)∈ED}
ηkij
)
+ cki ,∀i ∈ ND (6.13a)
ηk+1ij = η
k
ij + (x
k+1
i − xk+1j ), ∀(i, j) ∈ ED, (6.13b)
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Figure 6.3: Operation of DIC-i and its interaction with the microgrid and the consensus network
under the proposed control design.
where xi := pi/Di and ci := (PMi −Pi)/Di. Note that the input variable ci is locally measurable
at DIC-i. Under a connected communication network GD, the overall operation of DIC-i at k
iteration for the proposed distributed control can be illustrated in Fig. 6.3. Given the local dual
variable {ηkij}∀(i,j)∈ED , the consensus update unit takes in the current local measurement cki from
the local droop controller and updates its primal variable xk+1i as (6.13a) which is broadcast to the
neighboring DICs. Next, after receiving {xk+1j }∀j∈{j|(i,j)∈ED} via communication links-(i, j) ∈ ED
from the neighboring DICs, we update {ηij}∀(i,j)∈ED according to (6.13b). Meanwhile, the local
droop unit adjusts its output frequency ωki based on (6.3). The microgrid reacts to the variations
in frequencies of DICs and reaches a new power flow dispatch according to (6.5). This results in
the updated measurement ck+1i which is used for the next iteration. Thanks to the communication
network, each DIC is able to obtain neighbors’ information, which means the proposed secondary
control (6.13) is fully distributed. To sum up, our distributed control implementation is scalable
and flexible with respect to the size of the network while enjoying minimal overhead in sensing,
communication, and computation.
6.2.1 Choice of Step-size
Albeit the convergence of the proposed control algorithm (6.13) can always be guaranteed, its
implementation in microgrid control requires the proper design of update step-size . To this end,
the following remarks of P -ω droop controlled DICs under isolated microgrids are introduced.
Remark 7 (Center-Of-Mass Frequency). We further assume that loads are much less sensitive to
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frequency variation compared to DICs, i.e., Di  Dj, ∀i ∈ NL, j ∈ ND. Hence, it is possible
to directly relate the power balance to the system frequency in isolated microgrids, which is in-
dependent of state and can be determined directly from the power injections [112]. This feature
is instrumental for ensuing attack scenario analysis. Accordingly, the joint behavior of all DIC
frequencies follows the center-of-mass frequency [113]
ωc ≈
∑n
i=1 Diωi∑n
i=1Di
=
∑n
i=1(P
M
i − Pi − pi)∑n
i=1Di
. (6.14)
By implementing (6.13a) and (6.13b) to the DICs, another remark regarding the characteristics of
ωc is made.
Remark 8 (Characteristics of ωc). Initializing η0 = 0, we sum (6.13a) over all DICs
∑n
i=1
Di
2
(cki − xk+1i ) =
∑n
i=1
∑
j∈{j | (i,j)∈ED}
ηkij = 0. (6.15)
This leads to the following two observations:
(i) The first updates of all xi take the mismatch between power outputs of DICs as the initial
condition, i.e., ∑n
i=1
Di
2
x1i =
∑n
i=1
Di
2
c0i . (6.16)
(ii) Substituting xk+1i in (6.13a) into (6.14), ωc at (k + 1)-st iteration is
ωk+1c =
∑n
i=1
[
Di(c
k+1
i − cki ) + 2
∑
j∈{j | (i,j)∈ED} η
k
ij
]
∑n
i=1Di
. (6.17)
Interestingly, any power imbalance is compensated after one iteration of the proposed update de-
sign (6.13). Under Assumption 7 of a constant loading in addition to its less sensitivity to frequency
variations, we have
∑n
i=1P
k+1
i ≈
∑n
i=1P
k
i . This equivalently leads to (c
k+1
i − cki ) ≈ 0, ∀i ∈ ND
Thus, ωkc ≈ 0 is assured for k ≥ 2, and any changes in p has minimal effect on steady-state
frequency ωkc .
To formally analyze the step-size design, we define a vector ζk := {ζki }∀i∈ND where ζki :=∑
j∈{j | (i,j)∈ED} µ
k
ij and a weighting matrix D := diag(D1, ...Dn), the updates in (6.13a) and
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(6.13b) become
xk+1 = (−2D−1L+In)xk−2D−1ζk−1+
(
ck − xk) , (6.18a)
ζk+1 = ζk + Lxk+1, (6.18b)
where L and In are the Laplacian of graph GD and an n×n identity matrix, respectively. Substi-
tuting ck−1 = xk + 2D−1ζk−1 from (6.13) into (6.18a), we have
xk+1 = Wxk + (ck − ck−1), (6.19)
where W := (−2D−1L+ In). The linear dynamical system in (6.19) can be viewed as a con-
sensus iteration of xk with a disturbance depended on (ck − ck−1) = D−1(Pk−1 − Pk). Based
on Lemma 2, the disturbance is bounded by the total load variations and diminishing as k → ∞.
Selecting the step-size  properly ensures matrix W to have all but one of the eigenvalues strictly
within the unit circle. Accordingly, the iterate xk+1 under the update in (6.19) would converge to
the average consensus vector x¯. This consensus vector can be determined by further examining
the matrix W k, which denotes the constant matrix W to the k-th power. To this end, the work
in [114] with slight modifications leads to
lim
k→∞
W k =
11T
1TD1
D, (6.20)
where vector 1 denotes the all one-vector while T is the transpose operation. This differs from
[114] because of the weighting matrix D−1 in W . Since the disturbance (ck − ck−1) in (6.19) is
bounded and diminishing, the consensus iteration of (6.20) becomes
lim
k→∞
xk = lim
k→∞
W kx1 =
11T
1TD1
Dx1. (6.21)
According to (6.16), it suggests that the initial condition for xi takes the form of∑n
i=1Dix
1
i∑n
i=1 Di
= 1T
Dx1
1TD1
. (6.22)
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Thus, the average consensus x¯ is given by
x¯ = 1T
Dx1
1TD1
1 =
11T
1TD1
Dx1, (6.23)
which is the same as the steady-state value of xk shown in (6.21).
6.3 Attack Models and Countermeasures
In this section, the attack models against the proposed distributed control are introduced, and
the ensuing attack detection and localization strategies are offered. Such strategies are anomaly
tests based on examining the secondary control objectives under steady-state, namely, ωc = 0 and
pi/Di = pj/Dj, ∀i, j ∈ ND. In this work, we consider constant malicious communication signal
inputs which attempt to alter the microgrid operating points to be the worst-case attack scenario.
As detailed soon, such attack can effectively drive the frequency deviation ωi everywhere away
from zero, endangering stability. Regarding the attack strategy other than constant signals, it is
possible to improve its design assuming the attacker had the full knowledge of the communication
graph as well as the detection mechanism. This scenario is, nonetheless, unlikely from the practical
standpoint, as almost all recent cyber attacks in the energy sector are agnostic to the full network
information; see e.g., [115]. Studying the interactions between the design of attack strategies and
counter-measure algorithms is an important direction for our future work. Based on the complexity
of the malicious inputs, the attack models are categorized into link and node attack scenarios which
both may further be extended to individual and coordinated cases. As the malicious inputs are
implemented to alter the operation of consensus iterations, the formulation in (6.19) is adopted to
constitute the basis for developing the ensuing attack models.
6.3.1 Link Attack
We first study the link attack scenario, where the malicious inputs are applied only to the in-
formation sent to specific neighbors of the attacked DICs. Given the undirected communication
link-(i, j) ∈ ED, we define the attack signal `ij as the malicious input sent from DIC-j to DIC-i.
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Per DIC-i ∈ ND, the update (6.13b) becomes
ηk+1ij = η
k
ij + [x
k+1
i −(xk+1j + `ij)], ∀j ∈ {j|(i, j) ∈ ED}. (6.24)
By reformulating (6.13a) and (6.24) into the compact form, (6.19) is rewritten as
xk+1 = Wxk + 2D−1L˜`+
(
ck − ck−1) , (6.25)
where vector ` :={`ij}∀(i,j)∈ED , and L˜ specifies the malicious link indices of `. The attack vector
2D−1L˜` would equivalently offset the consensus vector x¯. Accordingly, ζ, the sum of dual
variables, is manipulated by the malicious inputs. The change of ωkc can be derived from (6.17) as
ωkc −ωk−1c =
1T (ζk−1−ζk−2)
1TD1
=
−1T L˜`
1TD1
, k →∞. (6.26)
Interestingly, one may observe the structure of (6.26) and alter the frequency by coordinating the
link attack inputs. This would lead to the following two cases for a sufficiently large value of k:
1. Individual link attack: Malicious inputs `ij’s are appended to the information sent from
DIC-j individually, resulting in (ωkc −ωk−1c ) 6= 0 and ωkc 6= 0.
2. Coordinated link attack: Multiple malicious inputs are deliberately deployed such that (ωkc −
ωk−1c ) = 0 and thus ω
k
c = 0.
Note that the link-based attack input is not in the null space of L in W . In fact, the cases
where L˜` lies in the null space of L should be categorized into node attacks, which is analyzed
in Sec. 6.3.2. The system (6.25) cannot reach the consensus among x in both the individual
and coordinated cases. Albeit the system frequency behaves differently in these scenarios, the
objective of power sharing cannot be achieved. This would potentially lead to the violation of DIC
ratings and thus damage the equipment. It is imperative to identify the malicious links and isolate
them from the network. To this end, we check the values of the dual variables which provide
essential information on cyber-physical interactions. Because of not achieving a consensus, the
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dual variables of the proposed algorithm would keep integrating, i.e.
(
ηk+1ij −ηkij
) 6=0,∀(i, j) ∈ ED. (6.27)
Given this dynamics, we are able to detect such attack by checking the convergence of the dual
variables. Furthermore, to localize the link attack, we adopt the fact based on (6.24) that |ηkij|
associated with the malicious link is always greater than those without the malicious inputs. Con-
sequently, each node would be able to localize the attack by comparing such value among the ones
related to the neighboring nodes.
6.3.2 Node Attack
Under the node attack scenario, the malicious inputs are applied to the information sent to attacked
nodes’ neighbors, as well as the attacked nodes themselves. By denoting ui as the malicious input
at DIC-i ∈ ND, the update (6.13b) for DIC-i becomes
ηk+1ij = η
k
ij + [(x
k+1
i +ui)− (xk+1j +uj)], ∀i, j ∈ ND. (6.28)
Reformulating (6.13a) and (6.28) into the compact form and denoting u :={ui}∀i∈ND , we have
xk+1 = W
(
xk + u
)
+
(
ck−ck−1) . (6.29)
Different from the link attack scenario, (x+u) lies in the null space of L, and thus the consensus
is achieved. Nonetheless, instead of the consensus vector x¯ of (6.23), a false consensus dictating
by u is attained from (6.29). Recall from Prop. 5 that the proportional power sharing can always
be achieved whenever pi/Di,∀i ∈ ND coincides across the network. Hence, the steady-state
DIC power output Pi,∀i ∈ ND is not affected by node-based malicious attacks. Regarding the
frequency deviation, similar to the link attack scenario, we examine ωkc based on (6.14) and Remark
8 as
ωkc =
1TD[ck − (xk + u)]
1TD1
=
−1TDu
1TD1
, k →∞. (6.30)
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Given a sufficient large value of k, this leads to the following two different cases depending on the
malicious signal u:
1. Individual node attack: The attack input is implemented individually and results in a deviated
system frequency, i.e., ωkc 6= 0.
2. Coordinated node attack: Multiple attack inputs are purposely implanted such that ωkc = 0.
The consensus among DICs is achieved in both cases. Meanwhile, there is no dynamic change
that can be utilized as a malicious detection/localization index in the system. Fortunately, the
information from the inherent dual variable characteristics contains cognizance regarding such
attack. Considering a pair of normal DIC-i and attacked DIC-j under steady-state (i.e., k → ∞),
this leads to xki = x
k
j + uj and c
k
i = c
k
j . Thus, (6.14) becomes ω
k
c = c
k
i − xki = ckj − (xkj + uj). In
addition, based on (6.13a), we have
ζki =
Di
2
ωkc , (6.31a)
ζkj =
Dj
2
(ckj − xkj − uj + uj) =
Dj
2
(ωkc + uj), k →∞. (6.31b)
Assuming {ζkj , Dj}∀j∈Ni is known at DIC-i, it is plausible to localized the node attack by com-
paring these values. Nonetheless, this would result in a higher communication cost due to com-
municating these additional variables. Similar to the aforementioned link attack scenarios, |ηkij|
associated with the malicious nodes in (6.28) would be larger compared to the ones without the
attacks. This additional knowledge offers the ability of localizing node attacks using only the
inherent information of the consensus update design.
6.3.3 Detection/Localization Strategies
Thanks to the information from the dual variables, the following conclusions are made for DIC-i
within a given detection time window while experiencing an attack from either its direct link-
(i, j) ∈ ED or neighboring DIC-j ∈ {j|(i, j) ∈ ED}:
1. ηkij 6= 0 under either malicious signals of `ij or uj according to (6.27) and (6.31). Also, |ηkij|
is larger than neighboring ones associated with non-malicious inputs.
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Algorithm 3 Attack Detection/Localization for DIC-i
Input:{ηk+1ij , ηkij}∀(i,j)∈ED
Require:DIC-i has at least 2 neighbors
1: for j ∈ {j|(i, j) ∈ ED} do
2: Compute F kij = |ηkij| and ∆kij = |ηk+1ij −ηkij|;
3: if max(F kij) > 0 then
4: if ∆kij > 0 then
5: Link-(i, j) is recognized as malicious;
6: else
7: DIC-j is recognized as malicious;
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: Report events to microgrid energy management system.
2. ηkij diverges under the malicious signal `ij whereas η
k
ij converges to a fixed point for some
node attack scenario.
Based on these facts, the following detection indices for each DIC-i are introduced: F kij = |µkij|∆kij = |µk+1ij −µkij|, (6.32)
which both can be obtained locally based on neighboring information. Note that when max(F kij) =
0, there is no anomaly in the system. Given these indices, the overall malicious attack detection
and localization strategies are tabulated in Algorithm 3. To perform appropriate attack isolation
actions, the adverse event report is sent to an energy management system (EMS), which is inherent
for typical microgrid structure for decision making.
6.3.4 Decision Making in Energy Management System
In our proposed cyber-security framework, the task of isolating the malicious node or link from
the consensus algorithm is handled by a centralized agent such as EMS which is an essential
component in typical microgrid frameworks. Communication links between the EMS and DICs
only require very low bandwidth and are highly reliable. Thus, based on the report events from
all DICs, the proposed decision making strategies would therefore be efficiently implemented in
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Algorithm 4 Decision Making in the EMS
Input:Events reported from all DICs
Require:Reports from all DICs received
1: for i ∈ ND and |{j|(i, j) ∈ ED}| ≥ 2 do
2: Link attack events:
3: if DIC-i reports link-(i, j) as malicious then
4: Examine the flag raised by DIC-j;
5: if DIC-j also indicates link-(i, j) as malicious then
6: Remove link-(i, j) from consensus network;
7: end if
8: end if
9: Node attack events:
10: if DIC-i reports DIC-j as malicious then
11: Examine DIC-m ∈ {m|(j,m) ∈ ED};
12: if DIC-m,∀m ∈ {m|(j,m) ∈ ED} reports DIC-j as malicious then
13: Isolate DIC-j from the consensus network;
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: Reconfigure the consensus network in case of disconnected graph after the isolation action.
existing microgrids.
The detectability of malicious attacks for the system (6.19) has been greatly studied in [91, 92],
and thus is beyond the scope of this work. Generalizing our current framework to include de-
tectability will be a focus of our future study. In the present context, we assume that the attack
inputs in the microgrid are sparse and do not exceed the theoretical bound under which the detec-
tion and localization strategies are no longer feasible. Accordingly, the attack isolation strategies
involve the following two stages: (i) identify the source of link or node attack; (ii) isolate the ma-
licious link or node from the consensus network. Motivated by the work of [116], the mechanism
behind the former stage adopts the characteristics of information propagation in typical consensus
networks. Thus, once the malicious source is pinpointed, the attack isolation intelligence would
either command to switch attacked nodes to the local primary control under a node attack scenario
or remove the malicious links from the communication graph under a link attack scenario. Under
either case, the reconfiguration of consensus network would be carried out if the graph is no longer
connected after the attack isolation. To sum up, the decision-making process tabulated in Algo-
rithm 4 is capable of isolating malicious attacks and its effectiveness will be validated extensively
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Figure 6.4: Proposed control diagrams for individual DIC-i.
using numerical tests.
6.4 Numerical Tests
The control block diagram of individual DIC-i is depicted in Fig. 6.4. The control architecture
consists of the primary droop control, distributed secondary frequency control levels and the attack
detection/localization mechanisms. Specifically, the voltage-droop controller and the fast inverter
inner voltage control loop have been included for tracking the voltage reference, corresponding to
4S
4 1 2
2DIC
3.00 kW 1.050 kvarj+
1.50 kW 0.525 kvarj+
1DIC
14Z
12Z
13Z
14 0.0002 0.000754Z j= +
12 0.2 0.754Z j= +
13 120.5Z Z=
3
3DIC
communication lines
transmission lines
Figure 6.5: One-line diagram of the 4-bus/3-DIC microgrid.
104
Assumption 5. The local control in the primary level works with a sampling rate of 20kHz. This
fast rate is necessitated to maintain a good output power quality, namely, the minimal frequency
harmonics. Meanwhile, the distributed control updates at a much slower rate of a 10Hz because of
a limited communication infrastructure in practical implementations. Fig. 6.5 depicts the system
configuration of the underlying microgrid, where DIC-1 is connected to both DIC-2 and DIC-3,
and thus receives information from both neighbors. Physical details of the MG including pulse
width modulation emulation are included in the tests and implemented in the real-time simulation
environment Opal-RT [117]. For ease of observation, we fix the ratings of these DICs to be the
same as 2kW while the droop gain is set uniformly as 5×104W · s · rad−1. Typical load variations
are implemented to show the effectiveness of the proposed control under nominal disturbances. In
addition, varying virtual inertia of DICs is further considered. Last, the link and node attacks are
further considered to certify the effectiveness of the isolation strategies of EMS.
6.4.1 Case I: Convergence Analysis
Case I-A: Load variations
For the given inertialess MG (i.e. J = 0), we set  = 2.1 × 104 and increase the system loading
from half to full at t = 10. The resultant DIC active power injections and bus frequencies are
shown in Fig. 6.6. Under this severe disturbance, the proposed distributed secondary control is ca-
pable of effectively achieving a zero system frequency deviation while maintaining accurate power
sharing within a few seconds. This corroborates our earlier claims in Lemma 2 that the equilib-
rium point (ω∗, f∗,p∗) is attained with ω∗ = 0. Based on the amount of time to attain convergence
which depends on system configuration, communication rate, and step-size choice, we design the
detection time window to be slightly longer than this period. Additionally, we can vary the rate of
control update according to load dynamics to achieve a satisfactory frequency performance, i.e.,
Assumption 7 holds. Therefore, the attack detection and localization mechanisms would not be
falsely triggered by load variations.
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Figure 6.6: DICs’ (a) active power outputs; (b) droop frequencies under a severe load change
from half to full load at t = 10 .
Case I-B: Virtual Inertia
With the same MG network under similar settings, the effects of virtual inertia of DICs are also
investigated. Comparisons among various uniformly set Ji’s are illustrated in Fig. 6.7. It is clear
that an increasing J significantly reduces the initial frequency dip when the load change occurs.
In addition, the level of frequency oscillations is slightly improved as well. Since the DICs are
modeled as second order systems, the droop gain would also contribute to the damping of the
frequency. A larger Di in terms of smaller droop ratio would slow down the convergence of
the power sharing operation and thus degrade the control performance. Meanwhile, varying J
does not affect the speed of convergence as corroborated in Fig. 6.7. Therefore, it is preferable in
supplying additional damping in the MG supported by droop controlled DICs to enhance frequency
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Figure 6.7: DICs’ droop frequency under varying virtual inertia J with Jb = 1× 1.061 kg ·m2.
responses. To sum up, the proposed virtual inertia-based DICs governed by our PPD-based control
algorithm (6.11) would effectively achieve a zero steady-state frequency deviation while enhancing
the frequency transient stability.
6.4.2 Case II: Malicious Attacks on Communication Networks
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed attack countermeasures in Sec. 6.3, we adopt a more
complex MG consisting of 14 buses and 6 DICs as shown in Fig. 6.8, which is same as that
deployed in [87]. Under the same setting for the previous test, we carry out the following attacks
on communication networks.
Case II-A: Individual link attack
An attack signal, 20% of the steady-state x1, is introduced at t = 35 to link-(1,4) and received by
DIC-1. The resultant plot of all DIC responses is shown in Fig. 6.9. Clearly, due to this individual
link attack, the center-of-mass frequency ωkc diverges as derived in (6.26). In addition, the power
sharing is deteriorated since the consensus can no longer be attained. To validate our proposed
detection indices, we plot {F k1j}∀j∈N1 in Fig. 6.10, which attests our claim in Sec. 6.3.1 that a dual
variable associated with the malicious link would always be greater than the neighboring ones
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Figure 6.8: One-line diagram of the 14-bus/6-DIC microgrid.
without the malicious attacks; i.e., F k14 exhibits the largest detection index during the detection
time window. According to Algorithm 3, one can then localize the malicious link-(1,4) based on
the fact that F k14 is the largest. For a 20-second detection time window, the malicious link-(1,4) is
flagged and reported to the EMS. Since DIC-4 only has one link, the control center corresponding
to Algorithm 4 disables DIC-4’s communication and commands it to operate in primary droop
mode at t = 55, which leads to no participation of power sharing operation from DIC-4 as depicted
in Fig. 6.9(a). After eliminating malicious link-(1,4), the active power injections of all DICs except
for DIC-4 reach a new consensus, and the steady-state system frequency is zero after t = 55.
Case II-B: Coordinated link attack
Under a more complex attack scenario, two malicious inputs received by DIC-1 and DIC-2 are si-
multaneously appended at t = 35 to link-(1,4) and link-(2,6), respectively. These two inputs which
have opposite signs are both 20% of the steady-state x1 in their magnitudes. Fig. 6.11 depicts the
responses of all DICs. Under this attack, the center-of-mass frequency ωkc in (6.17) would remain
at zero regardless of the coordinated attack inputs while the proportional power sharing no longer
holds. Conventionally, such attack would be challenging to identify since ωkc stays at its optimal
value throughout the process as shown in Fig. 6.11(b). Thanks to the information obtained from
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Figure 6.9: Case II-A: DICs’ (a) active power outputs; (b) droop frequencies.
the dual variables, the detection indices of DIC-1 and DIC-2 are computed and plotted in Fig. 6.12.
Similarly to the aforementioned individual link attack scenario, the malicious links are localized
by the largest F k14 and F
k
26 of DIC-1 and DIC-2, respectively. Under a 20-second detection time
window, malicious link-(1,4) and link-(2,6) are reported to the EMS. Since both DIC-4 and DIC-
6 have only one neighbor, they are therefore removed from the consensus network after t = 55
and thus operate in primary droop mode. Fig. 6.11(a) depicts a recovery of a proportional power
sharing operation among all DICs except for the DIC-4 and DIC-6.
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Figure 6.10: Case II-A: Detection indices F kij of DIC-1.
Case II-C: Individual node attack
With a similar setting to case II-A, a node attack signal with the same level is inserted to DIC-4
at t = 35, resulting a false received information at DIC-1. The consequent plots of DIC output
responses and detection indices F kij are illustrated in Fig. 6.13 and Fig. 6.14, respectively. Under
this attack scenario, as (xk + u) lies in the null space of L, the center-of-mass frequency ωkc in
(6.30) would depend on u and become non-zero while maintaining a proportional power sharing
operation as shown in Fig. 6.13. This corroborates our attack analysis in Sec. 6.3.2. To isolate the
attacked DIC-4, Algorithm 3 and 4 are executed. Accordingly, the EMS receives the flag reported
by DIC-1 regarding the largest detection index of F k14, and therefore commands DIC-4 to switch to
primary droop control mode at t = 55. After isolating malicious signals, similar results to earlier
link attack scenarios can be observed in Fig. 6.13(a) where the nominal frequency is restored with
a proper power sharing operation among all DICs except for DIC-4.
Case II-D: Coordinated node attack
To validate our proposed detection and isolation strategies under a coordinated node attack sce-
narios, we introduce malicious inputs which are simultaneously appended to DIC-4 and DIC-6 at
t = 35. These inputs are with the same magnitude as 20% of the steady-state value of x1 but
opposite in their signs. Fig. 6.15 plots the resultant output response of DICs. As mentioned in Sec.
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Figure 6.11: Case II-B: DICs’ (a) active power outputs; (b) droop frequencies.
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Figure 6.12: Case II-B: Detection indices: (a) F kij of DIC-1; (b) F
k
ij of DIC-2.
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Figure 6.13: Case II-C: DICs’ (a) active power outputs; (b) droop frequencies.
35 40 45 50 55 60
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
 
 
F12
F14
F15
Time (s)
D
u
al
 V
ar
ia
b
le
 M
is
m
at
ch
 (
W
)
Figure 6.14: Case II-C: Detection indices F kij of DIC-1.
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Figure 6.15: Case II-D: DICs’ (a) active power outputs; (b) droop frequencies.
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Figure 6.16: Case II-D: Detection indices: (a) F kij of DIC-1; (b) F
k
ij of DIC-2.
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6.3.2, such attack scenario would not deviate the center-of-mass frequency ωkc away from its opti-
mal value and deteriorate the power sharing scheme. As shown in Fig. 6.15, albeit the transient of
ωki ,∀i ∈ N is disturbed by the coordinated node attack, the overall system would eventually settle
back to the pre-attack conditions. Thanks to the information from the dual variables, the detection
indices of DIC-1 and DIC-2 shown in Fig. 6.16 are used to localize these two attacks through the
largest F k14 and F
k
26. For a 20-second detection time window, both DIC-4 and DIC-6 are flagged
and reported to EMS which commands the removal of DIC-4 and DIC-6 from the consensus net-
work at t = 55. After the isolation of malicious inputs, a slight change of power sharing operation
is illustrated in Fig. 6.15(a) due to switching of local droop control mode in DIC-4 and DIC-6.
To sum up, the aforementioned test cases II and III manifest the effectiveness of our proposed
strategies in terms of detection and isolation malicious link and node attacks.
6.5 Summary
This chapter showcases our proposed control architecture, which consists of a local VSG-based
droop control in the primary level and a distributed PPD-based algorithm in the secondary level.
Interestingly, our specially designed control algorithm would seamlessly incorporate the dynamics
of both power flow and VSG-based DICs which is implemented in the physical system by itself.
The convergence is guaranteed by properly selecting stable parameter values based on the analy-
sis of the PPD algorithm. To account for the cyber-security aspects of control design, malicious
attack models are investigated along with detection and localization strategies. Numerical tests
implemented in the real-time simulator demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed control de-
sign in terms of achieving the objectives. Additionally, the proposed dual variable-based detection
indices provide sufficient information to locate and isolate the malicious link or node.
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CHAPTER 7
TESTBED-BASED DISTRIBUTED CONTROL
IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL
MICROGRIDS
The smart grid vision of incorporating “the benefits of distributed computing and communications
to deliver real-time information and enable the near-instantaneous balance of supply and demand
at the device level”, stated in EPRI’s report [118], implies grid interoperability among multilayer
information and control systems. The complexity of this task involves changing to horizontal
communication, negotiation and collaborative decision makings. As communication networks
continue to advance in electric power systems, the industry standard IEC 61850 has emerged
for metering, protection, and control functions. IEC 61850 provides a standard for configuring
various vendors’ intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) for electrical substation automation systems
to be able to communicate with each other [119]. It has since found applications in new domains,
including MGs, see e.g., [120]. Hence, this protocol is a key element in building (de)centralized
automation functions in modern MG networks. We adopt the IEC 61850 standard [119, 121] and
its architecture for facilitating the ensuing decentralized control framework design in Section 7.2.
With a similar objective to Ch. 6, this chapter will focus on frequency regulation for an islanded
industrial IEC 61850-based MG; see, e.g., ABB IEC 61850 protocol [122]. Under this protocol,
the resultant capability to customize control design and automation logic would greatly enhance
both the flexibility and adaptability of a MG network, steering towards the relization of the smart
grid vision.
We formulate the secondary frequency control under quasi-steady-state as a consensus opti-
mization problem, as in [7]. To avoid a single point of failure and enhance DERs’ plug-and-play
capability, we propose to solve this problem in a decentralized fashion by adopting the alternat-
ing direction method of multipliers (ADMM) algorithm [57]. Accordingly, a DER controller uses
local sensor measurements of voltage and current to perform a simple algorithmic computation
for generating a local estimate. This estimate is then communicated to a utility central supervi-
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sor, e.g., ABB MicroSCADA [123], which computes the average consensus of all estimates and
broadcasts this consensus variable back to each DER controller. Our implementation differs from
that of most decentralized frequency control designs in that we advocate modifying the ADMM
updates originally derived for the steady state objective to an online feedback-based scheme, in-
corporating the instantaneous power measurements. Interestingly, it turns out that we do not need
to explicitly model the MG power flow as the instantaneous power feedback signal couples DERs
with the dynamics of power system networks.
While the IEC 61850-based cyber infrastructure enables the proposed decentralized control de-
sign, there is growing concern that it also exposes an attack surface for cyber adversaries. This
is not hypothetical, as evidenced by recent cyber-induced outages in the Ukraine power sys-
tem [124]. Hence, our control framework requires cyber defenses for controls and DERs against
potential malicious cyber attacks. We consider an adversary model whereby an adversary can in-
ject syntactically correct but destabilizing spoofed measurements and control commands, causing
the secondary frequency control to fail and possibly resulting in an outage. The utilization of syn-
tactically correct control commands during an attack to cause power outages has recently been
reported [125], which motivates this work as addressing realistic attack scenarios.
Our main contribution lies in the development of a collaborative defense strategy against these
attacks by leveraging the communication capabilities under the IEC 61850 standard. To enhance
the robustness to malicious control command attacks, we employ the round-robin (RR) technique
at the central supervisor for generating the consensus variable based on a variant of the ADMM
algorithm [126]. Interestingly, by tracking the evolution of this RR-related variable, we are able
to effectively identify compromised DER controllers. As for the measurement attack, we adopt
a complementary defense using an agreement algorithm (AA) to detect and locate false measure-
ments on which the secondary control is based [127, 128]. It should be noted that these two
approaches provide insight into where the attack is happening. Thus, this can not only enable
appropriate response with the correct mitigation, but also can alert an operator to the specific root
cause. Together with the RR and AA detection algorithms, the central supervisor would be able to
either isolate the malicious communication links from control updates or trip the malicious DERs
off-line. This provides a multi-pronged approach to resilient and efficient MG operation in the
face of adversarial conditions. These algorithms are demonstrated through simulation analysis of
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Figure 7.1: Reference industrial microgrid topology for this work.
several use cases of interest.
7.1 Industrial Microgrid
In this section, we define a reference industrial MG topology for this study and build a narrative
around the attack scenarios. Additionally, we qualitatively detail the attack scenarios that the
proposed mitigation strategies attempt to address.
7.1.1 Reference Industrial Microgrid Topology
Fig. 7.1 depicts the reference topology considered herein. The MG is connected to the area electric
power system (AEPS) via a substation, with a corresponding point of interconnection (POI) where
islanding decisions and requests can be executed. In normal operations, the MG will be connected
to the AEPS, but as a strategy for resilience, the MG has the ability to island from the AEPS in
the event of an outage or other degraded operation, including cyber or physical attacks as well as
widespread outage due to a major storm.
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Figure 7.2: Notional representation of a standard IEC 61850 substation architecture.
There are a variety of DERs and loads within the MG. Two DERs and an interruptible load are
connected directly to the MG feeder head. A load is considered interruptible if, in the event of a
power system disturbance, the load is not the first priority to be served. This would be according
to contractual agreements with the MG customer. The MG also contains a critical load and a DER
that essentially serves as the backup source dedicated to the critical load. With both critical load
and DER buses, they have the ability to island themselves from the rest of the MG as a resilient
strategy for the critical load. In effect, DER-1 and the critical load, with the associated bus, would
become a nested microgrid.
7.1.2 Communication Architecture: IEC 61850
IEC 61850 defines a number of protocols for various classes of substation messages. Among the
protocols relevant for our proposed MG control system are Sampled Values (SV) and Generic Ob-
ject Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE). Sampled Values transmit digitized measurements of
voltage and current from a merging unit to an IED. A merging unit accepts inputs from current
transformers (CTs) and potential transformers (PTs), and produces digital, time-synchronized out-
puts communicated to other nodes via an Ethernet bus, known as the Process Bus in IEC 61850;
see Fig. 7.2. GOOSE messages containing status, data, and control commands can be sent from
one IED to another. The reason for introducing this architecture is two-fold. First, this standard
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is seeing increased applications in MGs, and as such, we find it relevant to design practical algo-
rithms for field implementation. Second, using this standard provides a realistic attack surface that
adversaries search out. We find it useful to provide specific solutions for a widely-used standard,
especially considering a recent cyber attack impacting IEC 61850 [125]. Since we are dealing with
MGs and not with bulk power systems, the number of nodes such as DER and other components is
in the tens to at most low hundreds. Thus, modern substation communication architectures based
on Ethernet can easily meet the transmission time and bandwidth requirements of the ensuing con-
trol architecture. As detailed soon, we consider malicious communication and control signal inputs
which attempt to alter the MG operating points. Based on IEC 61850, such attacks can effectively
drive the frequency away from the nominal, greatly threatening stability.
7.1.3 IEC 61850-Based Attacks and Countermeasures
Emerging MGs include a central MG controller, denoted in this thesis as Microgrid Controller
(MGC), which communicates with individual DER controllers. Measurements and commands
travel over communication networks, as given by IEC 61850. This communication structure po-
tentially exposes the system to cyber attack, which can assume the form of invalid commands
(which can cause a DER to perform potentially destabilizing power injections) as well as falsi-
fied measurements (which can lead even a correctly functioning MGC to issue erroneous control
commands).
Attack 1: Communication Link Attack on Control Command
The scenario is a communication link attack on the control command (not measurements) from
the MGC which is used to exchange ADMM-related variables via the Ethernet-based IEC 61850
station bus. The attack would result in the MGC calculating the wrong consensus variable, which
would thus send the MG to a calculated off-nominal frequency setpoint. The attack detection
mechanism examines the consensus variable and monitors for any rapid changes that exceed a
threshold. If one is found, the mechanism looks for the errant local variable and sets the corre-
sponding DER to local droop control. The remaining DERs participate in the secondary frequency
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control while the spoofed DER operates in local droop mode only.
Attack 2: Local Attack on DER Control Command
The second scenario considers a local control command attack. An attacker compromises the DER
controller by some mechanism. The attacker can then cause the system frequency and consensus
variable to deviate from the appropriate references. This attack detection again relies on monitor-
ing the consensus variable. Therefore, when it detects which DER is malicious, it again sets the
malicious DER to local control mode since it is not yet known if it is a communication link or
local controller attack at this point. By setting the malicious DER to local droop mode, if the sys-
tem frequency and consensus variable are not converging to reference setpoints after a short time
period, the MGC then determines such attack must be a local DER controller attack and issues a
trip signal to the relay connecting the DER unit to the MG.
Attack 3: Local Measurement Attack
For the last attack scenario, we assume that the attacker either has access locally to the merging unit
(the sensor), or can have access to the Ethernet-based process bus and thus is able to inject false
measurement data. The DER controller that subscribes to the measurement messages would thus
calculate incorrect power injection commands due to the faulty measurements. This could drive the
MG to an unstable state. We assume that the attack is large enough to cause a reasonable frequency
disturbance within the MG. Accordingly, a local merging unit attack may result in the tripping
of the DER while a communication link attack on data measurements leads to reconfiguring the
control algorithm and excluding the malicious DERs by setting them to the local droop mode. We
next present the secondary frequency control problem statement with the proposed ADMM-based
solver and round-robin-based detection mechanism.
7.2 Problem Statement
According to the microgrid model mentioned in Sec. 6.1, the goal of a secondary frequency control
as mentioned is to 1) ensure a steady state zero frequency deviation (i.e., ωi = 0,∀i ∈ NM ) and 2)
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guarantee autonomous active power sharing in proportion to active power ratings among all DERs
such that
P1
PM1
=
P2
PM2
= · · · Pn
PMn
.
To this end, the active power-frequency (P -ω) droop control is adopted to achieve these objectives
[85]. Upon concatenating all scalar variables into vector form, we formulate the secondary control
problem as a consensus optimization problem under quasi-steady-state, as given by
min
p
1
2
‖PM −P− p‖2D−1
subject to
pi
Di
=
pj
Dj
, ∀(i, j) ∈ ED,
(7.1)
where D := diag(D1, ...Dn) is an n×n diagonal matrix and the weighted norm ‖v‖2D := vTDv
for any vector v. Based on (6.3), we formulate the objective of (7.1), aiming to achieving a zero
system frequency deviation. Similarly to Ch. 6, due to a default uniform Di/PMi setting, the
equality constraints in (7.1) equivalently enforce a proportional active power sharing. Note that
the quadratic program (7.1) could be solved using off-the-shelf convex solvers. Nonetheless, the
challenge lies in that the active power injection P is dynamical and coupled to the power system
network. To tackle this problem, as detailed soon, we adopt the feedback approach from [7] to
account for system dynamics.
7.3 ADMM-based Decentralized Solver
This section introduces our proposed ADMM-based decentralized secondary control design. The
dynamics coupling P and p are neglected initially. As detailed below, the feedback approach will
be introduced to account for such interactions. Hence, the objective in (7.1) is fully separable. Us-
ing the IEC 61850 communication protocol for measurement and control messages, we can solve
the consensus optimization problem (7.1) in a fully decentralized fashion. For notational conve-
nience, we let the optimization variable xi := pi/Di and the input variable ci := (PMi − Pi)/Di,
where Pi is the active power injection from DER-i and locally measurable. Accordingly, (7.1) can
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be reformulated as
min
x,z
1
2
‖c− x‖2D (7.2a)
subject to x = z1, (7.2b)
where z is a consensus variable among the DERs. Note that the equality constraints in (7.1) are
equivalent to (7.2b). Defining the multipliers λ and a constant ρ > 0, we introduce the augmented
Lagrangian function as L = ∑∀i∈ND Li(xi, z, λi) where
Li(xi, z, λi) = Di
2
(ci − xi)2 + λi(xi − z) + ρ
2
(xi − z)2. (7.3)
Based on the (7.3), the ADMM algorithm is invoked and its (k + 1)-st iteration for DER-i has the
following three steps [57]:
(S1) Update x: As L totally decouples into Li for each DER-i, minimizing xi involves only the
variables zk and λki . Thus, upon receiving z
k from the MGC, the update is
xk+1i := arg min
xi
Li(xi, zk, λki ). (7.4)
Taking the gradient of Li with respect to xi and setting it to zero, we have
xk+1i =
ρzk +Dic
k
i − λki
Di + ρ
, (7.5)
where cki is the feedback measurement signal, corresponding to the active power injection of
DER-i.
(S2) Update z: Likewise, the consensus variable is updated as
zk+1 := arg min
z
L(xk+1, z,λk).
By initializing λ0 = 0, the summation
∑
i∈ND λ
k+1
i is guaranteed to stay zero. Thus, we
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have
zk+1 =
∑n
i=1 x
k+1
i
|ND| . (7.6)
(S3) Update λ: Each multiplier is linearly updated by the iterative mismatch of the constraint
(7.2b), as given by
λk+1i = λ
k
i + ρ(x
k+1
i − zk+1). (7.7)
Because λ0 = 0, we have
∑
i∈N
λk+1i = ρ
∑
i∈ND
k+1∑
t=1
(xti − zt) = 0.
This fact corroborates the derivation in (7.6).
7.4 Detection and Localization Strategies
Under IEC 61850 communication network, we assume that attackers have compromised the local
DER controllers such that the local variable x is altered, e.g., x¯k+1i = x
k+1
i + δ
k+1
i where δ
k+1
i is
the bias appended to xk+1i at the DER-i. Therefore, z
k+1 in (7.6) at the MGC becomes
zk+1 =
∑n
i=1(x
k+1
i + δ
k+1
i )
n
= ∆k+1 +
∑n
i=1 x
k+1
i
n
(7.8)
with ∆k+1 :=
∑n
i=1 δ
k+1
i
n
being the average attack bias signal with time-varying and arbitrary mag-
nitude. Under the presence of this attack, the consensus variable zk+1 would diverge unless ∆k+1
is designed specifically so the effect on the consensus variable is trivial. This is, however, unlikely
to happen as the attacker does not have the full system information. In any case, such an attack bias
signal may drive the MG to unstable conditions and/or damage system equipment, e.g., causing
divergence of zk+1.
It is imperative to detect and localize the malicious attack signals promptly since the control
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design is based on zk+1. To this end, we monitor the evolution of zk+1 and design a flag to trigger
the ensuing detection algorithm. Assuming the convergence of zk+1 after k? iterations, we would
trigger the detection algorithm once the following condition has been satisfied:
|zk+1 − zk| > ,
where  > 0 is a pre-defined threshold.
7.4.1 Round-Robin-Based ADMM Detection Algorithm
The RR-ADMM detection algorithm to discover the malicious DERs is adapted from [126]. The
RR is an arrangement of selecting the DER in a fixed rational order, i.e., DER-1, DER-2, . . . , DER-
n. For notational convenience, we denote the consensus variable for the RR-ADMM at iteration k
as z˜k. Given α > 0, the steps (S1)-(S3) become
xk+1 = (D + ρI)−1(ρz˜k1 + Dck − λk), (7.9a)
z˜k+1 = α(xk+1
i˜
+ δk+1
i˜
), (7.9b)
λk+1 = λk + ρ(xk+1 − z˜k+11), (7.9c)
where I is the identity matrix with i˜ = 1, · · · , n representing the fixed round-robin iteration index.
For a non-malicious DER, we set δk+1
i˜
= 0. Hence, we have the consensus variable z˜k+1 as
z˜k+1 = αδk+1
i˜
+ α
ρz˜k +Di˜c
k
i˜
− λk
i˜
Di˜ + ρ
. (7.10)
For k ≥ 1, (7.10) can be expressed as
z˜k+1 = αδk+1
i˜
+ α
ρz˜k +Di˜c
k
i˜
− ρ∑kt=1(xti˜ − z˜t)
Di˜ + ρ
. (7.11)
Let z˜r := {z˜r,1, · · · , z˜r,n} ∈ Rn gather the all the values of the consensus variable at the r-th round
of the RR-ADMM algorithm. To determine a threshold to separate malicious DER controllers
from the rest of the system, we assume that the bias δk+1
i˜
is sufficiently large. Based on (7.11),
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Algorithm 5 Detection and Localization Strategies
1: for every iteration k = 0, 1, 2, · · · do
2: for i ∈ ND do
3: Compute xk+1i as in (7.5) and send it to MGC
4: end for
5: MGC computes zk+1 as in (7.6)
6: if |(zk+1 − zk| > ) ∧ (k > k?) then
7: if r = 1 then
8: MGC computes z˜k+1 as in (7.9b)
9: Broadcast the value of z˜k+1 to all DERs
10: Determine the index n˜ for the minimum entry of z˜1
11: end if
12: if (r = 2) ∧ (k ≤ k? + n+ n˜) then
13: MGC computes z˜k+1 as in (7.9b)
14: Broadcast the value of z˜k+1 to all DERs
15: Identify malicious DER-˜i where {˜i | z˜1,˜i > z˜2,n˜,∀i˜ ∈ ND \ n˜}
16: MGC reconfigures the communication network, resets λk = 0, and/or trip mali-
cious DERs off-line
17: end if
18: else
19: Broadcast the value of zk+1 to all DERs
20: end if
21: for i ∈ ND do
22: Compute λk+1i as in (7.7)
23: end for
24: end for
one of the values from the non-malicious DERs during the r-th round must be z˜r,n˜ with the index
n˜ corresponding to the smallest element of z˜r. Given this index, the (r + 1)-st round is carried
out for obtaining the value of z˜r+1,n˜ where n˜ is the same index as round 1, and this serves as the
detection threshold. Hence, any z˜r,˜i > z˜r+1,n˜,∀i˜ ∈ ND \ n˜ is identified as the malicious DER in
the MG. For a given initialization time index k?, Algorithm 5 tabulates the detection strategy. As
for the localization strategy to isolate the aforementioned malicious attack signals, the MGC first
reconfigures the communication network so the malicious DERs no longer participate the ADMM
updates in (S1)-(S3) and thus switch to only local droop (primary) control mode. Meanwhile, if
zero frequency deviation is achieved, we conclude the isolation process. Otherwise, the malicious
DERs are tripped off-line because of either measurement or control signal attack. Last, note that
there must be at least one non-malicious DER in the system for the RR-ADMM detection scheme
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to work. Such a scheme is only for detection purposes. Thus, once the malicious attacks are
localized, the control design is reverted back to follow the ADMM algorithm in (S1)-(S3).
7.4.2 Measurement Attack Detection
We now describe a defense against false measurement injection to complement defenses against
control attacks given above. We adopt the agreement algorithm (AA), developed in [127], to deter-
mine and locate malicious measurement attacks on substation IEDs and controllers. Accordingly,
assuming the loads as constant impedances, the Kirchhoff’s voltage and current laws along with
Ohm’s law are used to facilitate the development of agreement matrix A for a particular topology.
Albeit we assume loads as constant impedance, a general assumption in power flow studies, the
method for developing the AA presented herein remains valid for other load models. Elements
of A corresponding to the currents reflect the signed topology of the corresponding merging unit
while others corresponding to voltages are reciprocal complex impedances on the corresponding
lines. Fig. 7.1 showcases the reference MG topology with corresponding measurement locations.
The polarity of the complex current fi measured at the i-th merging unit is positive when current
flows into the loads and DERs. By concatenating as x = (f ,v), the physical equation can be
rewritten as
Ax = 0. (7.12)
Considering that (7.12) is similar to the error correcting code formulation from [127], if an at-
tacker falsifies one of the measurements, we would have a non-zero corresponding element of the
resultant vector, known as the Syndrome vector. By injecting the malicious vectors ∆f and ∆v to
the measurements, we have x¯ = (f + ∆f ,v + ∆v). Thus, the Syndrome vector is
s = Ax¯. (7.13)
By observing the pattern of vector s, we can classify multiple subsets of potential malicious merg-
ing units. Accordingly, the largest magnitude element of a subset corresponds to the malicious
location. This detection mechanism is valid for a limited number of attacks. We refer the reader
to [128] for a detailed discussion.
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Figure 7.3: Reference microgrid communication architecture and data types.
7.5 Numerical Tests
In this section, we evaluate the proposed mitigation strategies and responses for the communi-
cation and measurement link attack scenarios. The three-phase MG topology and power system
parameters are given in Fig. 7.1. The load is modeled as a constant impedance load, which is
frequency independent. Fig. 7.3 depicts the MG control system communication network topology.
To reiterate, the measurements are sent to the local DERs from a merging unit (which we omit
from the figure), and the DERs and MGC communicate updates for the ADMM algorithm. This
is done over switched Ethernet, denoted by the Ethernet bus in Fig. 7.3. All numerical tests are
performed in Mathworks R© MATLAB 2013a and Simulink software.
7.5.1 Load Perturbations
In this scenario, we increase the system load by 100% at t = 4s. Each DER is rated at P ∗i = 1500 W,
∀i, and we let Di = 5×104 W · s · rad−1,∀i ∈ ND to satisfy the active power sharing. The ADMM
algorithm is executed every 100 ms. The resulting bus frequencies and active power output are
shown in Fig. 7.4. Within approximately 1.5 seconds, the secondary frequency control is able to
obtain zero system frequency deviation from nominal, and the DERs have correctly achieved equal
power sharing. Accordingly, each DER archives the steady state frequency of 60 Hz.
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Figure 7.4: Frequency and active power output response to a load disturbance.
7.5.2 Local Attack on DER Controller
We generate an attack signal as a time-varying random number from a uniform (0,3) distribution
and draw a new random value at a time step of 100 ms. We multiply this by the steady state xi
value at the attack location, so that the attack is effectively a random re-scaling of this value. Given
the steady state conditions, the attack is introduced at t = 4.1s on the local xi issued to DER-3. The
resulting system response and RR-ADMM attack detection and mitigation algorithm results are
shown in Fig. 7.5. From the plot of the local xi update, this particular attack introduces a signal
that is approximately 275% of the steady state x3 signal. Clearly, the system diverges away from
its steady state while the attack is present. At t = 5.4s with  setting at 10% of the steady state x3
signal, the RR-ADMM algorithm successfully detects DER-3 as malicious and trips it off-line, i.e.,
P3 = 0. For t > 5.5s, the ADMM algorithm changes to only include DER-1 and DER-2, achieving
the nominal frequency of 60 Hz.
Next, we investigate the effectiveness of the RR-ADMM detection algorithm for an attack dur-
ing a load disturbance. While a coincidental simultaneous occurrence of these two events may
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Figure 7.5: Frequency, active power output, and local xi update responses to a local controller
attack in steady state operation.
seem unlikely, we are motivated to seek solutions to coordinated attacks, i.e., the attacker causes
a load disruption and alters the local controller updates, as depicted in Fig. 7.6. At t = 4s, we
introduce a load disturbance of 25% and then subsequently cause an attack at t = 4.1s on the xi
update to DER-3, similar to the attack scenario in the steady state case. We see that the random
attack signal is approximately 200% of the transient x3 signal. The RR-ADMM algorithm is still
able to identify the malicious DER even in the presence of a load disturbance. After reconfiguring
the ADMM algorithm and tripping DER-3 off-line at t = 5.5s, the system achieves the nominal
frequency of 60 Hz.
7.5.3 Communication Link Attack on Control Command
We consider that an attacker has gained access to the station bus (Ethernet bus) that is exchanging
control commands between the local DER controllers and the MGC. The attacker is able to spoof
the MAC address of a DER controller and thus can alter control commands over the link. This
is contrasted with the previous attack since it is not on the local DER controller, and thus the
time-varying attack signal does not directly affect the power injection command to the DER. The
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Figure 7.6: Frequency, active power output, and local xi update responses to a local controller
attack during a load disturbance.
Figure 7.7: Frequency, active power output, and local xi update responses to an communication
link attack on a control command.
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attack detection monitors the consensus variable and raises a flag when a deviation occurs that
exceeds a threshold. In our simulation, we again use a 10% deviation as the threshold. As the
consensus variable is the average across n DERs, an attack bias may not be large, so that is the
motivation for setting a relatively sensitive . After the flag is raised, the RR-ADMM is executed
to determine which DER is malicious. The MGC then reconfigures the ADMM update to only
include the non-malicious DERs while issuing a configuration command to the spoofed DER to
revert to local frequency droop control. The spoofed DER should then eventually return to its
initial power setpoint while the non-malicious ones continue to regulate the system frequency for
achieving 60 Hz. Fig. 7.7 depicts the results of this attack scenario. At t = 4.1s, an attack signal is
introduced on the x3 update sent from DER-3 controller to the MGC. With the same random attack
signal, the MGC then runs the detection mechanism from the RR-ADMM to find the malicious
DER. At t = 5.3s, the MGC identifies DER-3 as malicious and removes it from the ADMM update
by setting it to local frequency control mode. Note that the x3 update is a function of p3. By
setting x3 to zero, the corresponding DER controller equivalently becomes the local droop control.
By reconfiguring the ADMM algorithm, the DER-1 and DER-2 continue to execute the secondary
frequency control while maintaining power sharing and achieving the nominal frequency of 60 Hz.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce a decentralized secondary frequency control that can successfully
achieve frequency regulation in islanded ac microgrids. This approach is based on formulating the
DER droop characteristic equations as a consensus optimization problem with a power injection
offset command as the control variable. This quadratic program is solved with an ADMM-based
decentralized algorithm. To this end, DER controllers locally compute their power injection offsets
and communicate these values with the central controller, which then calculates the consensus of
all DERs and broadcasts over the network. This decentralized approach allows for cyber attack de-
tection mechanisms on local controllers and communication link attacks. The proposed detection
algorithm is based on a round-robin ADMM algorithm which sequentially updates the consen-
sus variable as a function of local controller updates to identify malicious DERs. We pair this
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with a so-called agreement algorithm, a complementary false data injection detection mechanism.
Mitigation strategies such as isolating attackers from the control algorithm or tripping a compro-
mised DER off-line entirely are discussed. Together with these algorithms, we can implement a
cybersecure resilient closed-loop control architecture. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness
of our decentralized secondary frequency control design and detection algorithms using three case
studies.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, we highlight the main contributions of the thesis and conclude with some remarks.
8.1 Thesis Summary and Contribution
Chapter 3: In this chapter, we have developed a local dynamic optimization framework for analyz-
ing the performance of a voltage control scheme based on gradient projection methods. Thanks to
the physical network couplings, the local voltage measurement serves as the instantaneous system-
wide gradient direction by forming a weighted voltage mismatch objective. Compared to earlier
results for a static optimization scenario, we have significantly extended the analysis on conver-
gence conditions and error performance to account for two dynamic scenarios: i) the nodes perform
the local update in an asynchronous fashion; and ii) the network operating point is dynamically
changing. Last, we provide the rules of selecting a proper step-size, which shows a trade-off
between the convergence speed and the steady-state tracking error for the dynamic control design.
Chapter 4: In this chapter, we have developed a fully distributed voltage control (DVC) design
to manage the VAR-capable DERs deployed to an increasingly dynamic and variable distribution
system. Under the limited VAR scenario, the local control in Chap. 3 may attain a suboptimal
voltage profile because of lack of information exchanges. To leverage the network-wide VAR
support, we have cast the voltage control problem as one of quadratic programming that mini-
mizes the unweighted voltage mismatch under VAR resource limits everywhere by formulating
the (multi-phase) power flow model to linear equality constraints. The ADMM distributed opti-
mization algorithm is evoked, which requires only information exchange among neighboring buses
and totally local computations. To account for external disturbances and lack of reliable communi-
cation links, we have further extended the implementation of the proposed ADMM-based control
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in an online fashion that is robust to random failure of communication links. We showcase the
effectiveness of the DVC design regarding mitigation of the variability introduced by DERs and
improvement of the voltage stability.
Chapter 5: We integrate the attractive features from both local and distributed voltage control
designs and develop the advanced hybrid control framework while being cognizant of various
communication scenarios. We have cast the specially-designed voltage control problem by com-
bining both weighted and unweighted voltage mismatch objectives under limited VAR resources.
The PPD-based algorithm is then evoked and only requires voltage measurement exchanges among
neighboring buses with local computations. We have further provided the rigorous proof for stable
step-size choices to guarantee control stability. To cope with cyber resource constraints and lack
of reliable communication links, we have extended the hybrid voltage control (HVC) design to
have robustness against random communication link failures and, in particular, communication-
cognizant feature to account for the worst-case scenario of a total communication outage. In-
terestingly, under this worst case, the HVC boils down to a surrogate local control of Chap. 3.
Henceforth, the adequate control performance can still be achieved as it responses to local voltage
variations.
Chapter 6: We have thus far considered distribution networks which are fully connected to the
transmission grids. Assuming DERs are capable of supplying the loads in feeders, it is a great in-
terest to develop control designs when feeders are disconnected from the main grid and formed iso-
lated microgrids (MGs). MGs are foreseen to play an important role in distribution networks to en-
hance the power system reliability. Under isolated MGs, these mostly power electronics-interfaced
distributed energy resources (DERs) exhibiting low-inertia characteristic have raised major con-
cerns over the frequency stability issues. To address these issues, we have adopted the concept of
the virtual synchronous generator (VSG) and developed a distributed secondary frequency control
for DICs in isolated MGs. Our proposed control architecture consists of a local VSG-based droop
control in the primary level and a distributed PPD-based algorithm in the secondary level. Interest-
ingly, our specially designed control algorithm would seamlessly incorporate the dynamics of both
power flow and VSG-based DICs which is implemented in the physical system by itself. Our fu-
ture work includes the analysis of the stable control parameter choices in addition to incorporating
the economics into our optimization framework. As most hierarchical control frameworks assume
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the time-scale separation among different control levels, our optimization-based control design
would explicitly account for the original dynamical model of network-coupled DICs in establish-
ing the stability conditions of the distributed control design. This would improve the conventional
MG control framework by incorporating various time-scaled control objectives automatically and
dynamically. Moreover, we have analyzed two types of malicious attacks on the communication
network, namely, the link and node attacks, and proposed model-based anomaly detection and
localization strategies based on the dual variable related metrics.
Chapter 7: Extending the work proposed in Ch. 6, we have focused on the development of a sec-
ondary frequency control design where the supporting communication network follows the IEC
61850 protocol. Formulating the DER droop characteristic under quasi-steady-state as a consen-
sus optimization problem, we have solved this quadratic program by an ADMM-based decentral-
ized algorithm. Our main contribution lies in the development of a collaborative defense strategy
against these attacks by leveraging the communication capabilities under the IEC 61850 stan-
dard. Specifically, this decentralized approach allows for cyber attack detection mechanisms on
local controllers and communication link attacks. Meanwhile, a so-termed agreement algorithm, a
complementary false data injection detection mechanism, is also implemented for monitoring the
measurement trustfulness. Mitigation strategies such as isolating attackers from the control algo-
rithm or tripping a compromised DER off-line entirely are discussed. This work has facilitated
the development of a multi-pronged approach to resilient and efficient MG operation in the face of
adversarial conditions.
8.2 Conclusions
In this thesis, we proposed several decentralized control strategies in power distribution net-
works including microgrids with the objective of either regulating voltage or frequency. In Ch. 3,
we formulated the weighted voltage objective under a single-phase network and solved the (local)
control problem in a totally communication-free fashion. While this approach has a simple imple-
mentation and can be readily extended to multi-phase networks, the stability and optimality could
become a significant concern. To address these problems, we developed the distributed control un-
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der a globally voltage objective in Ch. 4. Thanks to the information exchanges among neighboring
nodes, we can quickly and accurately track a desired voltage set-point while dynamically updat-
ing the system operation conditions and thus enabling online implementations. Regarding limited
communication resources, we further improved the distributed control design to be robust to ran-
dom communication failures. However, under the worst-case scenario of total communication
outage, this distributed design would fail to work as it cannot even incorporate local information
such as voltage magnitude measurements. We envision that a future voltage controller should be
cognizant of various communication scenarios. To this end, we develop an integrated design that
can achieve the dual objectives in terms of flexible adaptivity to variable rate of communications
and global optimality of voltage regulation performance in Ch. 5. Such an innovative hybrid de-
sign has the potential of unifying the currently separated framework of either local or distributed
control schemes.
With a high penetration of DERs in the networks, MGs are likely to emerge as a means to ad-
vance power and cyber-physical resiliency in future distribution networks. In Ch. 6, we developed
the distributed secondary frequency control design for isolated MGs for improving the frequency
stability. Interestingly, network dynamics is seamlessly governed by the physical system itself and
the convergence is guaranteed without assuming the time-scale separation of the hierarchical con-
trol design methodologies. Extending this work to an industrial MG network that follows the IEC
61850 communication protocol, similar frequency regulation objective is introduced and solved
by a decentralized ADMM-based algorithm in Ch. 7. As cyber threats are significant concern
in smart grid, we proposed several countermeasures for malicious attacks on the communication
network for both designs of Chs. 6-7. Anomaly detection and localization strategies are developed
based on the metrics of optimization-related variables.
This thesis provides a number of control strategies that reduce communication complexity and
potentially enhance cybersecure resiliency. Nonetheless, future work is needed to realize these
novel schemes. First, the aforementioned fast-acting control designs would require real-time sens-
ing and communications, and thus cyber attack surfaces should be well defined. Second, machine
learning tools could be deployed to analyze real-time data and facilitate automatic anomaly de-
tection schemes. Last but not least, the interactions among slow-acting devices should also be
considered and carefully examined to further improve overall control performance.
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APPENDIX A
MULTI-PHASE DVC IMPLEMENTATIONS
The multi-phase voltage regulation problem is given by
{v?,q?} := arg min
v,q
f(v,q) := ‖v − u‖22 + qTCq (A.1a)
subject to g(v,q) = 0 (A.1b)
q ≤ q ≤ q, (A.1c)
where the diagonal matrix C := diag({cφj }j∈N ,φ∈P) has the non-negative coefficients used for reg-
ularizing the network-wide DER output q. The constraint (A.1b) represents the nonlinear relation
between v and q based on the aforementioned AC power flow model (2.1)-(2.2) for given system
operating conditions (see [9, Chs. 3-7] for explicit expression of g(v,q)). Last, the bound con-
straints in (A.1c) are used to account for VAR resource limits due to either the apparent power
rating or power factor constraints of DER inverters [29].
We let (i, ψ) represent the node at phase-ψ of bus i, while the subsetN φj ⊆ NA := {(i, ψ)}i∈N ,ψ∈P
consists of all the nodes across the network coupled to node (j, φ) according to the AC power flow-
based equality constraints in (2.1)-(2.2). We reformulate (A.1) to demonstrate the decomposable
problem structure using a consensus version of ADMM. To this end, we define two groups of
variables: x := {xφj }j∈N ,φ∈P and z := {zφj }j∈N ,φ∈P , where
xφj :=
{
{νφ(i,ψ)j}(i,ψ)∈Nφj , δ
φ
j
}
, and zφj := {vφj , qφj }.
Clearly, the vector z includes all the optimization variables of (A.1), the decision variables. Each
vector xφj contains local estimates of some decision variables in z related to node (j, φ), termed as
auxiliary variables. For example, the auxiliary variable νφ(i,ψ)j at node (j, φ) estimates the decision
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variable vψi of node (i, ψ) in z while δ
φ
j maps to q
φ
j . By enforcing each decision variable to consent
with its local auxiliary copies, one can reformulate (A.1) as
min
x,z
N∑
j=1
∑
φ∈P
fφj (x
φ
j ) (A.2a)
subject to νφ(i,ψ)j = v
ψ
i , ∀φ, ∀j,∀(i, ψ) ∈ N φj (A.2b)
δφj = q
φ
j , ∀φ,∀j ∈ N (A.2c)
xφj ∈ X φj , ∀φ,∀j ∈ N (A.2d)
zφj ∈ Zφj , ∀φ,∀j ∈ N , (A.2e)
where the summand fφj (x
φ
j ) := (ν
φ
(j,φ)j − µφj )2 + cφj (δφj )2 while the constraints (A.2d)-(A.2e) rep-
resent those in (A.1) by defining
X φj := {xφj
∣∣gφj (xφj ) = 0}, Zφj := {(vφj , qφj )∣∣qφj ≤ qφj ≤ q¯φj }.
Since the equality constraints in (A.2b)-(A.2c) enforce the consensus between each decision vari-
able and its local auxiliary copy, the reformulated problem (A.2) is equivalent to (A.1). Thanks to
this decomposable problem structure, each node (j, φ) in the network has its own local objective
function fφj with a local set of constraints coupled by the decision variables among neighboring
nodes. As detailed soon, this structure is key to the development of our control design. Note that
vector z includes all the optimization variables in (A.1), termed as decision variables. Per node
(j, φ), each vector xφj contains a local copy of relevant decision variables, termed as auxiliary
variables. For example, the auxiliary variable νφ(i,ψ)j locally updated at node (j, φ) maps to v
ψ
i
in z, while δφj to q
φ
j . By enforcing the local auxiliary and decision variables to consent, one can
reformulate (A.1).
To develop the ADMM updates for (A.2), we form the augmented Lagrangian function by de-
noting yφj := {{λφ(i,ψ)j}(i,ψ)∈Nφj , θ
φ
j } as the multipliers for the consensus constraints (A.2d)-(A.2e)
per node (j, φ). For a given penalty coefficient ρ > 0 and by concatenating all multipliers in
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y := {yφj }j,φ, the overall Lagrangian L(x, z,y) =
∑
j,φ Lφj (xφj , z,yφj ) where
Lφj (xφj , z,yφj ) = (νφ(j,φ)j − µφj )2 + cφj (δφj )2
+
∑
(i,ψ)∈Nφj λ
φ
(i,ψ)j(ν
φ
(i,ψ)j − vψi ) + θφj (δφj − qφj )
+
∑
(i,ψ)∈Nφj
ρ
2
(νφ(i,ψ)j − vψi )2 + ρ2(δφj − qφj )2. (A.3)
Note that L is different from the conventional Lagrangian function; all equality constraints are
regularized by an additional quadratic term. Interestingly, this modification does not affect the
optimal solution in the primal domain since its corresponding gradient is essentially zero at any
feasible point of (A.2b). Using the augmented Lagrangian L(x, z,y), the ADMM works by cycli-
cally minimizing each of the three variable groups, x, z, and y, while fixing others. Thanks to the
decomposable reformulation in (A.2), each of these three sub-problems at the k-th iteration can
be solved locally per node (j, φ). The following three steps in (S1-S3) constitute the basis of our
proposed DVC design.
(S1) Update x: As L totally decouples into Lφj for each node (j, φ), minimizing xφj involves only
the variables in z[k] and y[k] that are related to xφj . Thus, upon receiving these variables
from all neighboring nodes inN φj , the following update can be implemented locally at node
(j, φ):
xφj [k + 1] := arg min
xφj ∈Xφj
Lφj (xφj , z[k],y[k]). (A.4)
(S2) Update z: Likewise, the decision variables are updated as
z[k + 1] := arg min
z∈Z
L(x[k + 1], z,y[k]), (A.5)
which is a box-constrained quadratic programming (QP) problem. It can be solved by pro-
jecting the unconstrained solutions to Z [46, Ch. 2]. Interestingly, if all multipliers are
initialized to zero by setting y[1] = 0, the sum
∑
(i,ψ)∈Nφj λ
φ
j(i,ψ)[k] remains zero throughout
all ADMM iterations. Thus, we can solve (A.5) by setting the gradient of (A.5) to zero,
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which would decouple into the following updates per node (j, φ):
vφj [k + 1] =
1
|N φj |
∑
(i,ψ)∈Nφj
νψ(j,φ)i[k + 1], (A.6a)
qφj [k + 1] = P
φ
j
[
θφj [k]/ρ+ δ
φ
j [k + 1]
]
, (A.6b)
where Pφj projects any input into the interval [qφj , q
φ
j ].
(S3) Update y: Each multiplier is linearly updated by the iterative mismatch of the corresponding
constraint per node (j, φ):
λφ(i,ψ)j[k + 1] =λ
φ
(i,ψ)j[k]+ρ(ν
φ
(i,ψ),j[k + 1]−vψi [k + 1]),
∀(i, ψ) ∈ N φj ,
θφj [k + 1] =θ
φ
j [k] + ρ(δ
φ
j [k + 1]− qφj [k + 1]). (A.7)
Clearly, the sum
∑
(i,ψ)∈Nφj λ
φ
j(i,ψ)[k + 1] is guaranteed to stay zero if initialized to be zero.
This corroborates the derivations in (A.6).
The number of auxiliary variables, and thus the complexity, of the proposed ADMM-based
DVC design grows as the size of neighborhood |N φj | increases. Due to the non-linear power
flow couplings, the subset N φj may contain almost all network nodes under the (lossy) AC power
flow models. This network-wide coupling greatly challenges the practical implementation of the
updates in (S1)-(S3), as it would require a fully-connected communication network across all
nodes. To tackle this problem, one could reduce the size ofN φj using the linearized q-v sensitivity
factors in (2.12). Using (2.12), the (S1) update in (A.4) boils down to the following linearly-
constrained QP:
xφj [k + 1] := arg min
(hφj )
Txφj =w
φ
j
1
2
(xφj )
TAφjx
φ
j + (b
φ
j [k])
Txφj . (A.8)
Matrix Aφj is a diagonal and non-singular matrix, and b
φ
j [k] contains the information from z[k] and
y[k]. The single linear constraint in (A.8) represents the set X φj := {xφj |
∑
(i,ψ)∈Nφj B
φ
j(i,ψ)ν
φ
(i,ψ)j −
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qφj = w
φ
j } where Bφj(i,ψ) is the (j, (i, ψ))-th entry of Bφ. Analysis of the first-order optimality
conditions of (A.8) leads to a closed-form solution. Upon defining
tφj [k] := (w
φ
j + (h
φ
j )
T (Aφj )
−1bφj [k])/((h
φ
j )
T (Aφj )
−1hφj ),
(S1) becomes
νφ(j,φ)j[k + 1] =
1
ρ+2
(
tφj [k]B
φ
j(j,φ) + 2µ
φ
j − λφ(j,φ)j[k] + ρvφj [k]
)
,
νφ(i,ψ)j[k + 1] =
1
ρ
(
tφj [k]B
φ
j(i,ψ) − λφ(i,ψ)j[k] + ρvψi [k]
)
,
∀(i, ψ) ∈ N φj \ (j, φ),
δφj [k + 1] =
1
ρ+2wφj
(− tφj [k]− θφj [k] + ρqφj [k]).
Our multi-phase DVC design not only requires minimal communication network deployment, but
also enjoys efficient computations with only linear updates and simple projection in (S1)-(S3).
The ADMM iterations in (S1)-(S3) have been developed assuming the availability of wφj at
every node (j, φ), which will change accordingly with network operating conditions. With the
full knowledge of complex power injection everywhere, one can compute w using (2.12). How-
ever, such a centralized approach would require two-way communications between each local
sensor/controller and a centralized computer, infeasible under fast system dynamics. Moreover,
this direct approach to calculate w also suffers from the approximation error introduced by the
linearized model (2.12).
To conveniently adapt to time-varying system dynamics, we propose to enhance the proposed
DVC design by updating wφj [k] at every iteration k through local information exchange. Specifi-
cally, the proposed online control design would seamlessly utilize the latest ADMM iterate qφj [k]
updated in (S2) as the instantaneous VAR input signal to control local inverters. Note that its up-
date rule in (A.6b) guarantees that every instance of qφj [k] is feasible to dispatch as it lies within
[qφ
j
, q¯φj ] due to the projection by P
φ
j . This way, the local VAR injection output is set to be q
φ
j [k]
once its latest value is updated in (S2) on-the-fly, without requiring the algorithm to converge.
Accordingly, by measuring the instantaneous bus voltage to v¯φj [k], each node (j, φ) can collect all
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Figure A.1: Multi-phase online implementation of the proposed DVC design that adapts to
dynamic system conditions and constantly updates the VAR control inputs. Rectangular blocks
denote local computational tasks of ADMM iterations and control updates, while the two vertical
arrows correspond to the communications exchange among node (j, φ) and the neighboring
nodes.
neighboring nodes’ voltage data to update
wφj [k] =
∑
(i,ψ)∈Nφj B
φ
j(i,ψ)v¯
ψ
i [k]− qφj [k]. (A.9)
This update simply needs node (j, φ) to know the self- and mutual-reactance of all lines incident
to bus j. Clearly, this proposed design of updating wφj [k] nicely adapts to dynamically varying op-
erating conditions because (A.9) seamlessly incorporates the instantaneous system voltage infor-
mation. Such an online feedback-based DVC design is attractive when dealing with the increasing
variability of renewable generations and elastic loads in up-and-coming distribution networks.
Fig. A.1 offers a schematic of the proposed ADMM-based DVC implementation. Every itera-
tion consists of the local computations of (S1)-(S3) per node (j, φ) (the blocks), in addition to two
steps of information exchange among all neighboring nodes (the vertical arrows). The requirement
on sensing hardware is minimal while the communication architecture is fully localized since each
node’s computations would just need voltage measurement and decision/auxiliary variables from
neighboring nodes. Furthermore, the local computational tasks, either the sub-problem in (S1) or
the linear updates in (S2-S3), can be executed very efficiently. Upon updating qφj [k + 1] in (S2),
node (j, φ) inputs it as the control signal for local VAR resources and then measures the voltage
v¯φj [k + 1].
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APPENDIX B
LINE FLOW DYNAMICS
Given a lossless network under Assumption 4, we define the branch power flow from node i to
node j as
fij(θ
0
ij) =
ViVj
Xij
sin(θ0ij),
where the nominal phase angle difference θ0ij := (θ
0
i − θ0j ). By using the Taylor series expansion
and defining phase angle difference between nodes i and j as θij := (θi − θj), the approximated
branch power flow at θij is
fij(θij) =
ViVj
Xij
sin θ0ij +
ViVj
Xij
cos θ0ij(θij − θ0ij).
Taking its time derivative yields
f˙ij(θij) =
ViVj
Xij
cos θ0ij θ˙ij =
ViVj
Xij
cos(θ0i − θ0j )(θ˙i − θ˙j) = Bij(ωi − ωj).
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